61. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
7643. Subject: Reply to Arbatov’s Message From Brezhnev. Ref: State 135636.2
1. (C—Entire text)
2. I delivered the message contained in para 4 reftel to Arbatov during a private meeting the afternoon of June 2. After I went over the points with him orally (I gave him nothing in writing), he seized upon the final one (that additional official or semi-official channels are neither necessary nor desirable and feigned perplexity about what this means. “Is it a suggestion that I not express my views to American friends?” He inquired. I assured him that it meant nothing more than it said, whereupon he claimed never to have made such a suggestion—indeed, he added, he was quite opposed to the idea of doing official business through other than official channels, and wondered aloud how such a suggestion could have been attributed to him. I told him that I could only infer that some of his American interlocutors had interpreted something he said as constituting such a suggestion, but that in any case there should now be no misunderstanding on either side regarding the matter.
[Page 167]3. He then proceeded to comment on other points in the message as follows:
—To the comment that the Reagan administration is still elaborating the details of its policy, he observed that these may be details from the U.S. point of view, but some are quite basic for the Soviets. For example, the administration’s attitude toward strategic arms limitation is still not clear to the Soviet leadership, but the conviction is growing that there is no genuine interest.3
—Regarding the principles of reciprocity and restraint, he said that his concern centered on the way these concepts were being used: Reciprocity could be employed as a pretext to dismantle the remaining ties between the two countries; as for restraint, this seemed to mean only that Soviet defense of its interests should be restrained.
—On linkage, he expressed doubt that it would result in practice in anything other than a rationalization for not making progress in any area, since a pretext for doing nothing can always be found somewhere.
—With some irony in his voice, he expressed pleasure at hearing that U.S. policy is not based on “anti-Sovietism,” but added that he was quite convinced that some senior members of the Reagan administration based their advice precisely on anti-Sovietism.
4. I replied to each of these observations in turn, pointing out, for example, that the President and Secretary had made clear their deep interest in genuine arms reduction, that neither reciprocity nor restraint were pretexts for something else but necessary in a relationship where benefits had been one-sided and restraint notable by its absence in such instances as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, that “linkage” reflects recognition of the basic political reality that Soviet behavior will have an impact on all elements of the relationship, and that he was making a serious mistake if he confused legitimate U.S. concern over Soviet actions and policies with doctrinaire “anti-Sovietism.”
5. Arbatov then dropped further discussion of these points and expressed great anxiety over the present state of U.S.-Soviet relations, saying that there is no real communication and that we are not in a good position to manage crises which could arise unexpectedly. “If a Yom Kippur war occurred today, I’m not sure a serious confrontation could be avoided,” he observed, and added that there is potential for such crises developing suddenly at many points, such as Lebanon and Pakistan.
6. I told him that I was confident that communication was quite adequate so long as there is a genuine Soviet desire to defuse problems, [Page 168] but it is the latter that I often found lacking. The conversation continued along predictable lines, with Arbatov trotting out his now familiar arguments that the policies of the Reagan administration run the risk of convincing the Soviet leaders that there is no U.S. intent to deal “constructively” with the USSR on any issue, but that there is a calculated U.S. policy of stirring up fear of the Soviet Union to justify massive military spending. I suggested to him that he would serve his profession and his government better if he made a more serious effort to understand why the American Government, and the American people, feel as they do about U.S.-Soviet relations, and how Americans attitudes had been formed by Soviet actions and policies—which now must be changed if improved relations are to be possible.
7. Comment: Despite Arbatov’s disingenuousness (to apply the kindest term possible) in denying having suggested a special channel of communication, he could not have missed message. I doubt, however, that this will put an end to his efforts to establish himself as a key interlocutor in the U.S.-Soviet dialogue. His other comments were largely identical with those he has served up to visiting Americans over the past couple of months. His visitors are likely to hear more of the same over the coming months.
- Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, Box 43, June 10, 1981. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Haig initialed the top of the telegram and wrote on the bottom of the page: “Larry, Arbatov is a phony—he’s not plugged in—we do better w/real people! AMH”↩
- In telegram 135636 to Moscow, May 23, the Department requested that the Embassy convey to Arbatov the message: “Official channels of U.S.-Soviet communication have been and remain open, both in Washington and Moscow. Additional official or semi-official channels are neither necessary nor desirable.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810244–1022)↩
- Haig underlined “there is no genuine interest” and wrote in the margin: “speech!”↩