292. Presidential Directive/NSC–361
Washington, April 28, 1978
TO
- The Secretary of State
- The Secretary of Defense
ALSO
- The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
-
US–USSR Talks on Conventional Arms Restraint (U)
The President directs that the U.S. Delegation to the US–USSR
talks on conventional arms transfer in Helsinki, May 4–8, should move
quickly and forcefully to engage the Soviets in discussions of specific
functional and regional restraint proposals, looking to further
development of these proposals in subsequent rounds. While the
Delegation should seek to secure Soviet agreement to participate in
further meetings, the primary objective is to determine whether they are
serious about this effort.
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In this context, the Delegation should reiterate the elements of our arms
restraint policy.
The Chairman of the Delegation is authorized to make use of the attached
Presidential statement as he deems appropriate, in order to demonstrate
the commitment and support of the highest levels of the United States
Government in this effort.
Attachment
Presidential Statement2
President Carter has asked me
to make this statement on his behalf:
This is an opportunity to convey my personal concern, and that of the
United States Government, over the growing world trade in
conventional arms, and the urgency I attach to international
cooperation to reduce that trade. The unrestrained transfer of
conventional weapons represents a serious and continuing threat to
peace, and a diversion of resources badly needed for economic and
social development.
As great powers, and as the world’s leading arms suppliers, the
United States and the Soviet Union have a special responsibility to
curb this traffic in armaments. We have distinct but common
interests in doing so. Moreover, without US-Soviet restraint, others
will not alter their arms transfer practices and opportunities for
meaningful multilateral restraint will be lost. And without
multilateral restraint, no single supplier could be expected to
sustain such a policy for very long.
Restraint does not mean an end to arms sales. Obviously, the
legitimate defense needs of friends and allies must be fulfilled.
Neither of us would have it otherwise. Restraint does mean that we
take steps in common—in cooperation with suppliers as well as with
recipients—to prevent sales from increasing the risk of war or
inflaming regional and global tensions. Regional conflicts cannot be
solved by arms transfer restraint alone. But restraint can
contribute to the resolution of such problems and help avoid future
conflicts.
Our common responsibilities in this area flow naturally from the
basic tenets of our relations—from the principles accepted by the
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leaders of our
governments on May 29, 1972.3
These principles affirm the importance of preventing the development
of situations which can lead to confrontations or aggravate problems
in our relations. They also affirm our readiness to exchange views
at the highest level when necessary on various problems in our
relations.
I regard progress in this field as one indication of the importance
we each ascribe to these principles. In particular, our governments
must take clear, visible steps now, in Helsinki, to record our
mutual determination to restrain arms sales, and to create machinery
appropriate to this purpose.
By enlarging our arms control agenda to include restraint in
transfers of conventional arms, we take one more important step away
from conflict and confrontation, and toward more cooperative
relations.4
