We seek your approval of the attached Executive Summary of the East-West
Policy study, your decision on the one remaining disagreement within the
Department, and your authorization to circulate the full study so that we
can move ahead promptly to the SIG and the
NSC.
Having passed the 4-month mark, the Administration now needs to pull together
the various strands of its East-West policy into one coherent strategic
approach. This is important for sustaining a consistent posture toward
East-West relations over the next few years. It is also necessary for
building allied consensus and in generating support at home for our policy.
We believe that the attached study contributes to filling these needs and
also provides the basis for a major East-West speech by you or the
President.
This study incorporates comments from throughout the Department and already
reflects considerable interagency work. We anticipate support from the
NSC staff and the Pentagon, although
some specific points of difference may still surface. With your approval,
Larry will convene an IG meeting to complete the work in preparation
for the SIG, and then we will move this
project rapidly to the NSC.
1. That you approve the attached Executive Summary and authorize us to move
the study promptly to the IG and SIG.2
3. That you approve the preparation of a draft speech, based on this study,
for delivery by you or the President following NSC approval of the final study.4
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of State6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EAST-WEST POLICY STUDY
I. Overview: The Present Situation and Future
Prospects
The Soviet-American relationship will be entering a
new and dangerous phase during the coming decade, independent
of any major US policy changes. Increased Soviet power threatens the
free and open international order the US has sought to maintain
throughout the postwar period. The most urgent dangers
are: (1) Soviet use of its own and proxy forces to acquire new
strategic advantages, particularly in politically
unstable but vital regions; and (2) Soviet efforts to divide the US
from its major allies through a combination of threats and
inducements.
In this setting, our East-West policy will be based on
the following premises: (1) that the East-West competition reflects fundamental and enduring conflicts
of interests, purpose and outlook; (2) that the US should move beyond its passive post-Vietnam foreign
policy and provide greater leadership to enable the West to
compete more effectively; (3) that over the near term, given the legacy
we have inherited, we often will have to compete with
the USSR under unfavorable
circumstance; and (4) some degree of
cooperation with Moscow is possible and desirable and can help
to sustain a consensus both at home and abroad in favor of a more
competitive posture.
Our ability to meet this challenge will have to be
based on a long-term effort to rebuild American and Western
power and willingness to assume higher risks in defending our
interests. We cannot reverse trends favoring the Soviet Union overnight;
to do so at all will require considerable patience and resourcefulness.
In the short term, we must make use of our existing assets more
efficiently by taking advantage of special areas of
American and Western strength, while
exploiting Soviet weaknesses and vulnerabilities.
US global strategy must improve our position by
joining American strength to that of allied and friendly countries. We
should draw on an
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informal but interlocking coalition of
European and Asian allies, our strategic association with China, and
our partnerships with key “Third World” countries. The US must be the fulcrum of this structure,
providing the leadership needed to integrate
Western assets and defend vital Western interests. On this basis we can ensure a sustainable internationalist US foreign
policy for the 1980s.
Naturally the Soviet Union will act vigorously to
protect and expand its position against a newly assertive American
foreign policy; it has a great many instruments for doing so.
We should avoid mindless confrontations and
take account of vital Soviet interests in devising means for countering
aggressive Soviet behavior. But this should not keep
us from competing forcefully with the USSR in defense of our own interests. We cannot buy time by
accommodation; such a course also would mislead our public and our
allies as to our purposes and steadfastness. Moscow is likely in any
case to take actions that challenge our interests and the costs of accepting the aggressive Soviet posture are simply too
high.
The long-term weaknesses of the Soviet Union, the
economic and political strengths of the West and the mandate embodied in
the November elections encourage us to believe that an
effective policy toward the Soviet Union is within our reach as long
as we make full use of our strengths. Yet the
material costs and political difficulties must not be
understated. Large and continuing economic burdens for defense
must be patiently and skillfully defended before the Congress and the
public. We will have to create and enlarge relationships with states
that are critical Soviet targets or strategically decisive. Finally, regaining the initiative will sometimes require that
we accept immediate risks in order to avoid greater albeit more
long-term ones. For example, security assistance to Pakistan at
this time can avoid more serious problems later.
A strong consensus both at home and abroad will be
crucial to sustaining these policies. We also will have to take
the lead on issues of critical importance, without letting uncertainty
over the extent of domestic or allied support deprive us of essential
freedom of action. Success will depend on a strong
sense of priorities and on effective leadership.
II. Soviet Strengths and Weaknesses
Management of the East-West relationship requires a dispassionate
tallying of Moscow’s strengths and weaknesses. Over
the near term, the Soviet Union possesses several distinct
advantages in its competition with the United States: First, it
enjoys, and in the short term will increase its significant military advantages in key regions, accompanied by
a greatly improved nuclear balance; second, it is in a
position to exploit instability in many areas of the developing
world crucial to Western interests, particularly the Persian Gulf; third, it has built up a network of allies, clients and proxies throughout the
Third World; fourth, from their recent use, Soviet
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armed forces
and those of its allies and proxies are gaining
operational self-confidence and an enhanced capacity for
intimidation; fifth, it can play upon a residual
Western attachment to detente to separate the US from its
allies; and sixth, Moscow can pursue its objectives in relative freedom from domestic political constraints and dependence
on foreign resources.
At the same time the Soviets must contend with a
number of liabilities: First, Soviet economic growth will continue to stagnate in this
decade for reasons inherent in the system itself; second, the USSR is on the verge of a wholesale leadership change that could hamper the
conduct of foreign policy; third, the Soviets face the hostility of all the industrial democracies and China; fourth,
the Soviets will increasingly suffer from imperial
overextension, as reflected by the weaknesses of Soviet proxies
and dependents and by the instability of Eastern Europe; and finally,
Marxism-Leninism is a bankrupt ideology which
fails to answer the needs either of the working class it is meant to
serve or of the developing nations in the Third World.
Unfortunately, these long-term liabilities do not
lessen the dangers that we now face or permit a more passive US
attitude towards Moscow. Indeed, the combination of short-term strengths and long-term weakness may
prompt the Soviets to capitalize on their advantage now. The Soviets
may regard the energy vulnerability of the West and their own
ability to exploit military power for political purposes in the
Persian Gulf area as an opportunity of historic proportions to
cripple the Western alliance once and for all. Moscow’s
long-term problems will be of little benefit to us unless we can defend
our interests over the short-run and establish trends favorable to
us.
III. U.S. Policy Toward East-West Relations
This Administration will pursue the following goals
with regard to the Soviet Union:
A. Restoring a statisfactory military balance.
Because military power is a necessary basis for
competing with the Soviets effectively, US forces will have to be
increased across the board. The Soviets have widened their
existing superiority in conventional forces in Europe, Asia and the
broad Persian Gulf/Middle East region, supplementing them with a network
of proxies in the Third World. This has occurred against the backdrop of
a shift in the strategic and theater nuclear balances, which weakens
deterrence and the US strategic commitments on which it is based.
Military modernization must emphasize the procurement
of systems which take advantage of American strengths and exploit
Soviet vulnerabilities, including those of Soviet proxies.
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• Nuclear Forces. The overall
nuclear balance is not satisfactory, and our programs of strategic
and theater modernization are not yet, even in combination, adequate
to redress the balance. At a minimum we need to restore the nuclear
balance and to improve the ability of these forces to support
US deterrent commitments. Nuclear force improvements should be gauged
not simply by static quantitative measures, but also by qualitative
factors, such as C3I, that have a
practical military significance, i.e., that provide enduring capability
to destroy targets of military significance.
• Regional Forces. The forces of the US and its allies
are insufficient to meet common security needs. Accordingly, the US
must modernize and expand its conventional force structure with
emphasis on four areas. First, in cooperation with our allies
and regional nations, we must work to create
capabilities adequate to meet the full array of Soviet and regional
threats, above all in the Persian Gulf area. We must improve
our own capability to utilize access to local facilities already
obtained, working steadily for gradual increases as regional nations
gain more confidence in us. Second, we must reverse
the deterioration of regional balances in Europe and Asia.
Third, the US must establish an improved margin of maritime superiority to put at risk the global Soviet navy and to
strengthen our capacity to manage the regional crises. Finally,
the US should improve its arms transfer
capability by making additional resources available on a timely
basis to meet the needs of regional allies
threatened by the Soviets or their proxies.
The US should pursue a realistic arms control
policy aimed at verifiable agreements that can enhance national
security by limiting those Soviet systems which are most threatening to
us and by reducing the risk of war or reducing its destructiveness if
war occurs. Disarmament or restrictions on new technologies for their
own sake should be eschewed, as well as agreements negotiated simply to
improve the atmosphere of superpower relations. Instead, we need to set tougher substantive standards that
challenge the Soviets to accept true parity at reduced levels and
prepare both US and European public opinion to accept no agreements
at all if these are not met. The US needs to establish the primacy
of our own military programs as the basis for assuring
security; indeed, this is the only way we can expect to achieve
meaningful limits on Soviet weaponry. We should
recognize that this arms control strategy may make it unlikely that
negotiated agreements will be achieved in the short run.
B. Defending Western interests in areas of
instability.
The greatest danger of Soviet use of military force, either directly or
by proxy, arises in the Third World. The US must break
out of its post-Vietnam passivity and adopt a counter-offensive
strategy that seizes the initiative from the Soviets by opposing
them and their proxies, where possible at times and places of
our own choosing. Such a strategy would seek
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to discourage the further use and growth of the
proxy network by driving up both risks and costs of
Moscow’s Third World involvements, by exploiting the vulnerabilities
of Soviet proxies and by weakening their Soviet connection
through appropriate use of incentives and disincentives. Many of these
regimes are narrowly based with severe ethnic, social, sectarian and
economic problems. Afghanistan, Cuba, South Yemen, Libya, and Ethiopia
represent particularly important points of Soviet exposure. On an
ideological plane, the US should put the spotlight on
the aggressive activities and internal shortcomings of Soviet
proxies and keep them on the defensive. This counter-offensive
strategy must be carefully tailored in light of regional political and
cultural realities.
We also should seek to preempt Soviet opportunism
through timely political action and constructive
economic policies to prevent instability, promote prosperity and
resolve disputes. Our concerns for security and peaceful
progress are mutually reinforcing. It is essential that the United
States continue to present a positive alternative to the arms and
repression that the Soviet Union offers to the Third World, while
understanding that our support for some types of political and economic
reform can generate instability which can be exploited by Moscow.
Given our present constraints, we need to set
priorities among US interests. Above all, the
US and its allies must be able to defend Western interests in the
strategic Persian Gulf and Near East area. We, together with
our allies and regional friends, need capabilities adequate to protect
Western access to oil against direct challenge and to respond to the
politically disruptive shadow cast by Soviet power. Horizontal escalation may be a useful stop-gap but cannot itself be counted on to deal with the
threat as the Soviets have such options of their own. We must expand cooperation with allies outside of the
region and with regional friends that are capable of countering
Soviet proxies. But our experience in
Iran indicates that there is no substitute for direct
US power projection and such cooperation is likely to be
achieved only if the US can demonstrate its own increased capability and
commitment to help its friends.
Our counter-offensive strategy should be applied at
once to Afghanistan. We should with other states combine
intense political pressure for a total Soviet withdrawal, appropriate
encouragement to Afghan freedom fighters, major security assistance to
Pakistan and a concerted political program to illuminate Soviet
aggressive behavior in the Third World.
Finally, our emphasis on the Persian Gulf should not
obscure our enduring interest in other parts of the developing
world, particularly the current volatile Central American area, the
ASEAN states and southern
Africa.
C. Improving Cooperation with our European
Allies.
The US must forge a new alliance consensus for its
strategy towards the Soviet Union, against the background of
European doubts about
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American
leadership, extensive economic links with the Soviet bloc, energy
dependence on the Middle East and fear of Soviet power. We should avoid
West-West quarrels of the sort that plagued the last administration; if there are hard times ahead with Moscow, they should
benefit, not harm the alliance. We must urge
European leaders to work actively toward reducing the political
constraints on their defense policies and to join us in countering
Moscow.
Our key goals in Europe are:
• To improve and enlarge consultation and
coordination with our allies, particularly on
issues outside Europe.
• To increase our allies’ commitment of resources to
the common defense, both in Europe and in areas vital to the
alliance. The US must provide defense leadership and a nuclear umbrella,
but the allies must do more in strengthening conventional forces and
sustaining LRTNF modernization. We
will have to seek a redefinition of the “division of labor.”
• To meet the allied need for a visible arms control
process, and to use that process to demonstrate Soviet
opposition to parity, arms reduction and effective, verifiable arms
control, while ensuring that negotiations do not
interfere with NATO
modernization. In particular, while maintaining a deliberate
track for negotiating
LRTNF
arms control, we must resist delays in modernization and
deployment.
• To arrest growing European economic dependence,
particularly energy, on the Soviet bloc, to take collective action
to prevent the emergence of future vulnerabilities and to reinforce
Western ties. The proposed European/Soviet gas pipeline is not
in our interest and should be handled to avoid further European
vulnerability. Common OECD policies
are needed on export credits and technology transfer. The coverage and
effectiveness of COCOM rules should
be improved. These policies also will require a consistent US policy of
denying the Soviets important economic support.
• To achieve greater understanding of US political,
economic and defense policies by European public and parliamentary
opinion, especially among the “successor generation” of
Europeans.
D. Developing the Potential of East Asian Allies
and Friends.
East Asia has enormous economic capability, but is militarily weak. Both
Japan and China will face major difficulties in realizing their very
large growth potential as counter-weights to Soviet power. As they do
so, US policy will aim to increase the security of the region against
outside pressures and interference and to preserve balance among the
East Asian powers. We can reach this goal by
encouraging the strengthening of friendly
regional states, while recognizing that their power
cannot become a substitute for that of the US. We will need to
continue to play a crucial balancing and integrating role.
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Japan and China have the greatest potential.
• While reconfirming our commitment to Japanese
security, we will encourage the acquisition of a military capability
by Japan to provide for its defense, within its constitutional
constraints, in such critical areas as air defense,
anti-submarine warfare, and protection of sea lanes in the Pacific and
Indian Oceans. Japan can also play a greater role in areas of common
alliance concern outside East Asia through supportive diplomacy and
economic assistance.
• China’s hostility to the USSR is of enormous political and strategic importance;
our goal is to solidify our developing relationship with China and
to strengthen China’s ability to resist Soviet intimidation. But the
Sino-American strategic association must be handled with care,
as Chinese interests and ambitions do not fully coincide with our own.
We should strengthen Chinese defensive
capabilities selectively while maintaining our commitment to the
security of Taiwan.
Beyond China and Japan, we will strengthen security cooperation with our
Korean, Australian, and New Zealand allies. We will also want to bolster
support for the ASEAN states to
promote their Western orientation and to strengthen their ability to
stand up to Vietnamese and Soviet expansionism.
E. Refashioning East-West economic relations so
that the Soviet Union is helped neither to strengthen itself militarily
nor to escape the full costs of its internal problems.
Far from moderating Soviet political-military behavior, the extensive
East-West economic ties of the past decade have created constituencies
among our allies, some of whom are vulnerable to Soviet pressure. We
need to define the guidelines for permissible East-West trade. Future Western economic policy must meet three major
criteria:
• It must not increase the Soviet capacity to wage
war. US policy will seek significantly improved controls over the transfer of technology important to
military production and to industrial sectors that indirectly support
military capability.
• It must narrow opportunities for Soviet economic
leverage over the West. While recognizing the greater stake of
our allies in commercial ties with the East, we must
try to cap and ultimately reverse political vulnerabilities
arising from the growth of East-West economic and energy
interdependence.
• It must not ease Soviet resource constraints or
associated political difficulties by relieving Moscow of the
burdens of its own economic problems or of responsibility for those of
Eastern Europe.
F. Promoting Positive Trends in Eastern
Europe.
Eastern Europe probably will have a more volatile and
dynamic character in the 1980s, posing major political
management choices for Moscow.
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The current Polish crisis forms an historic watershed for Soviet
imperial policy. While Moscow doubtless will use force where necessary
to keep its bloc in order, the Polish experiment is
testing—and perhaps stretching—the limits of Soviet
tolerance.
US policy objectives in Eastern Europe are to work
with our allies to support greater internal liberalization, foreign policy autonomy and contacts with the West,
while seeking to discourage Soviet intervention to block indigenous
reform movements.
—In the short term, assuming no Soviet
intervention in Poland, we should confirm our
differentiated approach to East European states, seeking to improve
relations and be forthcoming with countries that are relatively
liberal or independent, while dealing with other East Europeans on
the basis of strict reciprocity. A Soviet invasion of Poland
involving East European troops obviously would freeze relations for
a protracted period and present major strategic questions for
our East European policy. Whether there is an invasion
or not, we must keep the pressure on Moscow to bear a large share of
the economic burden.
In the longer-term, we seek to foster liberalization
and autonomy by intensifying contacts. Endemic East European debt
and economic problems should permit us to build increased economic
ties with appropriate East European countries, thereby enhancing both our influence and their
internal freedom of action. In doing so, we should employ
established multilateral institutions, such as the IMF and Western
creditor clubs, to avoid perpetuating chronic economic weaknesses. This
strategy must be coordinated with our allies, banks, unions and private
groups.
G. Recovering the ideological initiative by
spotlighting the deficiencies of the Soviet system.
The long-term weaknesses of the Soviet system can be
encouraged in part simply by telling the truth about the USSR. The Soviet Union faces
nascent problems among its nationalities
(particularly in the Baltic states and among Muslim groups in Central
Asia) and from its own working
class. The United States should provide
ICA with increased resources to
step up broadcasting activities to the Soviet Union, the
satellites and Soviet Third World clients, highlighting the economic and moral failings of Moscow and its
allies.
The expansionist international behavior of the Soviet
Union and its repressive, stagnant internal system make it
vulnerable to a moral counter-attack. Yet the US must also offer a
positive vision of the future. By promoting peaceful democratic
change, US policy will be able to give substance to this positive view
and prevent the emergence of Soviet opportunities.
H. Maintaining effective communication with the
Soviet Union.
A regular US/Soviet dialogue is not incompatible with
a more competitive US East-West policy. Indeed, effective
communication is essential to prevent
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dangerous misunderstandings of our intentions
and resolve, particularly at moments of high tension. We must
ensure that the USSR neither
exaggerates nor underestimates our purpose, and we should demonstrate
our openness to constructive Soviet approaches.
Visible US/Soviet contacts—and appropriate
negotiations—can be used in seeking to sustain political support at
home and in allied countries for a competitive Western policy toward
the USSR. But such contacts must
not prevent us from using the rhetoric needed in defending our policies. Nor can
they be allowed to divert us from necessary
tough and costly measures by falsely suggesting that fundamental
differences have been resolved. The Soviets can be expected to
exploit such contacts and seek to convince
our allies and our own public that negotiations should become a
substitute for forceful political, economic and military measures. Moscow also will make major efforts to divide us from
our allies on these issues. We must firmly
resist these Soviet efforts.
We need to subject all proposals for negotiations to
rigorous USG and allied review and
ensure that our participation and negotiating strategy are
consistent with clearly defined Western interests. Certain
negotiating forums can be useful for either arms control or
political purposes; we should know the difference. In European
arms control discussions, for example, we can challenge the Soviets to
accept true parity at reduced levels; in other East-West forums, such as
CSCE, we can challenge them to
honor commitments made and to build East-West relations on the basis of
strict reciprocity.
We must recognize that US/Soviet bilateral diplomacy
can sometimes undermine our larger purposes. In Third World crisis
areas, in particular, where we aim to work closely with our friends
in building barriers to Soviet influence, the Soviet Union generally
will not be helpful. We should recognize
the limitations—and disadvantages—of seeking to involve Moscow in the
peaceful resolution of regional disputes and should
not expand or legitimize the Soviet role. Instead, the West
should exploit its singular capacity to work with the key parties to
such disputes. Finally, if in the longer term the Soviet Union seeks to
deal with its internal or international liabilities through genuine
cooperation with the West, we should be prepared to conduct meaningful
negotiations, ensuring that our overall interests are protected.
