334. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Brzezinski) to President
Carter1
Washington, April 1, 1977
SUBJECT
- Comments on Jim
Schlesinger’s Memorandum of March 31 Regarding PD No. 8
I have no fundamental problems with Jim
Schlesinger’s thoughtful comments (Tab A). More
specifically:
1. Regarding constraints on non-nuclear weapons states, it seems to me
that the distinction between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear
weapons states is an important fact; in some circumstances this fact should be treated differently when it
involves in one case an ally and in another case a non-ally, and our
diplomacy should reflect this additional distinction.
2. With respect to the phrase “demonstrably acquires a nuclear explosive
device,” [2 lines not declassified] Thus I
believe you retain the needed flexibility, though otherwise Jim’s point
is well taken.
3. Unless I am profoundly mistaken, I think that the first interpretation
given by Jim to the phrase “emphasize alternative designs to the
plutonium breeder” is correct.
4. I share Jim’s concern that we do not overdo our efforts given our
interest in good trilateral relations. I believe your present efforts at
consultations take that consideration into account. The question which
is really at issue here is one on which the government is deeply
divided: should the fuel cycle evaluation program include reprocessing,
or just alternatives to it? The first section of the attached summary of
the PRC meeting on proliferation (Tab
B)2 will give you some feeling for the different
positions.
[Page 844]
Tab A
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant
(Schlesinger) to
President Carter
3
Washington, March 31, 1977
SUBJECT
- Problems Raised by P.D. No. 8
In accordance with your suggestion,4 I outline below the four problems that I see
created by the precise wording of P.D. No. 8.
1. The all-inclusive constraint on non-nuclear
weapons states. The P.D. imposes a definitive barrier
between the nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states in terms
of the handling of nuclear power technologies. Some non-nuclear
weapons states, notably Germany and Japan, will regard this barrier
as highly discriminatory. Both at the time they were urged to ratify
the NPT and in bilateral
negotiations both countries were assured that they would not be
subjected to discrimination by remaining in the status of
non-nuclear weapons states. (It has been the continuing desire of
the United States Government to avoid creating any incentive to
become a nuclear weapons state.) Reprocessing facilities in Germany,
Japan, and also Belgium and Italy were established under these
understandings. These nations must be persuaded to join with the
United States in the effort directed toward the control of
weapons-useable material. But they will not accept being treated as
in the same category as Pakistan, Iran, or Brazil. To avoid
unproductive controversy and to provide the proper incentives for
collaboration, the line of distinction will have to be drawn
someplace other than the non-nuclear weapons states.5
2. Termination of nuclear cooperation. The
difficulty in the phrase “demonstrably acquires a nuclear explosive
device” [2½ lines not declassified] The
political difficulties are obvious. Consequently, you may desire to
put more flexibility in your policy position before going
public.6
3. The U.S. breeder program. If the phrase
“emphasize alternative designs to the
plutonium breeder” implies that new money and the high growth rates
will go to alternative designs, that is readily accom
[Page 845]
plished. If, however, it were to imply
that aggregate spending on and program size of the alternatives will
be larger than for the LMFBR
program, it would imply either the dismantling of the LMFBR program or waste in the other
programs or both. We will need, I believe, to maintain an adequate
base program for the LMFBR. We
should avoid plowing ahead with commercialization. But we must
continue our R&D on the LMFBR because in the 21st Century it
may be an essential fallback—if none of the other energy
alternatives materialize. We cannot afford, as the Ford Foundation study
emphasizes,7 simply
to back away from R&D on the
LMFBR. We can defer
commercialization, but it will remain an essential fallback
option.8
4. The larger diplomatic problem embodied in the P.D. No. 8 is one
requiring your careful analysis, to assure that substantive benefits
exceed diplomatic costs. Briefly other nations will be reluctant to
follow us on reprocessing and even more reluctant to follow our lead
on defering the breeder. The starker (and purer) our diplomatic
position on these matters, the less likely is it that we shall gain
the necessary acquiescence of the Germans and Japanese, let alone
the French. But ultimately we must have the collaboration of the
other supplier countries. Thus, the question for your determination
is the amount of diplomatic capital that you wish to expend in
staking out a position which has the virtue of logical clarity but
has the deficiency of forfeiting the necessary foreign support.9
