309. Editorial Note
After the final meeting of the Reykjavik Summit on the evening of October 12, 1986, President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev were clearly both disappointed in the resulting stalemate. In his memoir, Gorbachev recalled: “We left the house as it was getting dark. We stood by the car. Everyone was in a bad mood. Reagan reproached me: ‘You planned from the start to come here and put me in this situation!’ ‘No, Mr. President,’ I replied. ‘I’m ready to go right back into the house and sign a comprehensive document on all the issues agreed if you drop your plans to militarize space.’ ‘I am really sorry’ was Reagan’s reply. We made our farewells and he left in his car.” (Gorbachev, Memoirs, pages 418–419) In his diary entry for October 12, Reagan wrote: “He wanted language that would have killed S.D.I. The price was high but I wouldn’t sell & that’s how day ended. All our people thought I’d done exactly right. I’d pledged I wouldn’t give away S.D.I. & I didn’t but that meant no deal on any of the arms reductions.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, page 647)
Pavel Palazhchenko, the primary Soviet interpreter during the Summit, recalled in his memoir: “In the end, of course, there was no agreement in Reykjavik. Reagan continued to insist on the need for SDI as protection against a madman and therefore refused to accept limits on it. Gorbachev said that without an agreement on defense there could be no agreement on offensive weapons—the two things were linked. What is more, he included INF missiles in that link.
“As Reagan and Gorbachev left Hofdi House, the reporters did not know what had happened, but Reagan’s dejected face told the story. Their final exchange was picked up by reporters and was in most newspapers the next day, as well as the photo of Gorbachev and Reagan saying goodbye to each other in front of Hofdi House, with me standing between them.
“[Secretary of State George] Shultz gave a gloomy press conference right afterward, saying that promising agreements had been discussed but fell through because Gorbachev insisted on limiting SDI. [See Department of State Bulletin, December 1986, pages 9–13] As Gorbachev entered the crowded auditorium where his press conference was to be held thirty minutes later, everyone was expecting a similar assessment. But as I interpreted his words, I sensed that Gorbachev took a completely different line.” (Palazchenko, My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, page 57)
Of his press conference and impression of the meetings, Gorbachev later recalled: “had we not reached an agreement both on strategic and [Page 1346] intermediate-range missiles, was it not an entirely new situation, and should it be sacrificed for the sake of a momentary propaganda advantage? My intuition was telling me that I should cool off and think it all over thoroughly. I had not yet made up my mind when I suddenly found myself in the enormous press-conference room. About a thousand journalists were waiting for us. When I came into the room, the merciless, often cynical and cheeky journalists stood in silence. I sensed the anxiety in the air. I suddenly felt emotional, even shaken. These people standing in front of me seemed to represent mankind waiting for its fate to be decided.
“At this moment I realized the true meaning of Reykjavik and knew what further course we had to follow.
“My speech has been published in newspapers and commented on by scores of journalists, political scientists and politicians. I therefore do not quote it in extenso. The key phrase of the speech was: ‘In spite of all its drama, Reykjavik is not a failure—it is a breakthrough, which allowed us for the first time to look over the horizon.’” (Gorbachev, Memoirs, page 419)
Reagan wrote in his memoir: “At Reykjavik, my hopes for a nuclear-free world soared briefly, then fell during one of the longest, most disappointing—and ultimately angriest—days of my presidency.” (Reagan, An American Life, page 675) He recalled the end of the meeting and his departure from Hofdi House: “He [Gorbachev] tried to act jovial but I acted mad & showed it. Well, the ball is now in his court and I’m convinced he’ll come around when he sees how the world is reacting. I was very disappointed—and very angry. When I flew home to Washington, the reception I got showed the American people were behind me. They didn’t want to surrender the SDI.” (Ibid., page 679)