Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

112. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Courtney) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)¹

Washington, October 2, 1985

SUBJECT

• The Soviet Arms Control Proposal

Following are my personal thoughts on the Soviet proposal, elaborated in NST Geneva 9029.²

At the end of his “TIME” Magazine interview Gorbachev made perhaps his most revealing public comment to date on Soviet foreign policy:

“I don’t remember who, but somebody said that foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy. If that is so, then I ask you to ponder one thing: If we in the Soviet Union are setting for ourselves such truly grandiose plans in the domestic sphere, then what are the external conditions that we need to be able to fulfill those domestic plans? I leave the answer to that question to you.”

Gorbachev appears to be saying that major changes in Soviet foreign policy—which has been rigid and harsh toward the West, and unsuccessful—are needed to bring it into better synch with the domestic priorities of revitalizing the economy and raising Soviet morale. If so, his penchant for tackling domestic problems head on suggests he might also take a direct approach to external problems. Soviet leaders claim the central one is arms control.

A Bad Deal?

Were it not for these broader considerations of Soviet policy, and an expectation that the USSR will fall off a number of its demands, the new Soviet NST proposal would seem unworthy of U.S. interest:

—Unequal Intercontinental Forces: Their INF forces (SS–20, SS–22, Backfire, Badger, Blinder) would not count against the 6,000 ceiling on charges, but our Pershing, GLCM, F–111, F–4, and F–16 in Europe, and A–6 and A–7 on aircraft carriers would count, leaving us with fewer weapons than the Soviets for intercontinental attack.

—Dangerous INF Imbalance in Europe: The U.S. could deploy no GLCMs, yet the USSR could retain 1,200 or so SS–20 warheads to offset British and French SLBMs.

—Bomber Penetrativity Jeopardized: The U.S. would get no advantage in bomber weapons (SRAM and gravity bomb) to offset unrestricted Soviet air defenses; also, ALCMs would be banned, thus jeopardizing the penetrativity of our remaining B–52 bombers and of the B–1 bomber in future years.

—SDI and ASAT Killed: The SDI research and ASAT programs would be stopped in their tracks.

—U.S. Offensive Modernization Prevented: The U.S. could not deploy new, more capable and more survivable weapons systems, such as the Trident D–5 and Midgetman missiles, nor nuclear-armed SLCMs.

—Soviet Offensive Modernization Preserved: The USSR could deploy the new SS–X–24 and SS–X–25 ICBMs and SS–NX–23 SLBM since they have been flight tested (D–5 and Midgetman have not); it could also deploy a new SS–18 follow-on ICBM, which the Soviets would call modernization of an existing system, not a new type.

—No Guaranteed Stabilizing Reductions: The Soviets could (but are unlikely to) keep all their hard-target-kill SS–18s, with 3,080 warheads.

Traditional Soviet Motives

Motives for this proposal seem rooted in the USSR’s traditional approach to arms control:

—an urge to use arms control to improve Soviet military capabilities relative to those of the U.S.;

—a perception that arms control can lead to better East-West relations which in turn can improve Soviet access to western economic and technological resources, increase the prestige of the Soviet Union and its leadership, and, consequently, raise domestic morale;

—a drive to decouple the U.S. from European security, and to gain nuclear superiority in the Eurasian military theaters, especially Europe;

—a compulsion to have substantial, prompt hard-target-kill forces for large-scale preemptive strikes, and active programs for air and missile defenses, so as to be able to cripple U.S. military potential and national resolve, and protect the motherland from nuclear devastation;

—a fear that U.S. advantages in high technology could upset the military balance in the future;

—an incentive to limit U.S. hard-target-kill capability (in the D–5 missile), so as to enhance the survivability of similar Soviet capabilities, concentrated in the vulnerable, silo-based SS–18.

What’s New?

What is new in the Soviet proposal is a willingness to reduce intercontinental attack weapons to as low as 6,000. Because of their conservative strike planning requirements, the Soviets seek nuclear forces with large numbers of weapons. But the new proposal would require them to reduce the number of warheads on ballistic missiles. For example, the 3,600 Soviet ICBM warheads (60 percent of 6,000) might be allocated to 1,800 SS–18 warheads (enough for two-on-one targeting against the remaining U.S. hard targets), and 1,800 SS–24 and SS–25 warheads, some of which would serve as a reserve of prompt ICBM capabilities.

The Soviets may be willing to cut their SS–18 force by about one-third for several reasons—the U.S. would probably reduce its number of ICBM silos (i.e., targets) under the new arrangement, and more accurate SS–18, SS–24, and SS–25 follow-on ICBMs will reduce the need for redundant targeting.

A Reason for Optimism?

Soviet interest in radical reductions in strategic warheads offers ground for modest optimism:

—A meaningful reduction in nuclear capabilities may have become a political imperative in the East as well as in the West. The Soviet political leadership has made a bold decision, a sharp departure from past positions which sought to preserve well over 10,000 warheads for Soviet strategic forces. The difficulty of making this decision may indicate Gorbachev’s commitment to achieving arms control progress, and perhaps the political pressures in Moscow that may allow further Soviet concessions as the negotiations gain momentum.

—As Ogarkov’s May 1984 article hinted, the Soviet military may now want nuclear reductions in order to free more resources for high-technology conventional forces, and to reduce the risk of NATO escalation to nuclear conflict in Europe.³

Still Grounds for Pessimism

Despite Soviet interest in reductions, the new proposal offers plenty of reason for pessimism. For example, the negotiations cannot progress unless the Soviets drop outright their frivolous demands, such as a ban on cruise missiles, a ban on modernizing strategic forces, and a ban on all SDI research (a demand Gorbachev appeared to concede in his “TIME” interview) and on our ASAT program. Past experience suggests these demands will eventually fall away. But for the moment they may represent a military wish list.

If these problems are overcome, the talks may center on several divisive issues:

—Europe: While in SALT I and II the Soviets dropped their demands for inclusion of forward based forces, they are unlikely to do so this time. The new U.S. INF missiles and new MIRVed British and French submarine missiles will give NATO upwards of 1,700 missile warheads by the mid- to late-1990s. Only a fraction of these warheads could destroy most worthwhile targets in the western USSR. The Soviets will insist on some compensation. A walk-in-the-woods-type formula (which would allow 225 Soviet SS–20 warheads in Europe and somewhat more in Asia, while restricting the U.S. to 300 GLCM warheads in Europe) might be barely acceptable to the Soviets. They could well, however, stick on a harder position.

—Bombers: We will insist on treating slow-flying bomber weapons, which face air defenses, differently from fast-flying ballistic missile weapons. Equal limits on bombers would give us some advantage, however, because of the greater payload of U.S. bombers. The Soviets will refuse to treat Backfire the same as B–1, and, in view of the new findings on Backfire range, we probably will have to find a way to count it as a theater rather than strategic aircraft. OSD will resist, however, citing the Backfire’s capability for one-way missions.

—Stabilizing Reductions: We will want guaranteed Soviet cuts in SS–18s of more than 100, and cuts in ICBM warheads to below 3,500. With flexibility on both sides a compromise might be reached, though OSD will fight for impossible-to-get cuts.

—SDI and ASAT: In view of the President’s recent comments, it is unclear whether he would agree to hold the SDI program to the research phase for a long period of time. Bill Beecher’s⁴ eastern source recently floated the idea that the Soviets might ask that it be held to research for only 5–10 years, as a price for an offensive agreement. The Soviets will seek to kill our ASAT miniature vehicle program, but may settle for nothing, or a high-altitude ASAT test ban (we have no plans to develop a high-altitude ASAT).

The Future

It is too early to predict where each side will come out on these difficult issues. We may also not know for some time the magnitude of the Soviet leadership’s commitment to achieving meaningful arms control. Even if a sea change in Soviet thinking has occurred—and we should not presume it has—past Soviet negotiating style teaches us that the haggling will be painful and protracted. Like us, the Soviets will not make most of the political decisions needed to get an agreement until they are forced to do so. No one can predict how those decisions will come out.

At the same time, the new signs of Soviet willingness to put its money where its mouth is on radical reductions reflect a change from the immobilism that has gripped Kremlin decisionmaking in recent years. We should test the new Soviet approach with serious dialogue, and counterproposals of our own. For example, a possible counter might include 5,000 ICBM and SLBM warheads (our current position), a limit of 60 percent on any one leg and 150 heavy ICBMs, 100 strategic bombers, and a walk-in-the-woods formula for INF. This would bring deep cuts in ballistic missile warheads, reduce Soviet hard-target-kill capabilities, preserve some U.S. advantage in bomber payload, and allow us a substantial INF deployment in Europe.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 NODIS and EXDIS Secretariat Memorandums, Lot 94D92, NODIS September 1985. Secret; Sensitive. In an October 2 covering note to Shultz, Armacost wrote: “Attached is a memo written by Bill Courtney giving his personal thoughts on the new Soviet arms control proposal. Bill is quite knowledgeable about arm control issues and has served in our Embassy in Moscow. I thought you might be interested in reading it.” In telegram 303840 to USUN for Armacost, October 2, Courtney noted: “I met with CIA analysts at Langley this morning to discuss the Soviet proposal. Their views are broadly consistent with those I sent you on Monday evening.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Eggplant II, September–December 1985 NP)
2. In telegram 9029 from the NST Delegation in Geneva, September 30, the delegation summarized the primary portions of the Soviet arms control proposal, which the Soviet delegation had tabled that day. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850693–0396) The full Soviet statement was transmitted to the Department in telegram 9098 from NST Geneva, October 1. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850698–0517)
3. Nikolai Ogarkov, “The Defense of Socialism: The Experience of History and the Present Day,” Krasnaya Zvezda, May 9, 1984, p. 3.
4. Reporter for the Boston Globe.