101. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan1
SUBJECT
- My Meeting With Shevardnadze
Despite all the advance publicity, as I told you over the phone, Shevardnadze had no new arms control proposals in our meeting this afternoon.2 In a private exchange with Bud McFarlane, however, Dobrynin said they would be forthcoming on Friday.3
Shevardnadze told me in our tete-a-tete that the Gorbachev letter he will deliver to you contains Gorbachev’s views on how the November meeting should go.4 Shevardnadze said that Gorbachev would focus on four areas: security, regional, and bilateral issues; and an agenda for the future. He indicated that the letter would suggest that these points be covered in a final document. I told him I thought we could begin work on such a document, but that our final position would be determined by how the substance was shaping up.
The tone of the general meeting was basically positive. There was a good deal of give and take; far more than with Gromyko and with more people on each side participating. Except for an initial exchange on our mutual desire for a positive November meeting, virtually the entire four hours were devoted to the issues being covered in the Geneva arms control talks.
I gave Shevardnadze an extensive presentation of our views on how to enhance nuclear stability, stressing that the underlying assump [Page 421] tions of the ABM Treaty and SALT I have been undermined. I made clear that we now need to get on with the process of radical reductions in offensive arms, reversing the erosion of the ABM Treaty, and ensuring that the Treaty is fully observed. I made a particular point of emphasizing that we have concrete proposals on the table in Geneva which would produce substantial reductions in offensive weapons. I reaffirmed our intention to continue to abide by the ABM Treaty, and elaborated on our concept of strategic defense.
Shevardnadze basically had nothing new to say. While he stressed the need to define points of convergence in our positions (and even used the Soviet word for “compromise”), he reiterated at length the standard Soviet linkage between a ban on “space strike weapons” and offensive arms reductions. He did say that fundamental and laboratory research is permitted by the ABM Treaty. But when Bud McFarlane asked whether Soviet laser, directed energy, and ballistic missile defense programs were consistent with the Treaty, he ducked. An extensive discussion of the specifics of the ABM Treaty produced no agreement, but may be worth having our negotiators pursue in Geneva.
In a separate conversation, Dobrynin told Bud McFarlane that Gorbachev had made a special effort to be asked in his Time interview about you, so as to be able to say something positive.5 Bud said we’d noticed it, but could hardly be expected to be grateful for appropriate courtesies. Dobrynin indicated Gorbachev is looking for ideas for the personal touches which could be done in Geneva to create good imagery, including activities involving wives. Bud pointed out the negative impact of Soviet public shrillness and rhetoric in this regard and urged that the Soviets find a way to close the Nicholson case and avoid further MLM incidents.
I had a strong sense that Shevardnadze is a different, more approachable, person in private than when he is surrounded by his advisors. I believe your tete-a-tete with him Friday will be a good opportunity to get our views across and that I may be able to do some business during my private dinner that evening.
- Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 Soviet Union September. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in New York.↩
- See Documents 99 and 100. No record of this telephone conversation was found.↩
- September 27. No record of this conversation between Dobrynin and McFarlane was found.↩
- See Document 100.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 80.↩