Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

307. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Reykjavik, October 12, 1986, 2:05–3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Secretary Shultz
  • National Sec. Advisor Poindexter
  • Ambassador Nitze
  • Assistant Secretary Perle
  • Robert Linhard, NSC
  • D. Zarechnak (Interpreter)
  • Others?

• USSR

  • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
  • Ambassador Karpov
  • G. Arbatov
  • Notetaker
  • P. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

This meeting was decided upon at the very last minute of the previous meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, which ended at 1:35 pm.² To save time, the meeting between the Secretary and Shevardnadze was conducted in simultaneous (without using equipment), and consequently, I was able to take (some) notes on what Shevardnadze was saying, and none on what the Secretary was saying, since I was interpreting as he was talking. The following is the gist of what I wrote down and recall:

Shevardnadze stressed that the main thing on which the sides would have to agree was the time period for non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. If that could be agreed, a formula for the talks on nuclear testing could be found, and everything else could be agreed. But without agreement on the period of non-withdrawal, there could be no document. The two sides had agreed on a 50% reduction of strategic forces, on zero medium-range forces in Europe, and a solution on Asia.

The Soviet side could not agree to less than a 10-year period of non-withdrawal. The U.S. had proposed 5–7½ years, and the Soviet side had proposed 15–20 years initially. Now it had come down to 10 years, and could not go lower.

The Secretary indicated that the U.S. could not agree to a 10-year period.

Shevardnadze said that it would take that long to physically destroy the existing systems. It was not accidental that the Soviet side had indicated a period of 10 years. But the U.S. side wanted to create new weapons within the 5–7 year period. The General Secretary was very adamant about this time period.

Shevardnadze mentioned that other nations would have to join the USSR and the U.S. in reducing nuclear weapons at a certain point, and the Secretary agreed.

Towards the end of the meeting, the Secretary proposed to Shevardnadze a draft text which had been worked out during the meeting by Poindexter, Perle and Linhard. The Secretary indicated that the text had not been cleared with the President, and Shevardnadze should bear that in mind.³ The text was the following, which was translated simultaneously to Shevardnadze:

“Both sides would agree to confine themselves to research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty for a period of five years, through 1991, during which time a 50% reduction in strategic offensive arsenals would be achieved. This being done, both sides will continue the pace of reductions with respect to all remaining offensive ballistic missiles with the goal of the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by the end of a second five-year period. As long as these reductions continue at the appropriate pace, the same restrictions will continue to apply. At the end of the ten-year period, with all offensive ballistic missiles eliminated, either side would be free to introduce defenses.”

Shevardnadze seemed not to have any problems with the first parts of the proposal, but immediately seized upon the last sentence, and was very critical of it. The meeting ended as this was being discussed.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memorandum of Conversations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Reykjavik Conversation October 1986. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Zarechnak. The meeting took place at Hofdi House. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: “That afternoon, we were back at the negotiating table. Shevardnadze and I sat on opposite sides of a long table, each of us flanked by our delegations, protagonists in the long cold war struggle over nuclear arms and ballistic missiles. I opened our discussion with what I regarded as a solvable drafting problem: the issues in nuclear testing. I found Shevardnadze cold, almost taunting. The Soviets had made all the concessions, he said. Now it was our turn: there was no point in trying to perfect language on other issues. Everything depended on agreement on how to handle SDI: a ten-year period of nonwithdrawal and strict adherence to the terms of the ABM Treaty during that period. That was their bottom line.” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 768)
2. See Document 306.
3. In his memoir, Shultz wrote: “Bob Linhard, an air force colonel and arms control expert assigned to the NSC staff, with Perle looking over his shoulder, was scribbling away on a draft, which he then passed to the other American delegates, who one by one nodded in assent. Then Poindexter passed it to me. I read the draft carefully. Linhard had combined in an interesting way ideas we had put forward earlier. Richard Perle had tried out something close to this on me before we came to Reykjavik. Poindexter had suggested to the president during our private dinner the night before, reflecting our feeling that something bold from us might be called for, that we should consider using in a dramatic way Weinberger’s idea of eliminating ballistic missiles. The president had not objected. I said to Shevardnadze, ‘I would like to explore with you an idea that I have not discussed with the president, but please hear me out. This is an effort by some of us here to break the impasse. I don’t know how the president will react to it. If, after we break, you hear some pounding in our area, you’ll know that is the president knocking my head against the wall.’” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 768)
4. Shultz continued: “Shevardnadze immediately questioned why we would want the right to deploy defenses at the end of ten years. By that time, it was almost 3:00 P.M., and the leaders had returned to Hofdi House. Each side caucused. President Reagan was entirely comfortable with the Linhard idea. He regarded it as his own idea dressed up in the lingo of arms control. His most ardently held goal as president was his desire to work to rid the American people of the threat of annihilation from ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads. The caucus on each side proceeded feverishly, delaying the start of our afternoon meeting until 3:25.” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 769)