195. Editorial Note
On May 4, 1987, the White House released a statement by President Ronald Reagan that read, in part: “Since the early days of my administration, our number-one arms control objective has been the achievement of significant and verifiable reductions of offensive nuclear forces, particularly the most destabilizing weapons—fast-flying ballistic missiles. I have directed our U.S. START negotiator to intensify efforts to reach agreement on reducing strategic offensive nuclear arms by 50 percent. Toward that end, the United States will shortly table a draft START treaty text. This text will reflect the basic agreements on strategic arms reduction reached by General Secretary Gorbachev and myself in our meeting at Reykjavik last October. It will be responsive as well to Soviet concerns expressed subsequent to Reykjavik and will provide ample basis for the creation of a fair and durable START agreement. Tomorrow marks the opening in Geneva of the eighth round in our negotiations with the Soviet Union on strategic arms reductions and strategic defense issues. With the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces having resumed on April 23, all three negotiating groups of the nuclear and space talks will now be underway. We have made great progress in START. I am firmly convinced that a START agreement is within our grasp, even this year, if the Soviets are prepared to resolve the remaining outstanding issues. And most important among these is the need, for the purpose of ensuring strategic stability, to place sublimits on ballistic missile warheads. We will likewise be making a new move in the defense and space area. Our negotiators return to Geneva ready to place on the negotiating table the new U.S. proposal, which Secretary Shultz discussed during his Moscow meetings. This new proposal incorporates the following elements:—Both the United States and the Soviet would commit through 1994 not to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty;—This commitment would be contingent on implementation of agreed START reductions: i.e., 50-percent cuts to equal levels of 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 6,000 warheads, with appropriate sublimits, over 7 years from entry into force of a START agreement;—The agreement would not alter the sovereign rights of the parties under customary international law to withdraw in the event of material breach of the agreement or jeopardy to their supreme interests;—After 1994, either side could deploy defensive systems of its choosing, unless mutually agreed otherwise.” The statement went on to say that the White House was reviewing a Soviet draft treaty text for an Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and “important issues remain to be resolved before an INF agreement can be concluded, including verification and shorter range INF missiles.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1987, vol. I, pp. 457–458)
[Page 862]On May 7, Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 271, “Instructions for the Eighth NST Negotiating Round.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: National Security Council, National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 271) Principal objectives for Round VIII included: “to continue to seek prompt and forthcoming response to the U.S. proposals in the three negotiating groups, including our new proposal in Defense and Space and our proposals in START and INF”; “—to intensify the schedule of negotiations and seek prompt negotiation of, and agreement to, an INF Treaty based on the U.S. INF Draft Treaty table in Round VII”; “—to table in Round VII a draft START Treaty when it is completed and approved, intensify the schedule of negotiations, and seek prompt negotiation of, and agreement to, a START Treaty based on the U.S. draft”; and “—to continue to press U.S. positions in START and Defense and Space, and to counter Soviet efforts to hold START negotiations hostage to progress in Defense and Space, noting that achieving agreement on a treaty providing for deep equitable and effectively verifiable reductions in strategic offensive arms, along with an INF agreement, should be our highest arms control priority.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870618–0406)
In a May 8 plenary session of the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms, Ambassador Ronald Lehman tabled a draft Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. “I will not read the treaty, which I now formally pass to you, both in English and in its unofficial Russian translation, but will instead outline briefly its major provisions” Lehman stated at the plenary session. “The treaty provides for the reduction of strategic offensive arms so that, for each side, the aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and heavy bombers does not exceed 1600 and the aggregate number of ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads and heavy bomber armaments does not exceed 6000. In this regard, the treaty provides for the necessary provisions for attributing to ballistic missiles the number of warheads associated with them, and similarly, the number of air-launched cruise missiles and other armaments associated with heavy bombers. With the 6000 aggregate, the treaty makes provision for sublimits on ballistic missile warheads, effectively to strengthen strategic stability. Specifically, each side would be limited to no more than 4800 warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, 3300 warheads on deployed ICBMs, and 1650 warheads on permitted ICBMs except those on deployed silo-based ICBMs which are not heavy ICBMs and which have six or fewer warheads. The treaty provides for a ban on mobile ICBMs, constraints on non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and the codified reduction of aggregate throw-weight levels to a level 50 percent below the higher of the levels possessed by the two parties. Effective verification is critical [Page 863] to a viable START agreement. Therefore, the draft treaty provides the necessary basis for defining the elements of strategic offensive arms relevant to the limitations and reductions of which I have just spoken. It also provides for effective verification of these limits and reductions, including use of national technical means, on-site inspection, and cooperative measures, together with provisions for non-interference with the foregoing. The complete treaty will also eventually include a memorandum of understanding and appropriate protocols to augment and lend further detailed substance to the treaty.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870357–0528)