Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

84. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, August 9, 1978

SUBJECT

• Argentina: Your Questions

You asked for three items on Argentina: (1) current status of the human rights situation in Argentina; (2) whether U.S. policy is in a bind with respect to Argentina and also the Southern Cone, and if so, how we got into it, and whether the NSC was involved; and (3) an alert item for the President. The item for the President is at Tab A.² The other questions are answered below.

I. Argentina’s Human Rights Situation

Argentina is still one of the world’s most serious human rights problem countries.³ Just this month, Amnesty International launched a major campaign world-wide aimed at focusing public opinion on Argentina’s dismal record, which includes, since March 1976, 15,000 disappearances, 8–10,000 political prisoners, the majority of whom have not yet been charged; over 25 secret prison camps; and numerous documented stories of arrest and torture. (One report from our Embassy is at Tab B.)⁴ On human rights-related matters, world opinion always seems to lag behind the reality; Amnesty intends to correct that.

While Argentina still has the worst record in the hemisphere, there has been some improvement in recent months. We understand that the Minister of Interior⁵ has instructed the police, and reportedly the military, to curb excesses; arrests under executive power have decreased and lists of those detained have been published; and a limited right of option for political prisoners to request exile has been reinstituted. On a number of cases in which we have expressed special interest—Jacobo Timerman, Alfredo Bravo, 4 of 5 members of the Deutsch family—the Argentine Government has released them.

II. U.S. Policy

In recognition of this progress, we have switched from voting “no” on non-basic human needs loans in the IFI’s to abstaining. We have also approved the licensing of 16 safety-related munitions items from FMS, and are currently considering another group of requests.

We have informed the Argentine government that if they reach agreement on terms for a visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and there is no deterioration in the human rights situation, we will go ahead with military training to them and will recommend that the Export-Import Bank permit two major credit sales.

The most pressing deadline is October 1, 1978, when the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment prohibiting new arms transfers, and the Roybal amendment, eliminating grant military training to Argentina, come into effect. Both the Argentines and we are eager to take steps which would permit the enormous back-log of credit to be committed before then. (There are over 75 pending FMS cases for $50 million and $150 million on the munitions control lists.) There are also funds for military training, which are being held up, and which the President noted (on June 29) that he had a “slight” inclination to find an excuse for approving.⁶

Our current objectives are to urge the GOA: (1) to permit the IAHRC to visit in accordance with the IAHRC’s regulations; (2) to begin releasing large numbers of prisoners (without rearresting them); (3) to stop the disappearances and explain those which have occurred; and (4) to seek a return to the rule of law.

Everything is stuck now pending Argentina’s reaching agreement with the Inter-American Commission or moving on one of the other objectives above. This basic decision, made in accordance with various legislative requirements, was made by State without consulting NSC.⁷

III. Future U.S. Policy: Who Blinks at the Brink?

Have we gone too far? Have we pushed our policy beyond its effectiveness? Are we pushing the Argentines over the edge and jeopardizing our future relationship? Does the terror justify the repression?

The last question is definitely the easiest. First of all, President Videla told our Ambassador in April 1978 that the war against subversion in Argentina had ended and that he was working to restore the rule of law.⁸ Terrorism has not left Argentina, but it is now the exception, not the rule. And Videla, himself, admits that the war is over; we are just encouraging that he secure his own promise. But regardless, a central tenet of our human rights policy is that government-sanctioned repression never solves terrorism. As Vance said in his OAS speech last year, “The surest way to defeat terrorism is to promote justice . . . Justice that is summary undermines the future it seeks to promote. It produces only more violence . . .”⁹

I, myself, believe that we may have overloaded the circuits and pushed too far, but like our policy to the Soviet Union, there is a logic to it which is difficult to argue. Indeed, it is even more difficult to change direction than with the Soviets because there are laws on the books which mandate that with respect to Argentina we tie our X-M credits, oppose bans in the IFI’s, and condition our arms sales. Anything less, or a step backwards from the place we currently find ourself, would be judged as a presidential retreat just as surely as a different decision on Dresser.¹⁰

Personally, I am most disturbed about the decision not to finance $270 million worth of Export-Import Bank credits. I don’t believe that this is either a legitimate or an effective instrument, though I do agree with State that the law gave us little choice.¹¹ The decision did have an unintended positive impact in that it has finally aroused the business community (there are $600 million worth of credit applications pending in X-M), and they have descended on me, and I have deflected them to Capitol Hill, where they helped defeat more restrictive amendments to the X-M bill last week.

I had sensed that we were approaching the brink when Newsom told me he had decided to hold everything up until the Argentines agreed to a visit by the Inter-American Commission. Newsom, Bushnell, and our Ambassador Castro all thought Argentina would reach agreement soon, but I had my doubts and still have them. Vaky agrees with me, and we both are looking into ways to step back from the brink without appearing as if it is we who blinked first.

It is not at all clear that the Argentines won’t blink first. For one thing, the Europeans made a joint demarche in March, and they seem to be behind us. Secondly, world public opinion is becoming conscious that Argentina is this year’s Chile, and the Argentines have become so nervous that they took out a half dozen pages of ads in the Times and have given at least $1 million to a Madison Avenue P.R. firm to improve its image. Most important, Videla, for the first time in a very long time, is in charge. And he keeps saying he is eager to move forward on his own to restore the rule of law. As he takes those steps, I will make sure that we are quick to respond.

So I will work closely with Pete Vaky to try to develop a strategy to make sure we don’t totter over the brink. Since we will have to act before October 1, I am conscious of a quick turn-around, and as soon as we have a strategy, I will get back to you.

IV. The Southern Cone: Are We Winning or Losing?

I think Kissinger’s observation that if we don’t turn our policy around to the Southern Cone soon, we will have them allied against us is out-of-date and wrong.¹² For a short time, in early 1977, the Southern Cone countries—led by Brazil but including Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay—tried to establish a bloc to confront our human rights policy. Because these governments distrusted each other more than they despised President Carter, the movement did not get off the ground, and indeed they were all over the lot at the O.A.S. General Assembly.

Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are big countries with extremely narrow, ultra-conservative authoritarian governments. The narrowness of their view is reflected in, among other things, the pettiness of their international disputes with one another. Chile and Argentina have almost gone to war over the Beagle Channel,¹³ and Brazil and Argentina have strained their relations almost to the breaking point on the issue of water rights.

Our relations with Brazil are now better than they have been at any time since January 1977, and they are as good as can be expected given our non-proliferation policy, and the deliberate chill which Silveira injects into the relationship. We have tried through the working groups and the visits by the President and Vance to develop a cooperative relationship, but that will have to await Brazil’s new government next year.

What Kissinger failed to see, after completing his talks with the military leaders in Argentina and Brazil, is that Jimmy Carter has inspired a younger generation of Latin Americans; no other American President in this century has done that. Even Jack Kennedy, who was loved in Latin America, was suspected in the universities because of his strong anti-Communism and the Bay of Pigs intervention. Carter is clearly viewed as a man of great moral stature in Latin America, and that inspires the young and the democratic and embarrasses, and unfortunately, sometimes infuriates some of the conservatives and the military. Carter’s stature has translated into real influence unlike anything the U.S. has had since we turned in our gunboats, and at the same time, it has given the U.S. a future in Latin America, which we had almost lost.

The best indication that the U.S. is winning in the Southern Cone, even though governmental antagonism is evident, is that the Argentines are still hungry for a return to normalcy in our relations. They use every opportunity and every channel—including Kissinger—to try to get Carter’s approval. Thirty, twenty, even ten years ago, the idea that the Argentines would ask the U.S. to bestow upon them the mantle of legitimacy would have been unthinkable, even laughable. Today, it’s real.

The Argentines are a proud people, but they are also embarrassed by the human rights situation. They are also more sophisticated than in the days of Peron when they looked for foreign scapegoats. There are limits to their sophistication, no doubt, and I will take care that we don’t cross them, but I think it would be a mistake and an injustice if we turned our policy around at this time.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/77–12/78. Confidential. Inderfurth initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. In the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote, “What do we do to get hold of the initiative? ZB.”
2. Tab A, undated, is attached but not printed. Brzezinski wrote, “While we are eager to build good relations with Argentina, the current human rights situation is so dismal that our relations may be reaching a breaking point.” He outlined the steps taken by the Administration up to that point and concluded, “We are currently looking into a new strategy to break the deadlock.”
3. Brzezinski underlined the phrase “the world’s most serious human” and placed a question mark next to it. He wrote: “Cambodia Cuba USSR” in the right-hand margin.
4. Tab B, telegram 5656 from Buenos Aires, July 21, is attached but not printed.
5. Harguindeguy.
6. See footnote 6, Document 83.
7. Brzezinski underlined the phrase “without consulting NSC,” highlighted the last sentence of this paragraph, and wrote in the left-hand margin, “give me memo on this.” The memo is printed as Document 86.
8. See footnote 6, Document 75.
9. Vance’s speech to the OAS General Assembly, June 14, 1977, is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, July 18, 1977, p. 70.
10. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 140 and 141.
11. Brzezinski underlined the phrases “about the decision,” “finance $270 million,” and “I don’t” and highlighted the two sentences in which those phrases appear.
12. Kissinger visited Argentina for the World Cup in June and met with Newsom on July 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot 81D154, David Newsom Files, 1978–81, Box 14, Latin America) In a January 16, 1981, memorandum to Brzezinski, Bloomfield noted that Mathews’ Evening Report for August 22, 1978, had stated “that Dr. Brzezinski had remarked to her on the previous week that the human rights policy had ‘ruined’ U.S. relations with Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. Demurring, Dr. Mathews blamed the problems that had arisen on attempts to ‘implement ill-advised Congressional directives,’ particularly those mandating human rights actions on OPIC and the Ex-Im Bank—‘the Harkins Amendments.’ An historic footnote: The staff had information that Dr. Brzezinski’s reaction to the damage caused by U.S. policy took place the day after former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had reported to Dr. Brzezinski on the private results of the Carter trip to Argentina.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Unfiled Files, Box 131, Human Rights Policy, 1/81)
13. For the Beagle Channel dispute, see Document 37.