Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

92. Memorandum From President Reagan to Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Director of Central Intelligence Casey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Vessey), and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Adelman)¹

Washington, September 17, 1985

SUBJECT

• Contingency Planning Against Potential Soviet Arms Control Positions (S)

In the upcoming November meeting, we face one of the most important questions with respect to managing U.S./Soviet relations that we have faced in the post-war period. At issue is whether, at this juncture, we can fashion a more stable basis for dealing with each other in a peaceful and business-like manner. In order to deal intelligently with this issue, we must focus on U.S. national objectives and, in light of these objectives, identify both the opportunities and risks offered by the situation. (C)

Over the last forty years, the U.S./Soviet relationship has exhibited a regular pattern of swinging from one extreme position to the other, from confrontation to so-called detente. At one extreme, we have the cold war experience where we felt we had almost no hope but to confront and compete. For example, during Korea, we were spending up to 10% of our GNP on defense. On the other extreme, during periods of so-called detente, we reached the point at which some felt that we had the possibility of a fundamental change in the ambitions of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, during such periods, the relative military strength of the Soviet Union—relative to the U.S.—tended to grow, and we saw the fruits of direct Soviet action in Angola, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, etc. (C)

Some convincingly argue that the Soviets know the value of encouraging and exploiting this cycle in the Western body politic—and actively exploiting Western impatience with confrontation to permit periods in which gains can be made and consolidated. As a minimum, this regular pattern that we can find in the history of the relationship clearly suggests that:

(1) it is illusory and dangerous to expect that fundamental Soviet ambitions and behavior will change; and

(2) to keep Soviet ambitions in check, we must show the clear national will to confront and compete as needed. (C)

As the United States approaches the November meeting, we have a number of strengths that we should recognize. The U.S. economy is strong. The U.S. has demonstrated a commitment to spend 6+% of its GNP to maintain its defenses. As a result, the U.S. military capability is being restored. The NATO Alliance has weathered a number of attempts by the Soviets to undercut its solidarity, and it remains fundamentally sound. In short, we can approach the meeting in a strong position economically, militarily and politically. (C)

General Secretary Gorbachev approaches the meeting with a nation which is militarily very strong, but in substantial decline in virtually every other measure. He faces an economy which appears in worse overall shape than it has been recently. Gorbachev may draw some advantage from the fact that he is a “new” Soviet leader, and possibly the only leader of a major power that can look to remaining in power through the end of the century. But, on the other hand, he is certainly the product of a very structured system in which his leadership stability holds a certain indebtedness to both the military (which provides the basis of the Soviet Union’s superpower status) and the KGB. (C)

It may be that Gorbachev represents a new generation of Soviet leadership which brings a different set of priorities to its task and, therefore, offers the chance to alter the U.S./Soviet relationship as it pursues these new priorities. This certainly is a possibility that must be considered and a hypothesis that must be tested. However, we have to give proper weight to the historical record and ensure that we fully protect our own national interests, and security as this testing is accomplished. (C)

The U.S./Soviet relationship has many aspects. The issues upon which we differ range from human rights to arms control, from fundamental differences in the philosophy of government to specific regional problems. The thrust and character of that relationship cannot be judged, as many observers all too often do, on any one of these issues. At the same time, we cannot forget that the sole basis upon which the Soviet Union holds the status of a superpower is because of its military strength. Economically, it certainly is not a superpower. Nor has its political philosophy demonstrated itself to be so compelling that it would provide the Soviet Union a special place in world affairs. Given this reality, in dealing with the Soviet Union as the other world superpower, the issue of the military balance is necessarily at the very heart of the U.S./Soviet relationship. (C)

As long as maintaining some positive motion, from their perspective, in the correlation of forces remains important to the Soviet Union, and as long as reversing the erosion of the military balance is essential to the security of the U.S. and the West, the maintenance of stability in the military balance will be a continuing problem for us. Therefore, how we approach maintaining stability in the military balance is absolutely central to how we hope to manage the U.S./Soviet relationship in the future. (C)

For at least the last 20 years, the Soviets have clearly been accumulating both strategic offensive and defensive capabilities and gaining advantages in several strategic categories at a steady rate. There is certainly some question as to whether, if the Soviets maintain their pace of activity in both offenses and defenses, the West will show the necessary prudence and will to be able to stay the course and to maintain the balance in traditional ways. (C)

In addition, the nature of future offensive weapons may be such that we in the West may not be able to gauge accurately the nature of the balance. For more traditional systems, like submarine launched ballistic missiles and silo based ICBMs, we could always be assured of being able to count the submarines or the ICBM silos as they were built. We are now entering a generation of cruise missiles and of mobile ballistic missile systems, with relatively small launchers that will be hard to account for during construction and hard to detect once deployed. Given our free society, the Soviets will have little trouble tracking the numbers and disposition of U.S. systems. However, for the West, uncertainties about the overall size and disposition of Soviet forces will almost certainly increase. (C)

Finally, we also have to recognize that the Soviets are pursuing strategic defenses with great vigor, investing as much on strategic defenses as on offensive forces. Adding to their already deployed defenses the extensive and long-standing Soviet research program in both traditional and exotic defensive technologies, we face a distinct danger that the Soviets may acquire a militarily significant defensive capability that could also radically alter the military balance. (C)

Based on the threat that we must deal with as outlined above, we have put the nation on a course that involves:

(1) the needed modernization of our offensive forces for the maintenance of deterrence in traditional fashion in the near-term;

(2) the pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to provide alternative future options for deterrence, as a prudent hedge against Soviet defensive breakout, and to see if we can alter the “rules” of the military competition to lessen the threat and increase longer-term Western competitiveness; and

(3) the use of diplomacy and negotiation to support the above. (C)

The Soviets have clearly indicated that they are disturbed by our SDI program, and will vigorously attempt to divert us from pursuing it. This gives the U.S. certain leverage. The challenge we face, however, is determining how to evaluate the opportunities the short-term situation may present in terms of long-term U.S. national interest. The key question before us is what mix of power—offensive and defense—can best assure stability and U.S. national security. (C)

Over the last four years, we have very carefully positioned ourselves in our negotiations with the Soviets not only to achieve equitable and verifiable reductions in the level of nuclear arsenals, but to do so in the context of a broader overall plan of action. We all recognize that such reductions, and the overall arms control process, are not ends in themselves; rather, they are instruments available to us to strengthen U.S. and Allied security and stability. Our arms reduction efforts should complement our needed strategic modernization so that we can ensure effective deterrence today. They should also complement our efforts in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program to seek options for a better, more stable means of deterrence in the future. (C)

All the elements of this overall plan—negotiated reductions, strategic modernization, and SDI—have the potential of making critical contributions to U.S. and Allied security. These elements, however, must be held in balance. To do this, we must keep our eye on our overall broad, national security objectives. Failing to do so in pursuit of any one of these elements, we may take actions that appear attractive in the short-term but that are fundamentally counterproductive to longer-term goals of increased security and stability. (C)

I have confidence that our current U.S. position is well structured to keep all elements in balance and to support our longer-term goals. However, given Soviet posturing, the Soviets may shortly try to put us at a very critical crossroads. They may try to present us with a choice between two very different, general courses—one, our current path, and the alternative, the offer to join us in deep reductions in offensive forces at the price of our moving sharply to meet their desires for significant restraint on SDI. I am also growing increasingly concerned that the conventional wisdom of some outside the Administration is pushing us towards such a crossroads by the repeated prediction of the Soviet offer of a deal which trades off U.S. SDI testing, development and deployment for deep cuts in certain categories of existing offensive nuclear forces. (C)

It is not clear to me that such a deal would be consistent with our national security interests, especially as the systems, numbers, and counting rules presented by the Soviets are likely to be designed to preserve or enhance significant Soviet advantages. On the other hand, we must be thoroughly prepared to face the contingency of such an option being proposed to us by the Soviet Union. As part of our preparation for such a Soviet proposal, I believe that we should study the implications of such a contingency. We must fully understand what the implications would be if we were able to achieve a stable offensive force balance at or about the 5,000 ballistic missile warhead level, complemented by a sustained and vigorous SDI research program, but with SDI development and deployment options foreclosed by the terms of an agreement. (TS)

The dilemma we face is that even to task the assessment of such a Soviet offer as a serious contingency risks serious consequences through leaks. It could result in the misperception that we were not as serious as we actually are about the imperative of SDI research to generate options for moving to a better basis of deterrence in the future. Such a misperception alone could undercut the entire rationale and support for the SDI research program. A leak could also result in the unintended signalling to the Soviets that we might be interested in such a deal. As a result, it would be more difficult to sustain support for our sound, current position. It could also cause us to forfeit precious negotiating capital. Still, we have to deal with the real prospect that Gorbachev may indeed introduce such a proposal. Consequently, we must know the facts in order to avoid being put on the defensive. (TS)

For that reason, I direct that we identify no more than five or six exceptionally qualified, highly trusted individuals to do the close-hold analysis needed to put us in a position to deal with this issue. The fact of the existence of this group, its charter, and its work should be protected by an appropriate, unique security compartment. As a minimum, this group should focus on the attached questions.² The group must complete its task quickly and quietly, and I would like to see a first cut at a product that we could discuss by September 24. In sum:

—this work should be done on a priority basis by the best small group we can assemble;

—the group should have access to each of you as needed to ensure that it understands your thinking;

—it should have a blank check discretely to draw upon any assets needed for timely help without a problem;

—the first cut of a quality product should be completed for my review by September 24; and

—this work must be done without any leaks. (TS)

While this group undertakes its work, I would ask each of you to focus on the questions that are posed for the group. When the group’s task is completed, I will want each of you to be in a position to comment on it and to give me your best answers to the same questions posed to the group. (TS)

It is essential that we enter the meeting with Gorbachev prepared to handle any Soviet maneuver drawing upon the answers to the attached questions. Once we have the benefit of these answers, we then must consider what the U.S. approach to the November meeting should be. (S)

It goes without saying that this memorandum and all subsequent actions which result from it must be held only to those who absolutely must know. I cannot overemphasize how closely I want this work held. (S)

ORIGINAL SIGNED
Ronald Reagan

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Eggplant II, September–December 1985 NP. Top Secret; Owl. Handle Via Owl Channels. A typed note at the top of the page reads: “(Placed in OWL after compartment established).” According to the paper produced as a response to this tasking, the Owl Channel was created “to handle this and related papers.” See Documents 97 and 91.
2. Attached but not printed at Tab A is a set of four questions. The Arms Control Support Group addressed each of the questions in the paper which was distributed on September 24. See Document 97.