Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

361. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 27, 1988, 1:45–2:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Hungarian Prime Minister Grosz’ Call on the Vice President

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • The Vice President
  • John C. Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State
  • Donald P. Gregg, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
  • Thomas W. Simons, EUR/DAS (notetaker)
  • Laszlo Szimonisz, Interpreter
  • Rudolf Perina, Director for European and Soviet Affairs, NSC
  • Col. Samuel J. Watson, Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

• Hungary

  • Prime Minister Karoly Grosz
  • Laszlo Kovacs, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Dr. Vencel Hazi, Ambassador of Hungary to the United States
  • Mr. Viktor Polgar, Counselor, Embassy of the Hungarian People’s Republic, (Interpreter)

After greeting Grosz, the Vice President said he had watched Grosz’ activities since he had taken office. His vigorous approach to his job was inspiring so far.

Grosz thanked the Vice President. Too much had been happening over the past year. The Vice President remarked that he had not had much chance to travel. Grosz said that was true. He had been working to put together a new government, and in the process he had become General Secretary. He knew a little bit about what was required, because he had spent all his life in the party. But he was also determined to establish the most favorable international conditions possible for Hungary’s economic and political program.

Grosz continued that his scenario was to explain what he wished to do first to Hungary’s friends in the socialist world, then to Western Europe, and then, if they would have him, to overseas countries. He did believe that it had been a fruitful year from this point of view. He had heard ideas and advice, and also gotten a lot of understanding. He did not wish to overestimate the results of his efforts, but he was aware of the responsibilities that rested on his shoulders. Success or failure of his program would have implications beyond Hungary’s borders. The Vice President probably understood that, having visited Hungary.

The Vice President said it had been a wonderful visit, which had made a big impression on him. He asked about the health of Grosz’ predecessor Janos Kadar. Grosz replied that Kadar was in very good health, but his wife had lost a lot of weight, and was down to 90 lb. This weighed heavily on Kadar. The Vice President asked if a malignancy were involved. Grosz said this was possibility. She was 75, and there were biological laws whether you liked it or not. He did not want to meddle in family affairs, but he could say that the Kadar family had been very closely knit, and for a long time Mrs. Kadar had provided Kadar with the sense of security that every man needs. So of course her illness had taken its toll.

Kadar had very much wanted the changeover, Grosz continued. Grosz had talked him into staying on as President of the party: they needed his political and human wisdom and experience. But he was not up to being part of the day-to-day management.

The Vice President said that everyone deserves to have some time to himself. When he had been there he had been impressed with the genuine affection people had for Kadar. Before going he had not known what to expect, since in this country years ago there had been some controversy about Kadar.

Grosz said Kadar was a terribly warm-hearted person. He really respects the opinion of others; he is open to opinions. And, as the Vice President knew as a political person, one has to have principles. He himself had a philosophy––it was personal, and he did not spread it widely––that a person needs to be not loved but respected for his efforts. One could have respect for Kadar. You could agree with him or disagree with him, but he was very clean, and has a lot of human sense. He had a lot to thank Kadar for. He had worked with him for many years, and he could say of their cooperation that it was not without clouds. They often had different points of view. He did not consider this a shortcoming, but natural. But that was a separate thing. If there were different viewpoints and no debate, there could be no respect.

The Vice President said he appreciated hearing that. Reading the newspapers one often hears of differences, but they don’t discuss the common ground. Grosz said that is the way it is.

The Vice President said he wished to make a political comment. The next President would be either he or Dukakis. Grosz had just began a big new job. There would be a lot of rhetoric in our election campaign, arguments about foreign policy objectives. So he wanted Grosz to hear from him directly that he firmly supported the policy undertaken by the Reagan Administration toward Hungary, the Soviet Union and indeed Eastern Europe as a whole. If his campaign proved successful he would continue that policy of working toward improved relations with Eastern Europe.

The Vice President went on to say that if you asked him to predict where we would be with the Soviet Union two years from now, he would find it hard to answer. We knew where we wanted to be. We would like to achieve a strategic arms agreement, following on the INF agreement Secretary Ridgway and others had worked so hard on, and which he had been proud to support. We would like to achieve a conventional arms agreement by that time, although that would probably be harder to resolve. But he did not know, and was not sure anyone could predict, where the Soviets will be.

He had been very impressed with Mr. Gorbachev, the Vice President continued. He was very open, easy to talk to, and he had his neck way out, compared to his predecessors. But events can change things. So he did not predict. He wanted to see better relations, but he did not know enough about what was going on inside the Soviet Union to predict whether this would be possible. But this Administration and, if he succeeded, his would do all they could to facilitate Gorbachev’s success. He was very hopeful that Gorbachev would succeed, would solidify his support, would accomplish the reforms he had set out to achieve. But the point he wished to make was that on a personal basis he was cautious.

The Vice President said he wished to make a last point. He and Grosz were talking about bilateral relations between the United States and Hungary. Regardless of what happened with the Soviet Union, we wanted to facilitate improvement in our bilateral relationship.

Grosz replied that what the Vice President had said could be a major election program. He himself was quite convinced––and had said in public––that the policies the President represented and had developed with the Vice President’s participation were of immense importance to the world. There was a historic opportunity, and the President had recognized that this was the moment to begin a dialogue with this Soviet leadership. This had changed the entire situation compared with before. It had shown great wisdom to extend the hand at a time when Gorbachev was just coming in with his program. If the U.S. continued, this could influence their way of thinking, their approaches to things. He also could not predict where the Soviet Union or the U.S. would be two or even five years from now, but he was convinced that they should continue down this road.

Great restructuring was going on in the Soviet Union, Grosz continued. He was convinced that it was in the interest of the U.S. and the whole of humanity to see Gorbachev succeed, for the Soviet Union to become a dynamic economy. He was not getting a percentage from Gorbachev for saying that, although they were good personal friends from a period long before Gorbachev had become General Secretary, when he was a regional secretary in the Soviet Union and Grosz had been one party secretary in one of Hungary’s smaller counties.

He knew the Gorbachevian approach, Grosz continued. Gorbachev wanted a stronger economy, and had a modernizing policy to get it. And the U.S., which had such a dynamic economy, had a historic opportunity to expand its economic relations with the Soviet Union. It was a rich country, and provided an enormous market opportunity. The U.S. should be interested in its developing economically, rather than militarily.

The Soviet Union welcomed any positive development concerning its neighbors, Grosz went on. Its relationship with China was not the best, but the Soviet Union was paying close attention to what was happening in China in the economic sphere. There were political developments in Poland. And the Soviets were encouraging Hungary to develop economic solutions. He had visited with Gorbachev on July 5; counting meals, they had been together eight hours. He had told Gorbachev how the Hungarians saw things. He had given Gorbachev some details that did not correspond to earlier thinking, and even ideology. For instance, they were going to permit foreign capital participation in Hungarian enterprises above 50 percent. He had prepared himself to hear doubts from Gorbachev, and had already been ordering his arguments to respond. The opposite had happened: Gorbachev had been encouraging.

The Vice President asked Grosz whether there were elements in the bureaucracy and the hierarchy that were resisting, or whether Gorbachev had a total mandate to go forward with his reform. Grosz replied that he had an absolute mandate. As to the rate, however, the problem was not the resistance of the bureaucracy, but the rate at which the population understood what was required. As he had told the President at lunch, he had friends in the Soviet apparatus, and he asked them why they were not helping Gorbachev to go faster. They had said they wanted to, but did not understand what he wanted. His thinking has not penetrated the country yet.

Try to imagine the conservatism of such a country, Grosz urged the Vice President. His friends told him extensive discussion was taking place, into the wee hours of the morning, over a single sentence of Gorbachev’s. There had not been such spiritual liveliness for decades. So we are in a period where it seems for a long time that nothing happens, and then things accelerate suddenly.

Moreover, Grosz continued, the final lineup of Gorbachev’s team is just being put in place. He had put together a team three years ago, but it had not really been prepared for this changeover. It turns out that not every player fit exactly. In the next year or two there will be qualitative changes.

Ligachev was one of Gorbachev’s closest collaborators, Grosz said. One read a lot about their differences. It was true there are debates. But they were debates in a good sense. The two personalities were entirely different. Gorbachev was explosive, full of dynamism. If you talked to him for two hours he would get up five times to go to the telephone, to give directions. Ligachev on the other hand was cool, reserved, meditative. But there was no real difference in their politics. So the leadership would be put together and formed through discussion, through debate; the process would not be a straight line.

The Vice President commented that things often went two steps forward, one step back. Grosz said that was right. Gorbachev and company really won at the party conference. The planning had been to have the next congress in 1991; Gorbachev had said it should be advanced by a year. Probably he would concentrate there on personnel matters. That was the next major battle he wanted to win. But by then he would have many more allies.

The Vice President asked if Grosz thought there would be a major Soviet push to improve relations with the PRC. Grosz said he was convinced there would be. The Vice President said that ten years ago many in the U.S. would have been concerned about such a prospect. But now China had changed so much that it could not revert to what it was under Mao Tse Tung. What they do is of course their business, but he did not see Sino-Soviet rapprochement as being against the interests of the U.S. Grosz said it could only be of benefit.

But, Grosz went on to say, he thought that before that happened, the Soviet Union would wish to settle with Western Europe, and particularly the FRG. The Vice President asked why. He asked how Grosz saw the FRG-GDR relationship. Grosz replied that a lot had happened in that relationship recently, and a lot was happening today. The rigidity of the GDR was beginning to ease a little. One-and-a-half or two million people from the GDR were visiting the FRG annually; this would have been inconceivable five years ago. Economic cooperation was going forward; it was unprecedented for them to be tied together as they were.

Kohl had asked him to help get better terms from Gorbachev, Grosz continued, and he had talked to Gorbachev about it. Gorbachev had felt that the GDR would not be too happy to see the Soviet-FRG relationship improve, but now it was his experience as well that there ought to be cooperation, and the Kohl visit will take place in that spirit.

The Gorbachev approach was to normalize relations with the U.S., with Western Europe, and then, if conditions were right, with China, Grosz went on. Only with regard to Africa was he uncertain; he did not know what to do with it. He did not have enough energy, and the processes underway there were impossible to deal with. Grosz said he had spoken to Gorbachev about subjects related to Israel, but Soviet views––and Gorbachev’s views––on the Arab world had not jelled yet. The U.S. approach promised to produce some headway; it was the best road for the U.S. to travel.

Grosz said that in Hungary they were beginning to formulate policies for these matters. They had opened their borders, and were organizing social relations with the outside world. Others had had reservations about this, or did not know what to make of it. Journalists did not know what he (Grosz) was, or what he stood for. They would find out through his actions whether he was conservative or not. They still had the feeling that Eastern Europe was monolithic, all dressed in the same clothes, eating the same way, marching in step. They were not looking for the differences that provide the real colors. It was Hungary’s fault too: they did not tell the world enough about themselves.

The Vice President said it was true that the area used to appear monolithic. But now the U.S. was more sophisticated. It was looking for differentiation in the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe. The point now was to reach out, to understand, to accommodate real change.

Grosz concluded that he did not know if it were appropriate to wish the Vice President success. Pointing to a picture of his family, the Vice President said Grosz should not worry. Grosz said that whatever happened, he would like the Vice President to honor Hungary with a visit, and bring his family; his last visit had been too short. The Vice President wished Grosz good look in his awesome responsibilities.

1. Source: Department of State, Records from Ambassador Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Lot 03 D 256, Chron, July 1988. Confidential. Drafted on July 30 by Simons. The meeting took place in the Vice President’s West Wing office. Copies were sent to Ridgway and Palmer.