71. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Bremer) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)1
SUBJECT
- Romanian MFN Waiver Authority
This is in response to Dr. Lenz’s memorandum of May 112 concerning the extension of MFN waiver authority for Romania. Our initial response was sent to you earlier today.3
As Secretary Haig indicated in his Memorandum to the President of May 1,4 the Jackson-Vanik waiver for Romania—as for the other countries concerned—is a central element in our bilateral relationship. We believe that the course the Secretary recommended to the President is one which contributes best both to the Jackson-Vanik objective of freedom of [Page 226] emigration (Romanian emigration to the U.S. has increased seven-fold since the granting of MFN) and our overall foreign policy interests.
Under the Trade Act, the President must make his recommendation to Congress by June 3, or his waiver authority will lapse automatically. Thus a key question is whether the U.S. can usefully take further steps to encourage Romania to permit increased Jewish emigration prior to that cutoff date. In our view, the Romanians are already under maximum pressure from us and American Jewish organizations to increase Jewish emigration.
The Jackson-Vanik waiver extension is a focal point each year in our continuing dialogue with the Romanians on their emigration performance. This year, as in previous years, we and the American Jewish community have used the requirement for a Presidential waiver recommendation and the Congressional waiver hearings as a means to encourage improved Romanian emigration performance. We have already made a series of demarches to the Romanians at high levels, emphasizing our concern about the level of Jewish emigration to Israel. The President of B’nai B’rith International, Jack Spitzer, and the President of the Appeal of Conscience Foundation, Rabbi Arthur Schneier, have both met personally with President Ceausescu to register their concern. They have also conferred with the Chief Rabbi of Romania. Both Spitzer and Schneier have returned from Romania convinced that the continuation of MFN provides the best means of applying pressure on the Romanians to live up to the terms of their 1979 understanding with American Jewish organizations. Both agree that if MFN were to lapse, the U.S. would have no meaningful leverage to support the Romanian Jewish community and that that community would be considerably worse off without MFN. The Israeli Ambassador to Romania has informed us in strict confidence that he believes continuation of MFN is in the best interests of Israel.
In our view, Dr. Lenz’s memorandum misjudges the way in which MFN leverage can be used to gain concessions from the Romanian Government. The threat of not renewing MFN is useful only if we are not forced to make good on it. If MFN were not renewed, we would lose our chief means of assisting those Jews who remain in Romania and wish to emigrate. Moreover, we have carefully avoided asking the Romanian Government for government-to-government assurances regarding Jewish emigration as we seriously doubt whether the Romanian Government would grant such assurances.
Our own Congressional soundings have indicated that although Romania’s record is certain to be raised at the waiver hearings and individual Congressmen will oppose MFN renewal, it is very unlikely that the major American Jewish organizations, which ultimately will support MFN, will seek to have the Congress override the President on the Romanian waiver. In the unlikely event Congress were to pass [Page 227] a disapproval resolution, the Administration could still argue that it wished to maintain positive relations with Romania. If, however, the Administration were to oppose MFN renewal on the grounds set forth in Dr. Lenz’s memorandum, our ability to pursue our interests in Romania would be seriously undermined.
Termination of MFN status for Romania would also have a dampening effect on U.S.-Romanian trade. This trade has grown dramatically since the reciprocal extension of MFN tariff treatment; it now stands at more than $1 billion annually and is balanced heavily (70–30 percent) in our favor.
Finally, MFN is the centerpiece of U.S.-Romanian relations and a critical element in Romania’s strategy of seeking maximum independence from Moscow. Romania looks to the West, and to the U.S. in particular, for political support and trade alternatives with which to resist Soviet pressures against its independent foreign policy stance. Terminating the waiver could therefore be very damaging to U.S. political and strategic interests.
- Source: Reagan Library, William L. Stearman Files, Subject File, Romania 06/02/1981–06/21/1981. Confidential.↩
- See Document 69.↩
- See Document 70.↩
- See Document 2.↩
- John H. Kelly signed for Bremer above Bremer’s typed signature.↩