268. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Brzezinski) to President
Carter1
SUBJECT
-
PRC Meeting on PRM–12—Conventional Arms
Control
Yesterday the PRC met on the subject of
conventional arms control. Attached you will find the following:
—At Tab A: decision memorandum covering the five major issues on which
there was disagreement. In each case the options
chosen and arguments for and against are presented on the facing
page.
—At Tab B: For your information—to be initialed if approved—a summary of
the PRM’s conclusions on which there
[Page 659]
was consensus. These are presented as modified by the PRC discussion.
—At Tab C: For your information only (Tab A contains the relevant
portions needed for decision), a summary of the
minutes of the meeting, and a list of attendees.
The major issue remains whether or not to impose a dollar volume ceiling.
In my view, the implicit message of those who argued against imposing a
ceiling was the feeling—or the fear—that we would not stay under it.
This goes right to the heart of the question of whether you are
determined to achieve real reductions in the volume of arms transferred
overseas. If you are, then nearly everyone would agree that the only way
to do so is to set a specific ceiling.
The fear that we might not meet a ceiling is quite justified. The FY 1976 FMS total, excluding NATO, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, was $7.02 billion. The comparable estimate for FY 1977 (including the decisions you made
earlier this week) is $8.25 billion. Possible
additional major cases of which State is already aware are:
|
Possible Major Cases
|
Low
|
High
|
| Iran |
250 F–18L |
2.5 |
3.0 |
| Iran |
140 F–16 |
2.2 |
2.2 |
| Saudi Arabia |
50 F–15 |
3.0 |
4.0 |
| Israel |
250 F–16 |
3.0 |
4.0 |
| Spain |
72 F–16 |
1.2 |
1.5 |
| Pakistan |
110 A–7 |
.6 |
.6 |
| Korea |
60 F–16 |
1.0 |
1.0 |
| Israel |
Miscellaneous |
.3 |
.3 |
| Egypt |
200 F–5s |
.7 |
.7 |
|
|
14.5 |
17.3 |
Thus we are already more than a billion dollars over last fiscal year. A
lot more is pending, and we have 5 months left to
go of FY 1977.
On the other hand, if we look at the calendar year—for which this
Administration is responsible—the picture is much brighter, in fact a
significant cut appears possible. My point is simply that a strict
discipline is going to be needed to just avoid surpassing last year—let
alone cutting back.
At this time, your choice is among: a specific ceiling; an unspecified
reduction; or, relying on other types of controls to achieve restraint.
The decision of exactly what a ceiling should cover, exactly what level
should be adopted, and which year it should be applied to, can be
addressed in a follow-on paper if you decide on the ceiling option.
In my opinion there are three compelling reasons for a ceiling:
[Page 660]
—Political necessity. Neither Congress nor the
press will let you get away with saying “we will sell less” as was
suggested yesterday. Conventional arms control was a major focus of your
campaign.
—International necessity. The U.S., as the world’s
leading supplier, will have to make clear its intent to exercise
restraint if we are to create any international momentum toward joint
supplier restraint. Tougher management guidelines will not be
sufficient.
—Management realities. A ceiling is probably the
only way to force the hard choices necessary to actually cut the volume
of arms transfers.
Tab A
Major Issues of Disagreement2
DOLLAR VOLUME CEILINGS
Vance
recommends Control 3(b). He believes there is a need for a
ceiling in the early years of the new arms sales policy, because it
would help us discipline ourselves and manage the program more
effectively than would a general statement on reduction. Also, it
would force us to consider more explicitly the trade-offs between
and among arms sales.
Brown
recommends Control 2. He believes that establishing a ceiling
would: 1) reduce our flexibility; 2) encourage purchasers to cluster
their orders early in the fiscal year; 3) result in the ceiling
being used as a floor; 4) lead to enormous accounting problems; 5)
spur Congress to put ceilings or subceilings into law. He notes,
however, that a ceiling is politically attractive and the only sure
way to meet our goal of restraint in the conventional arms area.
Warnke
recommends Control 2, agreeing that the ceiling cuts into our
flexibility and may become a target. He would recommend, however,
using the term “significant reduction.”
Smith
(JCS) recommends Control
1.
Benson
(Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance) recommends
Control 2, believing that reductions in arms sales can be achieved
without an inflexible ceiling.
Lance
recommends Control 2, but would also use the term “significant
reduction.”
[Page 661]
Aaron
recommends Control 3(b). He believes that, given your
statements on this subject, defense of a new policy of restraint
would be a political impossibility without a quantified percentage
reduction or ceiling. He stated that this would be the first
question asked of Jody
Powell and our witnesses on the Hill.
Brzezinski
recommends Control 3(b), believing that only a ceiling will
allow you to fulfill your pledge to reduce the transfer of arms.
Establishment of a ceiling would tell the U.S. public and the world
that we intend to scale down our arms transfers, thus indicating our
sincerity to the French, British, and other suppliers.
DOLLAR VOLUME CEILINGS
Issue: Should there be a fixed ceiling on the
dollar volume of U.S. arms transfers?
Controls:
1. Utilize ceilings for planning purposes only, relying on other
specific controls to achieve greater restraint in arms
transfers.
2. State that the dollar volume of arms transfers in FY 1977 will be reduced from the FY 76 total, and that the volume of
FY 1978 transfers will likewise
be reduced from the FY 1977
total.3
3. For FY 1977, impose a ceiling on
total U.S. arms transfers at a level equal to the FY 1976 total. For FY 1978, reduce the ceiling by 10
percent4 from the FY
1976 total. The ceiling could be applied:
a. Across the board to all types of transfers: weapons, ammunitions,
supporting equipment, spare parts, training, and construction.
b. Only to weapons and weapons-related items, exempting those sales
which clearly can be classified as services.
Decision:
Control 1. _______
2. ______5
3a. ______
3b. ______
[Page 662]
LIMITS ON TRANSFERS OF NEW SYSTEMS
Vance
recommends Controls 1, 2, and 4. He believes that this issue
is at the heart of the arms sale problem, and strict controls need
to be established.
Brown
recommends Control 1, and if dollar volume ceilings are not imposed, he recommends Control 4 also. He
does not recommend Control 2, because of our Latin American
experience which has demonstrated that unilateral restraint on our
part does not reduce the flow of weapons to a region.
Warnke
recommends Controls 1, 2, and 4. He also believes this issue
is central to the arms sale problem, and that strict control is thus
a necessity. He notes that Controls 2 and 4 are inextricably bound,
that applying Control 4 without Control 2 would be of little
use.
Smith
recommends Control 4.
Lance
recommends Controls 1, 2, and 3.
Brzezinski
recommends Control 1, assuming dollar
volume ceilings are established. He notes that while Control 2
appears reasonable in the abstract, it might unduly limit our
flexibility in future situations, where transfer of limited amounts
of high-technology equipment may advance our interests.
LIMITS ON TRANSFER OF SIGNIFICANT NEW SYSTEMS
Issue: The issue is the extent to which we
should limit the transfer, or production abroad, of significant,
newly-developed weapons systems. The transfer of advanced systems
raises concern about destabilizing effects in the region involved,
the financial burdens involved for recipients, and the compromise of
new technology.
Controls:
1. Establish more extensive guidelines for assessing requests for
equipment sales, including requirements 1) that supplying the system
would uniquely strengthen the requestor’s ability to perform
military functions which serve U.S. security interests, and 2) that
less-advanced existing systems with roughly comparable capabilities
are unavailable from the United States.6
2. Enunciate the principle that the United States will not be the
first supplier to introduce into a region an advanced weapon that
creates a new or significantly higher combat capability.7
[Page 663]
3. Compile a list of all major advanced systems which we will not
release overseas for sale, cooperative R&D, or coproduction.
4. Prohibit the commitment for sale, cooperative R&D, or coproduction of
newly-developed, major weapons systems at least until the systems
are operationally deployed with U.S. forces.8
Decision:
Control 1. ______9
2. ______
3. ______
4. ______
LIMITS ON NEW TECHNOLOGY EXPLICITLY DEVELOPED FOR
EXPORT
Vance
recommends Control 3.
Brown
recommends Control 2. He is against U.S. manufacturers
becoming so involved in a foreign market as to have a vested
interest.
Warnke
recommends Control 2, but would support Control 3.
Benson
recommends Control 3, but would support Control 2.
Brzezinski
recommends Control 1.
LIMITS ON NEW TECHNOLOGY EXPLICITLY DEVELOPED FOR
EXPORT
Issue: Should the United States permit the
sale abroad of systems which represent advanced U.S. weapons
technology, but which are developed or modified especially for the
foreign market?
Controls:
1. Establish more extensive guidelines for assessing requests for
equipment sales, including requirements 1) that supplying the system
would uniquely strengthen the requestor’s ability to perform
military functions which serve U.S. security interests; 2) that
after a specified period, the requestor must have the ability to
maintain the system with minimal U.S. assistance; and 3) that
less-advanced, existing systems with roughly comparable capabilities
are unavailable from the United States or friendly suppliers.
2. Permit the export of unique systems or major modifications of U.S.
systems on a case-by-case basis if the recipient validates a
requirement for a specific weapon system to fulfill a specific
mission, but nor
[Page 664]
mally
prohibit sales if roughly comparable capabilities could be provided
by existing or planned systems.10
3. Permit export of unique advanced weapons systems or major
modifications only11 to key treaty allies (NATO, Japan, Australia, and New
Zealand). Prohibit in all other cases.
Decision:
Control 1. ______
2. ______
3. ______12
LIMITS ON COPRODUCTION
Vance
recommends Control 1.
Brown
recommends Control 1, but would not object to imposition of
Control 2.
Warnke
recommends Control 1, but would not object to imposition of
Control 2.
Smith
recommends Control 1.
Lance
recommends Control 2.
Brzezinski
recommends Control 2, noting that it would be inconsistent to
approve significant numbers of coproduction agreements while
restricting U.S. exports of high-technology items.
LIMITS ON COPRODUCTION
Issue: The development of indigenous military
industries is a priority objective of an increasing number of
countries. Responding to requests for assistance in establishing
production capabilities is a growing policy issue for the United
States. There are two interrelated concerns: (1) Should the United
States limit the number of significant coproduction agreements; and
(2) How might we restrict the proliferation of arms we do approve
for coproduction.
Controls:
1. Subject all requests to review under guidelines applied globally.
In reviewing requests, analyze closely whether or not the proposed
coproduction project would over time provide equipment in excess of
[Page 665]
local needs. Stipulate
in each approved agreement the terms under which exports will be
permitted, if at all, emphasizing the principle that coproduction is
intended for the co-producers’ requirements and not for export.
2. Prohibit all new coproduction agreements of significant weapons,
equipment, or major components, beyond assembly of subcomponents and
the fabrication of high-turnover spare parts, except with key allies
and where the President determines that such agreement is justified
by extraordinary circumstances. Subject requests for any other items
(e.g., major overhaul facilities) to review under guidelines applied
globally. Apply to all agreements the export restrictions specified
in Control 1.
Decision:
Control 1. ______
2. ______13
SENSITIVE WEAPONS
Vance
recommends Control 3.
Brown
recommends Control 3.
Warnke
recommends Control 1, believing that a list is unnecessary if
we establish a policy presumption against sales. If a list were
approved, he has no opinion on whether it should be public or
private.
Smith
recommends Control 3.
Benson
recommends either Control 2 or Control 3.
Lance
recommends Control 1, with the President approving
exceptions.
Brzezinski
recommends Control 3.
SENSITIVE WEAPONS
Issue: Certain weapons are considered
sensitive from a political or a security point of view, because they
are particularly deadly, or are particularly susceptible to use by
terrorists. Should there be a public listing of sensitive weapons
which the United States will not transfer to foreign countries?
Controls:
1. Continue the current system of informal, unpublished
guidelines.
2. Establish a public list of sensitive items which the United States
will not transfer abroad.
[Page 666]
3. Establish a list of sensitive items which the United States will
not transfer abroad, but do not make it public.14
Decision:
Control 1. ______
2. ______
3. ______15
Tab B
Areas of Consensus16
1. Management
RECOMMENDATION:
1. Maintain essentially the present system, but improve procedures by
means of more explicit guidelines drawn from the policy controls
chosen.
2. Additionally, approve in principle the
establishment of an interagency Arms Export Control Board, advisory
to the Secretary of State and chaired by the Under Secretary for
Security Assistance, with the Director of State’s Bureau of
Politico-Military Affairs as Vice Chairman. Terms of reference for
the Board would be determined later.17
2. Multilateral Restraint
RECOMMENDATION: On the basis of the
President’s decisions that define U.S. policy, State and ACDA will develop a plan to promote
international cooperation in restraint of arms transfers.
3. Control of U.S. Government Financing:
MAP
RECOMMENDATION: Continue to use grant MAP as an element of base agreement
quid pro quo, and in special cases on a temporary basis for specific
political and military purposes (e.g., Jordan).
4. Control of U.S. Financing: FMS Credits
RECOMMENDATION: Continue to provide FMS financing at levels determined
essentially by U.S. political and military objectives.
[Page 667]
5. Employment of U.S. Citizens on Overseas
Defense Contracts
RECOMMENDATION: The question of the extensive
use of U.S. citizens to support overseas military projects will be a
factor in arms transfer decisions.
6. Third Party Transfers
RECOMMENDATION: That a policy recommendation
be made to terminate assistance in cases of substantial
violations;
Additionally, as a condition of sale for
certain categories of equipment and certain countries, require
agreement between the United States and the recipient that the
equipment will not be transferred.
Additionally, in cases where there is a
serious risk of future unauthorized third party transfer or the
quantity of items appears to exceed military needs, deny the
original sales request or reduce the quantity requested.
7. Arms Transfers to Low-Income Countries
RECOMMENDATION: Obtain an interagency
assessment of the economic impact of proposed transfers of major
defense equipment to those LDCs
receiving United States economic assistance. Consider denying arms
requests when the economic impact is substantial.
8. Restricting Arms Transfers to
Government-to-Government Transactions
RECOMMENDATION: Maintain a mix of
government-to-government and commercial sales. Review present
categories of commercial transfers to identify those items which
might be shifted to government channels. Remove civilian-type items
from the Munitions List.
9. Commercial and Government Incentives to
Stimulate Arms Transfers
RECOMMENDATION: Policy level approval by the
Department of State is required before authorizing:
(a) licenses for sales promotion or technical data transmission by
private firms;
(b) U.S. military or civilian briefings, site surveys, transmission
of technical information, or any similar activity which might
promote the sale of defense articles or services.
Additionally, U.S. embassies and military
elements will not promote nor assist in the promotion of arms sales
without specific authorization.
Additionally, the Defense Department will
continue its review of Government procedures which may promote sale
of arms, reporting the results of this review to the President
within 60 days.
[Page 668]
Tab C
Summary Minutes of a Policy Review Committee
Meeting18
SUMMARY MINUTES
POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING ON ARMS TRANSFERS
(List of Attendees Attached)19
Dollar Volume Ceilings
Brown
argued against dollar volume ceilings, citing the following
reasons: 1) reduces our flexibility; 2) encourages purchasers to
cluster orders early in the fiscal year; 3) encourages use of the
ceiling as a floor; 4) would lead to enormous accounting problems;
5) might spur Con-gress to put ceilings or even subceilings into
law.
Brown
said the arguments for dollar volume ceilings include: 1) the
political attractiveness of ceilings; and 2) the fact that it is the
only sure way of doing what we said we would do in the conventional
arms area.
Brown, Warnke, and
Benson
recommended that instead of imposing a ceiling, we should
state that we will agree to sell less each year, something that has
occurred over the past two years anyway, and something which would
indicate our commitment to restraint.
Warnke
and
Lance
recommended further that the President announce that we will
have “significant reductions” in arms sales.
Smith
stated his opposition to a ceiling, maintaining that we will
have trouble with our allies if we set an arbitrary ceiling at the
outset of a fiscal year.
Brzezinski
said that he thought ceilings would allow the President to
fulfill his pledge to reduce the transfer of arms, and that ceilings
would tell the U.S. public and the world, especially other
suppliers, that the President intends to scale down the transfer of
arms. Brzezinski stated,
however, that he would recommend focusing on weaponry since that is
what contributes most significantly to the arms race.
Vance
stated that he believed there was a need for a ceiling in the
early years of the new arms sales policy, because it would help us
discipline ourselves and manage the program more effectively than
would a general statement on reduction.
Aaron
stated that, given the President’s strong statements on this
subject, defense of the new policy would be a political
impossibility without a number indicating some percentage reduction
or ceiling.
Vance
agreed, and
Brzezinski
stated that, excluding allies
[Page 669]
and focusing on weaponry alone, a 10 percent
cut would be an appropriate number.
Significant New Systems
Vance and Warnke
recommended: adoption of restrictive guidelines; enunciation
of a principle that we would not be the first to introduce
significant systems into a region; and, prohibition of transfer at
least until the system was deployed with U.S. forces.
Brown and Smith
supported the prohibition of transfer at least until U.S.
operational deployment.
Brzezinski and Brown
were hesitant about establishing the principle prohibiting our
first introduction of a significant system, because it might be
beneficial in selected instances to introduce limited quantities of
new significant items to preclude proliferation of less-significant,
but still dangerous, weaponry. If dollar volume ceilings are
established,
Brzezinski
recommended only adopting restrictive guidelines.
New Technology Developed Solely for Export
Brown, Warnke, and Lance
recommended that systems developed or modified solely for
export normally be approved only if a special need exists and
comparable capabilities cannot be provided by an existing U.S.
system.
Brown
stated that he is against U.S. suppliers becoming so involved
in foreign markets that they develop a vested interest.
Vance
recommended an even more restrictive control, allowing
transfers of this type only to key allies.
Brzezinski
recommended establishment of extensive guidelines, rather than
the other two controls.
Coproduction
Brzezinski and Lance
recommended prohibition of coproduction agreements except in
very limited circumstances.
Brzezinski
noted that it would be inconsistent to approve coproduction
agreements while restricting U.S. exports of military equipment. All
other participants recommended adoption of restrictive, but not
prohibitive, guidelines, although
Brown, Warnke, and Benson
stated they could accept the guideline calling for
prohibition.
Sensitive Weapons
Most of the participants agreed that a list of sensitive weapons
needs to be established.
Vance, Brown, Smith, and Brzezinski
recommended keeping the list private,
Brown
asserting that a public list could be an attractive nuisance.
Lance
recommended maintaining the current system of informal,
unpublished guidelines, while
Warnke
said that a list would be unnecessary if we established a
presumption against sales.
[Page 670]
Arms Export Control Board
There was agreement in principle to establish an interagency Arms
Export Control Board, advisory to the Secretary of State, and
chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance.
Terms of reference will be established in a follow-on memorandum,
with special emphasis given to ensuring the President is kept
apprised of significant developments.
Multilateral Initiatives
Vance
reiterated our commitment to seek multilateral cooperation
after establishing our own policy. He stated that it would be ACDA and State’s responsibility to
develop a proposed program for submission to the President.
