Office of the Historian

382. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance1

Washington, April 18, 1980

SUBJECT

  • April 9 PRC on Non-Proliferation Issues (C)

The President has approved the PRC decision at the April 9 meeting that an interagency working group should prepare a paper providing a systematic analysis of a full range of options for our post-INFCE non-proliferation strategy. (S)

The analysis should include consideration of the following specifics:

1. MB–10 Policy2

—the criteria which would be used to distinguish FBR and ATR research, development and demonstration programs from “commercialization” in approving requests for plutonium return and/or use;

—a quantitative analysis, through the year 2000, of projected accumulations of separated plutonium, and of the requirements of breeder and ATR programs in EURATOM and Japan, under each of the MB–10 options considered;

—how each MB–10 option would be applied to countries, other than Japan and EURATOM, and the political and non-proliferation implications of distinguishing between categories of countries. (S)

2. Quid Pro Quos

The analysis should consider a full range of non-proliferation commitments which might be sought from EURATOM and Japan in return for modifications of US MB–10 policy, including continued US prior consent rights over the disposition of US supplied or derived materials used in EURATOM and Japanese breeder and ATR programs. (S)

3. International Plutonium Storage

The paper should specify in some detail the characteristics of an IPS regime which we would regard as effective, including the definition of “excess” plutonium, release conditions, and verification mechanisms. In particular, it should discuss whether a negotiable IPS would restrict plutonium release to certain countries (e.g. those meeting agreed economic criteria) or end-uses, whether the US and other suppliers would apply such restrictions to plutonium entering the IPS, and

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how such restrictions, however applied, would affect the prospects for acceptance of IPS by countries of proliferation concern. (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski
  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 79, PRC 137, Non-Proliferation, Tarapur: 4/9/80. Secret. Also sent to Brown, Duncan, McIntyre, Eizenstat, Christopher, Earle, Speth, Jones, Turner, and Press.↩
  2. See footnote 5, Document 341.↩