Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

59. Memorandum From Nelson Ledsky and Peter Rodman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, June 23, 1988

SUBJECT

• Discussing Eastern Europe with the Soviets

At the Summit, the State Department questioned the propriety of the President broaching Eastern Europe with Gorbachev.² The State position was that to do so could be seen as acknowledging Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and that therefore, as a matter of policy, the U.S. did not discuss this region with the Soviets.

We think this position is wrong, both factually and in terms of our policy interests, for a number of reasons:

Historical Precedents

Our exchanges on Eastern Europe with the Soviets stretch through the entire postwar period. For example, the division of Germany (as opposed to Berlin) has been the subject of U.S.-Soviet dialogue since the war. No peace treaty was ever concluded after World War II, making the status of Central Europe legitimate unfinished business in which the U.S. and USSR have had a special role since Yalta. President Eisenhower wrote Bulganin in 1956 demanding an end to Moscow’s intervention in Hungary. President Johnson informed Brezhnev that the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia required him to cancel a planned summit. Both Presidents Carter and Reagan made clear to Brezhnev that a Soviet intervention in Poland in 1980–81 would seriously damage U.S.-Soviet relations. This Administration also discussed with Moscow and Warsaw our dissatisfaction with the Polish government’s declaration of martial law and curtailment of civil liberties. In response to these Polish measures, we applied sanctions against both Poland and the USSR. In none of these circumstances did our representations to Moscow imply acceptance of Soviet control over East Europe. Just the opposite.

Although these are examples of crisis situations, the fact is that Eastern Europe enters the U.S.-Soviet dialogue frequently in routine discussions. Attached at Tab A is a recent example of this, a report on a June 17 discussion between Warren Zimmermann, our Ambassador to the Vienna CSCE meeting, and his Soviet counterpart Kashlev (Vienna 7229).³ In the discussion, Warren complains to Kashlev that the Soviets have not gotten their East European allies into line in Vienna and that each East European country is speaking “only for itself.” We do not mean to criticize Warren because we understand the tactical considerations behind his approach. But we cite the discussion as an example of how Eastern Europe is raised by us with the Soviets, even in non-crisis situations.

Eastern Europe as a Regional Issue

When looked at closely, the argument that raising Eastern Europe implies recognition of Soviet hegemony in fact does not hold water. We discuss regional issues such as Central America, Southern Africa, the Middle East and Cambodia with the Soviets, and in no case would we accept the thesis that this implies a Soviet sphere of influence in the area. Indeed, one could make a good case that treating Eastern Europe so completely differently from other regional issues is what legitimizes Soviet hegemony. Silence, after all, is most often interpreted as acquiescence.

In addition, circumstances clearly are changing. We are in a new era of ferment in both the USSR and Eastern Europe, and of great potential volatility. Some group or party in East Europe is sure to test the limits of the new tolerance declared in Moscow—and limits there surely will be. While direct dealings with the bloc countries are the principal vehicles now for our encouragement of diversity and independence, a dialogue with Moscow may soon be warranted.

The Political Factor

The reluctance to raise Eastern Europe with Moscow also aggravates a very large political constituency—East European ethnic groups—who invariably want us to raise this subject with the Soviets and have long complained about the State position. At Tab B is a letter to the President from Polish-American Congress, which alone represents about 10 million Americans of Polish descent, expressing regret that Eastern Europe was not raised at the Summit.⁴ The Office of Public Liaison advises us that other ethnic groups are similarly unhappy. And this unhappiness is frequently expressed in the Congress. It could easily have been avoided through a reference to Eastern Europe in the President’s remarks to Gorbachev.

The Key: How to Raise Eastern Europe

We would not advocate raising Eastern Europe if this in any way did impugn the sovereignty of these countries or legitimize Soviet hegemony. The key is in how the subject is raised. Except in unusual circumstances, we should not discuss specific internal developments or matters which we discuss bilaterally with East European governments. But there is a broad theme which can very legitimately be raised with Moscow and to which Eastern Europe is central—the postwar division of Europe and the need to work toward healing this division. This is the essence of the entire CSCE process, a fully legitimate part of the East-West and U.S.-Soviet dialogue, in which the issues of human rights and European security converge. Our objective in the Summit talking points was to raise Eastern Europe in this context and thus to signal our continued dissatisfaction with the division of Europe and of Germany, which is long-standing U.S. policy. This would not have legitimized Soviet hegemony but rather put us on record as continuing to oppose it.

The President’s Berlin Initiative is in large measure a challenge to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe—a challenge to them to lower all the barriers they have put up. The Gorbachev line about a “common European home”—echoed by GDR Foreign Minister Fischer in an outrageous statement at the recent Potsdam conference—is that an easing of tensions in Europe requires acceptance of the division of Europe. This line cannot be accepted.

At the Madrid NAC restricted session, Secretary Shultz commented very correctly that “we should continue to blame the Soviets as well as their agents in Eastern European parties and governments for the continued unnatural division of Europe” (Secto 11130, 100940Z Jun 88).⁵ If we can do this publicly, there is no logical reason for not making the same point to the Soviets directly.

Next Steps

None of this is an argument for a major new initiative toward the Soviets on Eastern Europe. But it is a brief for including Eastern Europe, in the right context, in our dialogue with the Soviets at both the policy and expert levels. Over the past 40 years, no one area or set of issues has so consistently soured U.S.-Soviet relations as Eastern Europe. There is no excuse for excluding only Eastern Europe from our global exchanges with the Soviets, either for fear of “acknowledging hegemony” or out of sensitivity about raising a subject they won’t like.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984–1989, Lot 92 D 52, Super Sensitive, June 22–30 [1988]. Secret. Sent for information. Prepared by John Herbst and Perina. A handwritten covering note from Powell to Shultz, June 23, reads: “I hope you will find the attached memo from my staff interesting and provocative.” (Ibid.)
2. Reference is to the summit between Reagan and Gorbachev, May 29–June 2.
3. Attached but not printed is telegram 7229 from Vienna, June 20.
4. Attached but not printed is a June 8 letter from the Polish-American Congress to Reagan.
5. Telegram Secto 11130 from Shultz in Madrid, June 10, provided a summary of the discussion on Eastern Europe at the Madrid NAC meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, D880821–0275)