395. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Brzezinski) to President
Carter1
Washington, November 24, 1980
SUBJECT
- Non-Proliferation Policy—Report of Gerry Smith (U)
Attached are three papers from Gerry
Smith which together comprise his final report to you on
non-proliferation policy:
—A report (Tab A) on his explorations with Europe and Japan of a possible
bargain in which the US would relax its
constraints on their reprocessing and plutonium programs in return for
greater cooperation in dealing with problem countries. He concludes that
such a deal cannot be struck “within the strict framework of the April
1977 policy.”2 (C)
—A longer paper (Tab B) giving his overall assessment and recommendations
on how our policy should be changed. (C)
—A brief memorandum (Tab C) urging that priority attention be given to
the Israeli weapons program and the negotiation of a CTB. (S)
These papers cover a lot of territory, but two issues are central: (a)
how to deal more effectively with problem countries, like Pakistan and
Argentina, where proliferation risks are immediate or around the corner,
and (b) the relevance of global constraints on reprocessing and
plutonium, which affect important Allied programs, to such risks.
(C)
Smith believes that we have put
too much emphasis on denying access to sensitive material and
technology, and should focus more on proliferation motives through the resolution of disputes and by enhancing
security arrangements. The alternative view, elaborated in PRM–15,3 is that where
motives and technological capability coincide, proliferation will almost
certainly result; motives are the most volatile and least controllable
factor, and access to materials and technology the most amenable to
short-term control. (C)
While he acknowledges that economic developments since 1977 have strongly
confirmed US arguments that reprocessing
and plutonium fuels should be deferred, Smith believes that the European and
[Page 1005]
Japanese programs present no significant
proliferation threat, and that we must relax our controls there in order
to gain their cooperation in withholding sensitive materials and
technology from problem countries. The alternative view is that a more
permissive plutonium policy toward Europe and Japan would inevitably
increase both proliferation risks, and political resentment, in the rest
of the world. (C)
These and many other questions addressed in Smith’s analysis were debated extensively in 1977. It is
entirely appropriate that they should be examined again in the light of
our experience over the past four years. Smith’s present conclusions would be contested by many,
but this is an important and well-argued brief for one point of view.
(C)
Tab A
Memorandum From Ambassador-at-Large and Special
Representative for Non-Proliferation Matters Smith to President Carter
4
Washington, October 30, 1980
SUBJECT
- Non-Proliferation Policy after INFCE
I
In June, you authorized me to explore with major European allies and
Japan on a personal and non-committal basis arrangements by which
they might agree to greater cooperation in strengthening the
non-proliferation regime and limiting reprocessing of spent fuel and
use of plutonium.5 The purpose was to
clarify what we might expect from our allies in return for greater
predictability in exercise of consent rights over the use of US-origin fuel. On the basis of such
clarification, we would be better able to develop positions for
renegotiation of agreements for cooperation with EURATOM, Japan, and other
countries, as required by the NNPA. As you requested, here are the results of the
explorations.
II
In a series of discussions with senior nuclear and foreign policy
officials of the UK, France, the
FRG, and Japan, I put forward
for their
[Page 1006]
consideration
a regime for the next 10–15 years in which those countries
would:
—defer commitments to thermal recycle;
—limit new reprocessing capacity to that required for breeders, and
limit separation of plutonium to avoid unnecessary stockpiling and
pressure for thermal recycle;
—support development of an effective International Plutonium Storage
regime, and avoid excess national stockpiles of plutonium;
—agree to US consent rights, as
called for in the NNPA, including
their continuation over material after use in breeder RD&D
programs;
—increase commitments to spent fuel storage as an alternative to
reprocessing;
—require full-scope safeguards as a condition of new supply
commitments and improve cooperation in dealing with problem
countries;
—cooperate to make reprocessing more proliferation-resistant, to
improve the “once-through” fuel cycle, to limit future enrichment
capacity to production of low enriched uranium only, and to improve
IAEA safeguards through
financial, technical and political support.
III
I suggested that in such a regime the US might:
—adopt predictable ground rules for exercise of consent rights over
reprocessing and plutonium use in specified breeder and other
advanced reactor RD&D programs;
—grant generic authorizations to reprocessing in the UK and France for other countries that
have good non-proliferation credentials, no spent fuel storage
alternative, or where it is in our non-proliferation interest to
remove spent fuel.
The regime defined above, which you approved as a basis for
exploration but without decision as to its ultimate acceptability,
was drawn up after extended review within the Executive Branch. Our
effort had been to identify a position for reprocessing and
plutonium use in Europe and Japan that would meet the near-term
requirements of those countries, avoid damaging precedents for other
countries, and evoke greater support from Allies in dealing with
countries of near-term proliferation concern.
IV
The Allies recognize the need to increase efforts with problem
countries. They believe the more promising approach is political
(dealing with motivations of problem countries) rather than
technical (trying to stop or slow access to sensitive technologies
and materials). They may be willing to adopt NPT-type full-scope safeguards as a
requirement for new supply commitments, in return for our easing
interference in their programs.
The Allies agree that national stockpiles of excess plutonium should
be avoided. They support establishment of an international plu
[Page 1007]
tonium storage regime,
with some skepticism that a truly effective IPS would be acceptable
to the countries we worry about most. This skepticism may be
well-placed, but I believe we should work actively to try to develop
the best possible IPS.
V
The EURATOM countries (where we
now have no consent rights) are very loath to give us such controls.
They resist proposals that they set a “good example” to the rest of
the world by limiting their domestic programs for reprocessing and
plutonium use. They see a right of consent as an infringement of
their national sovereignties, as giving us a “supervisory” role over
their programs, and as introducing an arbitrary and unpredictable
element in their nuclear power planning. They foresee our generic
approach as requiring impossible precision in forecasting the
plutonium needs of their breeder programs.
In the end we may be able to get the Europeans to grant formal
consent rights provided it is clear that they would be exercised in
a very general way. The UK, France,
and the FRG, unlike the US, are committed to reprocessing and
to developing options for breeders and thermal recycle. They believe
these programs are indispensable for their energy security, and that
their decisions on and pursuit of these programs are national issues
not subject to compromise with the US. They believe we overemphasize the dangers of the
civil nuclear fuel cycle and that decisions they take with respect
to their own programs are not relevant to dealing with the problem
countries.
VI
Japan will not much longer tolerate asymmetry between US–EURATOM and US-Japan
nuclear relations. Our case-by-case exercise of consent rights in
Japan is a constant source of friction. We are unlikely to get
control over use of US supplies in
Europe comparable to that which we have in Japan. If unable to get
consent rights in Europe, or able to get them only under an
agreement providing for liberal application, we will have to agree
to the same with Japan. We probably will have to accept Japan’s
having a commercial scale reprocessing plant, and agree to some
generic approvals for reprocessing of Japanese fuel in Europe and
use in Japan of some of the separated plutonium.
VII
I believe we cannot accomplish the foregoing within the strict
framework of the April 1977 policy. For this and other reasons, the
direction of our non-proliferation effort should be reviewed. I
think the NNPA should be amended
to restore a positive attitude toward inter
[Page 1008]
national cooperation on the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy. I expand on these ideas in the attached paper.
Tab B
Paper Prepared by Ambassador-at-Large and Special
Representative for Non-Proliferation Matters Smith
7
Washington, October 30, 1980
U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY AND PROGRAMS: AN
ASSESSMENT
Executive Summary
I
In light of concerns that growth of civil nuclear power and the
advent of wide-spread trade in weapons-usable materials would lead
to an increased proliferation of nuclear explosives, initiatives
were taken by the Administration and Congress to foreclose the
electric power route to nuclear explosives. They included i) the
President’s April 1977 Policy Statement,8 deferring indefinitely commercial reprocessing
and commercial-scale breeders in the United States and continuing a
moratorium on exports of enrichment and reprocessing technology, and
ii) enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), which established detailed
criteria and procedures to govern United States nuclear export and
international cooperative activities. Studies were started (the
International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) and the Non-Proliferation Alternatives System
Assessment Program) to seek ways of minimizing the proliferation
risks inherent in nuclear electric power generation.
There resulted an increased awareness of proliferation risks and a
willingness of major nuclear suppliers to defer new reprocessing
export commitments and, generally, to cooperate in restricting
exports where proliferation risks could be demonstrated (e.g.,
Pakistan). However, serious concern persists about Pakistan.
Acquisition of sensitive facilities by Iraq, Argentina and Brazil
also creates proliferation risks.
[Page 1009]
We have been unable to persuade these
countries and India, South Africa and Israel to accept fullscope
safeguards.
Nations with the most advanced nuclear power programs (in Europe and
Japan), which are not of proliferation concern, resent our efforts
to impose stringent requirements on them which have resulted in
uncertain nuclear supply. They now see us as insensitive to their
critical energy needs. They have not agreed to condition exports, or
even new export commitments, on the recipient’s accepting full-scope
safeguards or foreswearing national enrichment or reprocessing
facilities. While the reduction in the growth of nuclear electric
power supports U.S. arguments that reprocessing, thermal recycle and
breeder commercialization can be prudently deferred, it has put
governments committed to nuclear power and their nuclear industries
on the defensive and as a result spirited defenses of these options
have been mounted.
II
Our approach to non-proliferation has been too single-minded.
Inadequate consideration has been given to linkages between
proliferation and other foreign policy and security interests. In
particular, where other interests have appeared to conflict with
non-proliferation constraints—in the Tarapur and Pakistan cases, for
example—the former have appeared to prevail (although our actions in
these cases were supportive of or consistent with our
non-proliferation interests).
U.S. non-proliferation consideration led to legislative and policy
constraints of general application, including a highly restrictive
export policy, disregarding the fact that proliferation risks vary
greatly from one country to another, and that the energy security
requirements of other major industrial nations differ from
America’s. We should adopt a more balanced approach which recognizes
the motivations which lead nations to acquire nuclear explosives. No
system of export constraints can substitute for elimination of these
motivations, by resolution of international disputes, security
guarantees and reduction of the prestige value of nuclear
weapons.
III
There are only five states of near-term proliferation concern—India,
Iraq, [less than 1 line not declassified],
Pakistan and South Africa—with perhaps a half dozen others of
concern in the longer term. While as a matter of general policy
accepted international practice calls for equal treatment for all
states, distinctions where risks are gravest are the only way to
achieve the support of major Allies and other nuclear suppliers in
coping with proliferation risks effectively.
We need more flexibility in dealing with close Allies on export,
reprocessing and retransfer requests, and in nuclear cooperation
negotia
[Page 1010]
tions. We need
policies which are more sensitive to Allies’ energy needs, are
consistently and predictably implemented, and are neither
unilaterally derived nor based on threats of denial.
There is virtually no support for a “throw away” fuel cycle,
abandoning the energy value of the plutonium and uranium in spent
fuel. We should recognize that regrettably R&D and pilot scale reprocessing plants are a
prudent near-term step to nations with medium or long-term interest
in reprocessing for energy purposes, and that technical fixes we
once thought to have promise do not now appear viable.
It is illusory to believe we have much leverage to force our views on
foreign nations when other supply sources are available and it is
we, not the recipients, who are seeking to alter existing terms of
nuclear trade.
IV
What leverage we do have has been undercut by i) the ambiguity of
American government policy on nuclear power as an energy option, ii)
the divisions in the country on this issue, and iii) our speaking on
non-proliferation with different voices—those of the Administration,
the NRC and the Congress. In
particular, with the export licensing function residing in the
NRC, other nations lack
confidence that undertakings of the Executive Branch will be
fulfilled in a timely and predictable manner. Our unilaterally
established policy and legislative requirements have generated
concerns about security of supply and have driven foreign nations to
increased fuel cycle independence, further reducing any residual
leverage for our supply position. A policy of export restraint can
succeed only if suppliers act in concert. It is not likely that all
supplies will accept our policies. Measures to enhance security of
supply are likely to be more effective in inducing nations to forego
reprocessing and enrichment technology and breeders than threats of
denial or highly restrictive conditions.
V
I recommend that we:
1. Consider proliferation problems primarily as international
security issues;
2. Center non-proliferation efforts on problem countries—those where
early explosive acquisition seems probable;
3. Increase flexibility in dealing with major Allies (EURATOM and Japan);
4. Recognize that reprocessing will occur and
—support an international plutonium storage system,
—rely on economic factors rather than U.S. pressures to dissuade
nations from adopting thermal recycle,
—urge other suppliers to condition new nuclear supply commitments on
full-scope safeguards, and
[Page 1011]
—give increased support to IAEA
safeguards;
5. Enhance U.S. nuclear supply reliability by
—transferring the export licensing function from NRC to the Executive Branch,
—eliminating duplicative reviews of export activities to allow some
predictability concerning U.S. actions in authorizing requests,
and
—eliminating certain sanctions provisions in the NNPA and the Foreign Assistance
Act.
Gerard Smith
9
Tab C
Letter From Ambassador-at-Large and Special
Representative for Non-Proliferation Matters Smith to President Carter
10
Washington, October 31, 1980
Dear Mr. President:
I am sending along separately my final report. But I would like to
stress two matters which I believe to be central to success for your
non-proliferation policy—[less than 1 line not
declassified] and a Comprehensive Test
Ban.
While we have urged our allies to set a good example by limiting
their power programs’ [less than 1 line not
declassified] we have set a bad example by acquiescing in
[less than 1 line not declassified] While
we, by law, cut off aid to Pakistan11 [1 line not
declassified] a large percentage of American [less than 1 line not declassified] The
international community is well aware of this inconsistency and
discrimination. I trust [less than 1 line not
declassified] can be introduced into the Middle East
negotiations.
CTB—For ten years we have had an
obligation under NPT to get on with
arms control and disarmament. That was the quid pro quo for the
non-weapons states to forego weapons. As clearly demonstrated during
last August’s NPT Review
Conference, a large number of states believe we have failed to keep
our end of the bargain. That belief bodes badly for the credibility
of your program and the life expectancy of the NPT regime. That argues strongly for
ending the subordination of our proliferation interest to possibly
marginal weapons refinement.
[Page 1012]
As I leave government, I urge you to give priority to these two often
overlooked aspects of your great non-proliferation effort.
Again, may I say how much I appreciate having had the privilege,
opportunity and experience of serving under your fine
leadership.
Respectfully,
