Enclosure
Paper Prepared in the Department of
State3
ARGENTINA: ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION
(C) Parameters and problems. The following
assessment covers the Argentine government’s 1978 performance and
the current situation with respect to category-one human rights.
Inevitably, efforts have been hampered somewhat by the US
Government’s limited capacity for monitoring human rights events in
Argentina and verifying reports of either positive or negative
developments.
(C) Imprecision is most clearly a problem with statistical material.
Frankly stated, we do not know exactly how many people have been
tortured or killed, how many are now being held prisoner, how many
prisons are being used, etc. We are forced, in many cases, to rely
upon estimates whose credibility stems from their relatively wide
acceptance among groups interested in and informed upon Argentina
human rights developments.
(C) We do not believe, however, that timely, precise and verifiable
information would fundamentally alter the assessment offered
below.4 The
record of Argentine human rights events is sufficiently complete to
produce a convincing cumulative picture of the government’s
performance. And while precise statistics might alter somewhat the
quantitative dimensions of that picture, its qualitative aspects
would remain unchanged.
(C) Current situation. With respect to
category-one rights, conditions can be summarized as follows:
(C)—Political prisoners: Approximately 2,900
persons purportedly guilty of security violations are being detained
at the disposition of
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the
national executive branch under state-of-siege powers provided for
in the Argentine constitution (PEN
prisoners).5
There are two other groups of prisoners, neither of which is publicly
acknowledged by the government. One group is being held at the
disposition of military authorities (DAM prisoners) and probably includes about 500 persons.
According to Embassy Buenos Aires sources, most of these prisoners
are either former terrorists now cooperating with security units or
new detainees undergoing interrogation and not, therefore, listed as
PEN detainees. The final group
involves prisoners who have been selected for a rehabilitation
program run by the security services. We have no reliable figures,
but the program appears to be relatively small, encompassing at most
a few hundred persons.
(C) No sustained official effort is being made to substantially
reduce the number of political prisoners by (1) releasing those
against whom there exists no evidence of terrorist or criminal
involvement nor pending charges; (2) trying those charged with
specific offenses; or (3) permitting political prisoners to exercise
their constitutional rights to choose exile over imprisonment
(right-of-option). The right-of-option program initiated in late
1977 has resulted in few approvals of prisoner petitions for
exile.
(C) There is little evidence to substantiate persistent rumors that
thousands of political prisoners are being held in clandestine camps
located throughout the country.
(C)—Torture and prisoner mistreatment:
Physical and psychological torture apparently remain standard
treatment for alleged subversives, or persons believed to have
information about subversion who refuse
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to cooperate with security officials. Torture
generally occurs during interrogation, prior to official listing of
a detainee as a PEN prisoner, or
his or her summary execution. [less than 3 lines
not declassified] in August that as many as 90 percent of
PEN detainees were tortured
during interrogation.6
(C) Prisoner treatment beyond the interrogation stage and after
PEN listing appears to vary
considerably depending upon such factors as the prisoner’s alleged
offense, the proclivities of the regional military commander, and
the character of individual jailors. Reports of severe mistreatment
(beatings, denial of adequate food, medical care, exercise, etc.)
are most often associated with specific military jurisdictions and
prisons, or with the transfer or release of prisoners. In at least
five reasonably documented instances in early 1978, for example,
prisoners released from a La Plata jail were immediately either
murdered or kidnapped, presumably by security elements. Official
actions appear to have prevented recurrences of this particular type
of abuse, but in late 1978 an IRC official reported to the Embassy
his belief that prison conditions and prisoner treatment had
deteriorated during the year.7
(C)—Disappearances: Reports of disappearances
continue to accumulate. In the vast majority of cases,
responsibility almost certainly lies with one of the many security
units. In the absence of evidence of clandestine camps housing
thousands of allegedly disappeared persons, most must be presumed
dead.
(U) Non-governmental human rights organizations tend to use the
figure of 15,000 for disappearances over the past 3–4 years.
Argentine groups share that estimate and have presented the
government with documentation on almost 5,000 cases. In truth,
however, no one knows precisely how many people have disappeared or,
in many cases, why specific individuals were victimized.
(C) Few who have disappeared since about mid-1977, and on whom we
have any information, could be considered terrorists or security
threats. With most terrorists either eliminated or living in exile,
the security forces have made a significant shift in their
targetting practices to draw into the security net a range of
non-terrorists associated with the vague and expansively defined
political left. The decision as to which specific individuals will
be picked up is left to regional and local authorities and,
therefore, depends upon the latter’s perception of what kinds of
activities constitute security threats. The victim’s culpability may
only have involved past membership in a group that was entirely
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legal at the time. Insofar
as there is a discernible pattern, there has been a tendency toward
the disappearance of persons with a common association past or
present; e.g., graduates of the same high school or university
faculty, members of a political party or youth group, etc. However,
there are many cases that make no apparent sense and for which the
explanation may lie more in internal politics than in any specific
act of the victim.
(C) Public criticism of government policies has, with few known
exceptions, generally not been considered by authorities as grounds
for detaining the critics and abusing or killing them. Many
politicians, labor leaders, businessmen, and other professionals
have criticized the government’s economic, political and human
rights policies without suffering retribution at the hands of the
security forces.
(C) There has been no significant official effort to collect and
publish information on persons who allegedly have disappeared. When
queried about disappearances by non-governmental organizations or
foreign governments, the Argentines’ standard response is “no
information”. The Argentine courts regularly accept habeas corpus
petitions concerning alleged disappeared persons, but they have
refused to accept jurisdiction in such cases.
(C) The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (relatives of disappeared
persons) one of the most persistent and cohesive groups seeking
information on disappeared persons, has recently been prohibited
from conducting what had been a weekly Thursday vigil in front of
Government House in downtown Buenos Aires.8 The demonstrations apparently had
become too large and potentially disruptive in the judgment of
government officials who do not intend to satisfy their demands for
information. The Mothers are now holding their gatherings at smaller
and less conspicuous sites.
(C) Given the diffusion of authority that has characterized the
counterterrorist effort, it is highly unlikely that any government
agency either has collected or will be able to collect definitive
files on alleged disappearance cases. The various security units
have an obvious interest in withholding or destroying information on
cases for which their operatives have been responsible.
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(C) “Reappearances” emerged as a new and possibly underreported facet
of the human rights scene in 1978. There are no reliable figures,
but the number of cases is probably quite small in relation to the
reported number of disappearances. As of mid-September, the Embassy
had received reports of 15 cases and by mid-November Argentine human
rights groups placed the figure at over 100, with a UNHCR
representative suggesting it might be as high as 300. During 1978,
the government published 4 lists with the names of hundreds of
persons who had allegedly reappeared. In most cases, however, the
individuals appear to have been the subjects of regular “missing
persons” cases. Their names did not appear on the lists of
disappeared persons maintained by the Embassy and Argentine human
rights organizations.
(C)—Fair public trial. All who have been
detained by official security agencies and subsequently disappeared
have obviously been denied a fair public hearing of the charges
against them.
(C) Insofar as alleged security violators are charged and tried in
civilian or military courts,9 there are two notable
problems: the often extended period between detention and judicial
processing and the reported predominance of convictions based on
confessional evidence extracted through torture. Professional legal
groups such as the ICJ intend to
investigate the question of confessional evidence.
(C)—Invasion of the home. The detention
practices of operational counterterrorist units regularly involve
illegal invasion of the home. In addition, there are numerous
reports of arresting officers ransacking private residences and
stealing the personal property of the detainee.
(C) Trends. 1978 produced no substantial
quantitative improvement or deterioration in category-one terms. The
year featured a variety of positive and negative factors, but the
net result was to leave the situation little changed.10 Violations of
category-one rights at the hands of official security personnel were
frequent throughout the year, and there was no evidence of a
concerted, effective government effort to halt the abuses.
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(C) It is difficult to refine the trends analysis to reflect possible
patterns of the incidence of certain kinds of abuses because the
available statistical material is not always reliable. The question
of disappearances provides a good example. In June 1978, Embassy
Buenos Aires and Argentine human rights groups believed that
disappearances during the first third of 1978 had declined in
frequency (about 15 per month) in comparison to 1977. By later in
the year, however, additional information forced upward adjustments
in the figures. Interior Ministry records showed a rate of 40 per
month for January to October (as compared to 150 per month in 1977
and 250 per month in 1978) and a Foreign Ministry source placed the
ten-month 1978 figure at about 80 per month. By November, the
Embassy had reports of disappearances averaging about 34 per month
for the January–April period. The Embassy has since concluded that a
figure of 55 per month would be a reasonable estimate for 1978.
(C) On the basis of such evidence, the only conclusion that can be
drawn is that disappearances occurred with relative frequency
throughout the year with month-to-month variations reflecting
tactical considerations rather than policy decisions. In essence,
the situation changed little during 1978.11
(S/NF/NC) Counterterrorism uncontrolled. The conclusion that
conditions did not improve in 1978 is based, in part, on evidence
that the security forces continued to operate without effective
central control. Numerous reports during the year from a variety of
intelligence sources stated that:12
—President Videla and his
moderate supporters were attempting to establish rigid command and
control over security operations;
—new orders had been issued with respect to conducting police and
military operations within the bounds of the law; or
—police and military operatives had been dismissed or disciplined for
abuses.
(C) Some of the reported efforts were probably undertaken. Some
improvements may well have occurred, particularly in areas under the
jurisdiction of officers disposed toward reform. Nonetheless, at the
close of 1978 it was apparent that counterterrorist actions were
generally being conducted in accord with orders issued by regional
and local military authorities who viewed themselves as
unconstrained by the
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law
or the directives of national authorities. In late October, an
admiral with counterterrorist responsibilities in the Buenos Aires
area stated to an Embassy officer that there was almost no central
control over operational counterterrorist units.
(C) The political context. The “dirty war”
argument so frequently employed by Argentines to rationalize human
rights abuses is no longer relevant. According to estimates drafted
by the Argentine Federal Security Service in late 1978, there were
only about 400 active terrorists in Argentina; no single group was
estimated to have more than 245 resident activists, and no group was
judged a serious and immediate security threat. High government
officials, including President Videla, have repeatedly stated both publicly and
privately that the “war” is over, i.e, that there is no continuing
high-level internal security threat.
(C) The explanation for the continuing human rights abuses lies in
armed forces, and especially army, politics rather than in internal
security problems. The army is the predominant service, and its
political heterogeneity is reflected in the conduct of government
affairs. President Videla
leads a group of military and civilian moderates who would prefer to see human rights abuses halted.
Videla’s priority concern, however, is to maintain the
maximum degree of army and military unity, because the development
of irreparable internal splits probably would spell his own quick
demise and the end of the military’s National Reorganization
Process. Videla is not power
hungry, but he is committed to the military government’s reform
program and believes his own role important. Thus, Videla’s preferences give way to
his long-term political goals when his preferences threaten military
cohesion.
(C) In the case of human rights abuses, neither Videla nor any other significant
military figure, has questioned the pre-March 1976 decision to
physically eliminate hard core terrorists. Videla’s differences with the
so-called hardliners center on violations of the rights of
non-terrorists. The hardliners are philosophically authoritarian and
inclined to label a wide range of political activity and sentiment
as subversive. They do not entirely share the moderates perception
that the “war” against subversion is over.13 Powerful corps commanders like Major General
Carlos Guillermo Suarez
Mason (formerly Commander, Corps I, Buenos Aires) and
Major General Luciano Benjamin
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Menendez (Corps III,
Cordoba) continued throughout 1978 to condone counterterrorist
tactics that ensured human rights abuses.
(C) Other factors that diminished Videla’s chances of achieving human rights reforms
in 1978 included his August retirement as an active-duty officer and
Army Commander and a gradual increase in military and civilian
disenchantment with the general economic and political performance
of his government. Those conditions, plus the degree to which the
Beagle Channel controversy with Chile dominated official attention
during the last quarter of the year,14 created highly
improbable circumstances for bold human rights initiatives on
Videla’s part.
(C) The results of the recent army promotion/reassignment cycle
appear to offer mixed prospects for human rights reforms. Moderates
politically in sympathy with Videla and Army Commander Viola now may be in a position to
exert more effective control over the service. Particularly notable
changes involved the following officers:
—Suarez
Mason has been shifted from his Corps I
commander slot to Army Chief of Staff. His new post is a prestigious
one from which he might be able to advance to the Commander in
Chief’s slot. Nonetheless, since he no longer has a troop command
nor, more importantly, direct control over counterterrorist units,
his promotion is probably a net short-term human rights gain.
—Major General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri has replaced
Suarez Mason as Corps I
commander. Galtieri most
recently commanded Corps II (Rosario) where he established a
reputation for reasonableness and restraint in human rights matters.
It has been in his geographic jurisdiction, for example, that the
most progress has been registered with respect to the judicial
processing of PEN prisoners. If he
displays the same tendencies as Corps I Commander, he will be a
needed improvement over Suarez
Mason.
—Major General Santiago Omar Riveros, another
officer notorious for his permissive attitude toward human rights
abuses, has been shifted from his sensitive Buenos Aires command
(Military Institutes) to the Inter-American Defense Board.
—Major General Jose Montes will replace Riveros. A Videla-Viola loyalist, Montes could combine with Galtieri to give the moderates the
potential for curbing the abuses heretofore characteristic of
counterterrorist operations in the Buenos Aires area.
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—Brig. General Juan Bautists Sassiain’s
appointment as Chief of the National Police is an ominous move in
human rights terms. A counterterrorist expert, Sassiain is reputedly
rough and cruel.
—Major General Luciano B. Menendez, a fanatic on
subversion who has condoned human rights violations by those under
his command, remains the Corps III commander (Cordoba). Militarily,
Menendez’s retention may
be attributable to the need for his services in the event of
hostilities with Chile over the Beagle Channel. In human rights
terms, however, it means that the situation in Cordoba is not liable
to improve in the near future.
In all likelihood, the army command shifts will not result in
immediate and drastic human rights improvements, but the political
context appears to be more favorable than it has been since the
March 1976 coup.15 Much will depend upon whether the Videla-Viola tandem chooses to exercise the necessary
leadership, and perhaps ultimately upon whether the Argentine public
becomes sufficiently exercised over continuing abuses to demand
change.
(C) IAHRC
visit. From the Argentine government’s perspective, the
next critical human rights deadline is May 29 when the
Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) will begin a week-long on site
investigation.
It is questionable, however, whether the prospect of the IAHRC visit will lead to fundamental
changes in the tactics employed by the security forces and, thereby,
open the way to long-term human rights advances. In this critical
area, the army command changes probably offer more hope for reform
than the IAHRC visit.16