Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

189. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia¹

108912.

Washington, April 28, 1981, 2000Z

SUBJECT

• Discussion With Yugoslav Ambassador Loncar: Yugoslav Perspectives on International Issues.

1. (S—Entire text).

2. Summary. After spending a couple of days with Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vrhovec at UN in New York, Yugoslav Ambassador Loncar offered some interesting insights into current Yugoslav thinking. He found Vrhovec completely uninformed about GOY plans for military purchases from the US. The Yugoslavs have strong evidence of Albanian Government involvement in Kosovo unrest but do not intend to make an issue of it. Belgrade is optimistic about Poland and sees the USSR on the defensive, which creates new opportunities for US diplomacy in key areas such as Namibia. End summary.

3. US military sales. Barry² asked Loncar if Vrhovec had cast any light on current Yugoslav attitudes to military purchases from the US in light of the imminent expiration of the LOA on TOW/Dragon. Loncar found Vrhovec completely uninformed on this subject. At Vrhovec’s urging Loncar cabled Belgrade expressing puzzlement over Yugoslav reluctance to pick up on the US TOW/Dragon offer which had been Defense Minister Ljubicic’s top priority. Loncar will soon call on Defense Secretary Weinberger at the latter’s invitation but wants to get a better idea of Belgrade’s thinking before doing so.

3. Kosovo. Vrhovec told Loncar that the GOY has hard evidence of Albanian Government involvement in the unrest in Kosovo—this evidence is much more persuasive than evidence of Soviet involvement. Yet the GOY has no intention of making an issue of Albanian involvement. Yugoslavia has its eye on the bigger picture—the fate of Albania after Hoxha’s death—and therefore will strive for good relations with Albania at almost any price while avoiding any step which could drive a new Albanian leadership into Moscow’s arms. Loncar said that Vrhovec was very optimistic about future developments in Kosovo—an optimism Loncar did not share.

4. Poland. According to Loncar, the current Yugoslav estimate as conveyed by Loncar is that there will be no Soviet intervention because the cost is too high. Moscow will keep up the pressure against revisionism as the Polish Party Congress approaches but will tolerate a good deal. The Yugoslavs see Soviet policy towards the Polish economic situation as ambiguous. Moscow fears that further economic deterioration will be destabilizing but also sees negative trends in the economy as strengthening the hard-liners’ hands.

5. US policy towards the USSR. Taking off from his discussion of Poland, Loncar opined that the Reagan administration was missing important opportunities by over-emphasizing the expansionist elements in Soviet policy. Indeed this element was there, but the USSR was more on the defensive now than any time in recent history with economic problems at home, the “Yugoslav views” spreading through China, Eastern Europe and European communist parties, the Non-Aligned Movement shifting away from Cuba and the USSR, and the West moving to build its defenses. The US should exploit these opportunities which can yield concrete gains at the negotiating table and in this sense Washington has a “window of opportunity”.

6. Namibia. Loncar stressed that Namibia represented an important opportunity and test for the Reagan administration which could be turned to advantage by the US in the competition with the Soviets.³ If we are willing to provide momentum to the negotiating table and if majority rule can be won, other benefits such as the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola could follow.

Haig

1. Source: Reagan Library, Robert H. Lilac Files, Arms Transfer: Country File, AT: Yugoslavia [January 1981–April 1981]. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Bonn, London, Moscow, Rome, Paris, the mission to the UN, and Warsaw.
2. Presumably Robert Barry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.
3. Documentation regarding Namibia’s efforts toward independence is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXV, Southern Africa, 1981–1984.