Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

274. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the Embassy in the German Democratic Republic¹

Secto 11091.

New York, October 5, 1984, 1006Z

SUBJECT

• Memorandum of Conversation: Secretary’s Meeting With GDR Foreign Minister Fischer—October 4, 1984.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Secretary Shultz met with GDR Foreign Minister Fischer in the Secretary’s suite at the UN Plaza Hotel in New York at 1045 on Thursday, October 4. Minister Fischer was accompanied by GDR Ambassador Herder, two aides and an interpreter. Other US participants were EUR Assistant Secretary Burt, Department Press Spokesman John Hughes, EUR/CE Director Kornblum and interpreter Harry Obst.

3. Summary: Primary topic of discussion at the meeting was US-GDR bilateral relations. After presenting a standard expression of Eastern positions on the need to lower the level of nuclear armaments in Europe, Fischer stressed the GDR’s interest in improving bilateral relations with the US. He said the GDR attached high importance to these relations for reasons of national interest and because better US-GDR ties could have a positive effect on the situation in Europe. Fischer said most rapid progress should come in the fields of trade and science and technology. He suggested negotiation of agreements in these fields which could also serve as a foundation for progress in other areas.

4. The Secretary expressed US interest in improved ties also, but noted our belief that these ties could move forward through progress on practical issues. As three examples of such practical issues he mentioned Jewish claims, human rights and emigration and the rumored arrest of GDR citizens who had visited the US Embassy in Berlin. The Secretary followed this presentation with a short discussion of meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.² Fischer reciprocated with a short statement on relations with the FRG.

5. The meeting concluded with agreement on both sides that there should be efforts to establish an expanded framework for bilateral ties. The Secretary suggested intensifying contacts through ambassadors, but also agreed that other types of political contacts could be considered. End summary.

6. Fischer opened the meeting by expressing his pleasure at the opportunity to meet with the Secretary. The two ministers had sat next to each other at meetings, but had never met formally. Fischer thought it a positive step that they had now met. The time had come to continue US-GDR exchanges at the Foreign Minister level. There was no alternative to the policy of peaceful coexistence and no alternative to dialogue between states. The US and the GDR should pursue the issues facing them. Fischer noted that Assistant Secretary Burt’s talks in Berlin in February, 1984 had been especially useful in developing such a dialogue.³

7. Fischer noted that in the current somewhat tense atmosphere, all sides should make an effort to pursue not only better understanding, but also solutions to outstanding problems. The GDR believed the time had come for a dialogue of reason. Otherwise, those who bore responsibility could not fulfill their tasks. One main problem was the continued growth of military confrontation in Europe. The GDR was of the view that more weapons did not bring more security. Fischer noted that during the UNGA session, he had asked many of his ministerial colleagues whether they believed more weapons would bring more security. None of them had answered in the affirmative. One negative example had been the stationing of new Western missiles in Europe and the necessary counter measures by the East including the GDR. Peace and security must be based on military equilibrium. This had been the situation for the past 40 years and the GDR hoped to maintain this equilibrium at a lower level of armaments.

8. The Secretary noted that President Reagan had made many proposals to reduce arms in Europe. As for reductions of nuclear weapons, the Secretary recalled that during his visit to East Berlin, Assistant Secretary Burt had showed his GDR interlocutors a chart on which the top line showing Soviet deployments had risen continuously. All this time, the Soviets had been saying that equality existed. The US had continued to negotiate despite Soviet deployments. Then, when the NATO alliance found it necessary to increase its strength to meet Soviet deployments, the Soviets had broken off the talks. The Secretary said he agreed on the need for dialogue, but it should be clear that it was the Soviets who had broken off the exchanges.

9. Despite these differences, the Secretary said that both sides should do their best to improve bilateral relations. He suggested that the conversation turn to US-GDR bilateral issues. Fischer said the Secretary knew that the GDR was closely allied with the Soviet Union. It was also clear that negotiations on nuclear arms could succeed only if there was a basis for such talks. It was necessary for both sides to demonstrate the will to improve relations. It was in this context that the GDR viewed bilateral ties with the United States. Our relations should be based on reason and good will.

10. In Fischer’s view, US-GDR bilateral relations could serve two purposes. They could of course strengthen the interests of both countries. But in the current situation in Europe, bilateral relations also served an important international function. Fischer said the GDR attached great importance to its bilateral relations with the United States, also in the international context. Noting that bilateral ties had existed for 10 years,⁴ Fischer was of the impression that these ties had stagnated for the past five years. He thought that arrival of the 10th anniversary provided a good opportunity to build on the existing basis to achieve a more active relationship.

11. Fischer said that the GDR was ready to expand ties in areas such as trade, science and technology. He thought it would also be especially useful for he and the Secretary to repeat their meetings and in the coming period to conclude agreements in the fields of trade and scientific and technological cooperation.

12. Fischer continued by noting that he had mentioned the fields of trade and scientific and technological cooperation because they seemed to him to be the most important issues facing the two sides at the moment. He understood that it would not be possible to make the same amount of progress in all areas simultaneously. He thought that the political dialogue could help form a foundation for these efforts by building trust between the two countries. But a trade agreement could also be a solid foundation for all the rest. In general, the GDR saw no problem which could not be addressed or even solved. The GDR had the political will to move forward. Speaking informally, Fischer added that the East Germans sometimes would prefer not to be situated on such a strategic spot, but that was their fate and they must live with it.

13. The Secretary responded that the US was perfectly prepared to broaden bilateral relations, including in the fields which Fischer had mentioned. We also had no objection to agreements. But the two sides should also focus on areas where actual progress could be reported. Such progress would demonstrate that the two sides could work together and would stimulate efforts to achieve agreements.

14. The Secretary wished to mention three areas where specific progress could be made:

a. Jewish claims: The Secretary understood that Fischer had met earlier in the week with Rabbi Miller and officials of the Conference on Jewish Material Claims. This issue was something which could be dealt with and it was important. If it were possible to deal successfully with the claims question, overall relations would be improved.

b. Family reunification: The Secretary noted strong US support for the principle of free emigration. Improved GDR performance in this field would help relations. For example, the son of the new conductor of the Detroit Symphony Orchestra was being refused the right to emigrate. If he were allowed to leave, this would be a positive development in our relations.

c. Visitors to Embassy: The Secretary said he had heard reports, still unconfirmed, that some persons who visited our Embassy might have been arrested after they left. This was not a good development and could not help further relations.

15. The Secretary said that these were only selected examples of the types of things the US looked at to see if agreements could work. However, he wished to stress again that the US was interested in improving relations.

16. Fischer said he had been encouraged by the Secretary’s remarks. As a result of this discussion, it was possible to hope that improvements could be pursued. One could also hope that the US and the GDR could affect the world around them. The Secretary interjected that his remarks had been intended to be encouraging.

18. ⁵ Fischer said he assumed that the Secretary would be informed about the results of his meeting with Rabbi Miller and that he need not go into detail. He did not know what Ambassador Ridgway had reported, but there had been no arrests of persons visiting the Embassy. As for the case of the conductor’s son, Fischer had not heard of the issue but would look into it. He added that for completeness sake, he should add that such matters of course fell within the sovereign competence of the GDR. Finally, he wished to say that he was truly encouraged that the Secretary’s appraisal of the future of US-GDR bilateral relations was the same as his own and that of his government.

19. The Secretary suggested that he and Fischer agree to work on the problem of building a better framework for relations. He would ask Assistant Secretary Burt and Ambassador Ridgway to examine ways to move things forward. Perhaps the fact that he and Fischer had met could stand as a symbol of their mutual good intentions.

20. Since time was running out, the Secretary said he would like to make a few summary comments about recent meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. (Fischer nodded strongly in support of this suggestion).

a. First, taking the meetings as a whole, the Secretary believed that one way or another the two sides had touched on practically every issue one could think of which might have come up between them.

b. Second, while the discussions were sometimes intense, they were never angry or polemical. Both sides had been very engaged in the discussions and the Secretary thought there had been a good exchange of views.

c. Third, in terms of formal positions, neither side had expected the meetings to result in negotiations or agreements. Basic positions remained unchanged.

d. Fourth, the Secretary assumed that the Soviets shared the US intention to develop the dialogue systematically and carefully. Management would be through diplomatic channels. The Secretary believed the effort would be worth pursuing. The outcome remained to be seen, but the US would move forward with care and energy in private diplomatic channels.

21. Fischer noted that he had not spoken with Gromyko since his visit to the United States. However, Gromyko would be arriving in East Berlin at 5:00 p.m. on October 5 and the GDR would have a full chance to hear his views. From what he had heard so far, Fischer believed that the meetings had been timely and helpful. The Secretary asked whether Fischer would be in Berlin during Gromyko’s visit. Fischer said that he had a speaking engagement at the Council of Foreign Relations in New York and thus could not return for the visit.

22. Fischer added that it would perhaps also be useful for him to say a few words about the GDR’s relations with the FRG. The GDR also viewed these ties in a broad context. The GDR meant it when it said that war should never again begin on German soil. Relations with the FRG were governed by a basic treaty and there was no open German question. There were still a few small problems kept alive by certain circles in the GDR’s western neighbor, but there were now two separate and sovereign German states. The GDR was certain that this situation was a positive contribution to the search for peace and security in Europe.

23. Fischer concluded by saying that he hoped to see the Secretary again and that during that meeting it would be possible to draw up a positive balance of progress in relations. The Secretary agreed that it was important to continue the dialogue on bilateral relations. He would also continue to be interested in GDR insights on relations between the two German states and its perceptions of overall developments, in particular the dialogue between the US and the USSR.

24. The Secretary noted that one way to continue the dialogue would be to discuss such matters with Ambassador Ridgway. The Secretary considered her to be one of our best Ambassadors and he wished to put her name forward as a good means of pursuing the dialogue which he and Fischer had begun. Other contacts would of course also be possible.

25. Fischer thanked the Secretary for hs sentiments. He had a high regard for Ambassador Ridgway. He thought it also useful to refer to the fact that GDR Ambassador Herder was a top diplomat who had known Honecker since 1949. He was one of Honecker’s closest collaborators and was an excellent partner for a dialogue. The Secretary said that the US would be pleased also to continue contacts through Herder.

Shultz

1. Source: Reagan Library, Paula J. Dobriansky Files, Germany, Democratic Republic of (3). Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Bonn, Moscow, Paris, London, Vienna, West Berlin, and the mission to NATO. Shultz was in New York for the UN General Assembly.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 284–288.
3. Burt had meetings in East Berlin on February 21. Telegram 588 from East Berlin, February 24, provided a summary of the meetings. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840121–0491)
4. The United States recognized the GDR and established diplomatic relations in 1974.
5. There is no paragraph 17 in the original.