Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

88. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 16, 1985

SUBJECT

• Preparing for Geneva

I believe we should take a much more positive and commanding attitude toward the Geneva meeting than is at present apparent to the public. We sought the meeting and we got it. We have important objectives. We have a strong position from which to work and we are ready to engage with the Soviets and confident that we can represent ourselves and the free world strongly.

The Soviet Union needs to know from the top how determined we are not to be pushed around or have others pushed around in various parts of the world. They need to know that we will defend our interests. They need to see on the basis of concrete proposals that we are ready for give-and-take to reduce the burden of the arms race and reduce the risk of war.

We need to take charge of the Geneva meeting and manage it visibly and aggressively. Procedurally we need to:

A. Work strongly with friends and allies around the world both before and after the meeting.

B. Engage in a serious and visible preparatory effort.

C. Engage the Soviets bilaterally in the effort.

With the allies, you may want to take advantage of the presence of counterpart heads-of-state at the United Nations to seek their views visibly so they feel involved in the process. We might consider sending a special envoy around, say in the latter part of October or the first part of November, such as I did as a private citizen before the Versailles Summit.² Someone like Larry Eagleburger could do this well. It would be partly substance and partly imagery.

We need to construct our “delegation,” as distinct from who actually sits in the meetings, so as to be able to quickly and effectively shape our positions on the spot.

After the meeting we will want to fan out the members of our delegation to capitals of friends and allies to give them a first-hand feel for what happened.

Assuming you will get back to Washington by mid-afternoon Thursday following the meeting, you might call in the Congressional leadership that afternoon and brief them.³ You could, in addition, send me to brief members of the Senate and House separately the next day in meetings open to any member who wishes to come, as I have done on other occasions. Whatever the outcome of the meeting, a direct report by you to the American people should be considered, so that whatever is filtered through the press is not the only story. After Thanksgiving, you might send me or someone around for follow-on discussions to consolidate the support of our friends.

With regard to preparatory work, there are a number of important decisions to be made and that process is moving along. But there is also a great deal of preparation to be done, first in connection with Shevardnadze and then, of course, for the Gorbachev meeting. I think that the visibility of this process should be raised following your U.N. visit. Briefings in informal settings, such as in the Family Dining Room or up at Camp David, ought to be considered. The real work needs to be done with your own advisors in the government, but it may be quite useful to pull in people from outside and hear their views, as was done before the China trip.⁴

With regard to public affairs, I think we need to hew to a forceful and confident line without being unduly confrontational. We should increasingly emphasize our serious preparatory efforts and the unity of your Administration and the Congress behind you in this great undertaking. When we get to Geneva, I think there is a powerful argument for a “no contact with the press” rule for everyone in the delegation, with very little said and that only by the Spokesman. Or if you decide something should be said, it would be by explicit decision. There would be no backgrounders, no leaks, no meetings with the press of any kind. When the meeting is over, there will be plenty to say and we need a plan for how to say it.

Mike Deaver is a genius at thinking out the management of a major event of this kind. He is willing on a completely private and unpublicized basis to help brainstorm this subject. I would like to take advantage of his willingness.

I have always thought that letting Reagan be Reagan means a self-confident and positive approach.⁵ With the strong position we are in and the important objectives to be served, we should stop poor-mouthing this gigantic event and take it on as the important challenge and opportunity it really is. This is not the opening game of the little-league season. This is THE SUPER BOWL. We can and must win, whether it turns out to be a propaganda battle, an acrimonious exchange, or a constructive effort with a promise of more to come. We want the constructive effort and so do our friends, allies, and the American people.

1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Secretary’s Meetings with the President (10/10/1985); NLR–775–18–85–1–8. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Regan and McFarlane.
2. The G–7 met at Versailles from June 4 to 6, 1982.
3. November 21.
4. Reagan traveled to China from April 26 to May 1, 1984. Documentation on his trip is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXIX, China, 1984–1988.
5. In a memorandum to Shultz, September 16, Ridgway reported on a breakfast meeting between Hartman and Dobrynin in Moscow: “Dobrynin expressed notable misgivings about the scheduled private meeting between the leaders in Geneva. He said that Gorbachev very much wants the private session, but that he (Dobrynin) was concerned about what might transpire. He commented that there had been many angry words exchanged between our leaders in the past to no avail whatsoever and hoped that would not be the case this time. Dobrynin agreed that Gorbachev was likely to want to spend some time on ‘how we got where we are’ in the relationship and ‘where we are going,’ but he showed some concern about what we might have in mind by our references to an ‘agenda for the future.’ Art emphasized the importance of our leaders setting the course and having a good talk about the internal and foreign policy issues on their minds, but Dobrynin clearly remained uncomfortable with an unstructured meeting that could have unpredictable results.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (09/14/1985–09/16/1985); NLR–775–14–31–5–7)