Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

25. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 30, 1978

SUBJECT

• The President’s Trip

Countries Selected

Obviously, the first questions that need to be addressed in drawing up scenarios for the President’s trip are: (1) Which countries will he visit? and (2) How much time will he spend in each country?²

First of all, let me repeat the point that I think a stop in Trinidad and Tobago is very important

—to show that we are not lumping the Caribbean into Latin America as we have done in the past,

—to try to gain the cooperation of a very important leader in the Caribbean which has resources as a donor, and

—to show a balance in our approach to the Caribbean between Manley on the one side and Williams of Trinidad on the other.

I understand that Secretary Vance agrees on the importance of putting a stop in Trinidad on the trip.

Of importance, but secondary compared to a stop in Trinidad, would be a second stop in Brazil to Sao Paulo, the center of Brazil’s business and intellectual life and a city which symbolizes the ferment and political dynamism of Brazil in a most interesting period of transition.

In addition, you may want to resist two temptations as you consider the schedule. First, there may be an attempt to make a “Latin America only trip” and do Africa in the summer. I think this would be a mistake. Right now, we are trying to encourage Latin American leaders to get involved in international politics, particularly African politics.³ A trip only to Latin America might tempt us into the rhetoric of the “special relationship” while a trip that includes Africa will give him the opportunity to make points about global interdependence, the North-South dialogue, and “constructive” links between Africa and Latin America.

I understand that some consideration is being given to doing the Africa portion after the Summit in the summer. I think that is the time for him to do his travelling in the U.S., campaigning for Congressmen, rather than abroad.

A second temptation might be to begin the trip in Panama to fulfill the President’s pledge of exchanging the instruments of ratification there. I think such a trip is an easy and discreet one-day or weekend trip which should occur after ratification by the Senate. I think it would be a mistake to make the rest of the trip contingent on the quick and easy resolution of the Canal Treaties. I know that the Congressional people believe that we will finish the treaties in February, but I continue to believe that it will take March and perhaps part of April as well. I think the trip to Panama should be kept separate. With luck, he can do it in a day before the global trip. Otherwise, afterwards.⁴

VENEZUELA

Events

As originally planned, the first major speech on North-South economic issues by the President should be made before the Venezuelan Congress.⁵ After meeting with Perez, the President also needs to meet separately with the two leading Presidential candidates—Piñerua Ordaz of Perez’ party, Acción Democratica; Herrerra Campins of COPEI.

Finally, the President should meet briefly with the Venezuelan press, only one of two entirely free press corps in South America. When I was travelling with Secretary Vance in November,⁶ Pete Vaky took me to task on the issue of a press conference. He said the question we face in Caracas and Brasilia is not whether to have a press conference, but how it will be handled. Either the press will surround the President when he arrives or after meetings—as they did with Secretary Vance—or it is organized in a way so as to achieve maximum impact—i.e., questions on all the major issues, translation, orderliness, quiet, and a listening audience when the President answers. I continue to believe that a press conference in Brazil is essential and critical, whereas one in Caracas is just important. I would recommend both, however.⁷

Issues and Decisions

There are two broad categories of issues for the Perez-Carter discussions: seeking cooperation from Perez on a variety of international issues and exploring modes for cooperating on research and development in alternative energy sources.

Consultations on Global Issues. As a result of the President’s meeting with Perez in June and again in September,⁸ we have tasked our Embassy in Caracas to consult with Venezuela on Tlatelolco and non-proliferation, human rights, Belize, Bolivian corridor, Southern Africa, and the Caribbean. In each of these areas, we need to clearly define our objectives between now and the trip and then decide how Venezuela can best contribute to those objectives. If you approve, I will organize a meeting with State and Treasury people to do that, and will send you a memo on it.⁹

Energy Cooperation. In June, the President suggested to Perez that we have Ministerial talks on energy. Since then, Schlesinger has shown little or no interest in meeting with the Venezuelans in spite of the fact that working-level groups have defined a full agenda. Provided that someone can persuade Schlesinger to meet with Venezuelan Minister of Mines Hernandez, there will be much that the two Presidents can talk about in this area.

Though Schlesinger has postponed the meeting three times, Hernandez has come back again and asked for a meeting between February 20 and March 5 (see Tab A).¹⁰ That’s already quite late if we want to use it as a preparatory meeting for the President’s trip. But unless you or the President persuade Schlesinger to meet with Hernandez, I don’t think it will ever come off, and we will have lost an important opportunity. I have prepared a memo for you to send to the President (Tab I),¹¹ but you may prefer to use it as background and just talk directly with Schlesinger.

RECOMMENDATION:

In the light of Schlesinger’s failure to respond to your memo to him of January 10 (Tab B),¹² I would recommend that you send the memo to the President first (Tab I).¹³

or alternatively, phone Schlesinger directly.¹⁴

In addition, there are two other areas we may want to explore with the Venezuelans:

Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries (TCDC). An idea which has attracted a good deal of interest at the UN is to build scientific research centers in middle-income developing countries, like Venezuela and Brazil, to develop intermediate or “appropriate” technology for LDCs. In addition to helping develop technology which is more labor-intensive and thus better-suited to their needs, this program would help to create horizontal linkages among developing countries, permitting them to relate to one another directly rather than through industrialized countries. We could explore ways to develop such a program in Venezuela (and in Brazil).

Themes: A Common Responsibility to Help the Poor. One theme, which was in the President’s Pan American Day speech,¹⁵ but has not yet been elaborated, is that “all of us have a special responsibility to help the poorest countries in the world as well as the poorest people in each of our countries.” The stop in Caracas, the capital of one of the “new rich,” seems to be an appropriate place to restate the commitment, which OPEC must share with the industrialized countries, to help the poor countries and the poorest people. If you approve, I will develop this concept a little more fully in the speech.¹⁶

BRAZIL

Scenario

The single most important event in Brasilia which the President could do is a press conference. Both Mrs. Carter and Secretary Vance have had receptions for a broad cross-section of Brazilians, including people who have criticized the government. The significance of these receptions was lost on the Brazilian people. On the other hand, Mrs. Carter’s press conference was the event which made her stop in Brasilia so successful.¹⁷

In addition to meeting with Geisel, the President should also meet briefly with General Figueiredo, Geisel’s appointed successor, and also with Magalhaes Pinto, the first civilian of the post–1964 period to seek the Presidency. I think the meeting with Figueiredo would be important since he is likely to be the President from March 1979–1985. The meeting with Magalhaes will be of enormous symbolic importance, underlining our interest in continued liberalization without being unduly provocative.

The President may also want to give a short speech on the role of law in the Brazilian Congress.¹⁸

I would also recommend a short stop in Sao Paulo to meet with Cardinal Arns and with representatives of business, labor, professionals, and academe. Given the traditional independence of “Paulistas”, you may want to consider scheduling a small seminar of people like Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Helio Jaguaribe to discuss Brazil’s future. Even if the President didn’t participate, I believe you and Secretary Vance could really profit and would definitely enjoy such a discussion.

Issues

I am currently working with S/P in State on a proposal for US-Brazilian cooperation in non-nuclear energy research and development, and we should have a draft by the end of the week.¹⁹ This is one area we may be able to make some progress.

State is currently trying to decide whether to issue a human rights report for Brazil because of OPIC. Given Brazil’s open and strong distaste with these reports—leading to their renunciation of the US-Brazilian military agreement, I believe it would be a disaster to release such a report and would probably expose our investments to possible arbitrary action. I understand that Christopher is considering the decision at this time, and you may want to phone him on this.²⁰

Cuba’s presence in Africa is another subject for discussion. I am tasking [less than 1 line not declassified] an update on Brazil’s policy toward Africa as a way to probe for the best approach to them.²¹

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 11, President, Latin America and Africa, 3/28/78–4/3/78: 10/7/77–1/31/78. Confidential. Sent for action. At the top of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote, “RP, give me a revised memo to Jim Schl (copy to Vance) urging once more the Ven. talks. If he doesn’t react (and pt. out that I wrote earlier) I will go to the P. ZB.” Inderfurth also initialed the first page of the memorandum. In a January 24 memorandum to Pastor and Richardson, Brzezinski wrote, “With reference to the forthcoming trip, I think it is extremely important that we now develop plans for specific and concrete actions which could be associated with the trip: agreements to be signed, initiatives to announce, joint statements, etc. Please develop an initial scenario and consult with me within a week.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 63, President’s Visit to Brazil and Venezuela [3/78], 1–5/78)
2. Carter traveled to Venezuela, Brazil, Nigeria, and Liberia from March 28 to April 3, 1978. See Documents 345, 346, 172, and 173.
3. In a January 20 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor wrote: “I believe that your idea of involving Latin America in our strategy on the Horn is a far-sighted one, and I enthusiastically support it. As it relates to Latin America, our objective in the Horn should be: to brief, gain support, and engage leading Latin American nations (and Heads of State) in a multinational effort to influence the Cubans, the Soviets and ultimately international opinion for a peaceful settlement.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 45, Latin America, 12/77–7/78)
4. The Senate approved the first Panama Canal treaty on March 16 and the second treaty on April 18. Carter traveled to Panama June 16–17 to deliver the instruments of ratification. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIX, Panama, footnote 2, Document 185.
5. Brzezinski highlighted this sentence with an arrow in the left-hand margin.
6. Vance traveled to Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela November 20–23, 1977. See Document 68 and footnote 3, Document 342. In telegram 9691 from Brasília, November 23, the Embassy transmitted a draft memorandum of conversation for Vance’s talk with Geisel. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072–0418)
7. Brzezinski highlighted this sentence with an arrow in the left-hand margin. For Carter’s March 28 exchange with reporters in Venezuela, see Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, pp. 616–617. For his March 30 press conference in Brazil, see ibid., pp. 627–634.
8. See Documents 336, 337, and 340.
9. Brzezinski checked the approve option. No record of the meeting has been found.
10. Not found.
11. Not found.
12. Not found.
13. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. In a March 20 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor wrote that according to “the informal cooperative arrangement worked out between Schlesinger and Venezuelan Minister of Mines Valentin Hernandez,” Bergold “will be going to Caracas later this year to begin a program of technical exchange and cooperation on a wide range of energy issues.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 63, President’s Visit to Brazil and Venezuela [3/78], 1–5/78)
14. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation.
15. See footnote 3, Document 5.
16. Brzezinski checked the approve option and wrote in the left-hand margin: “Start on it urgently with Erb.”
17. For Rosalynn Carter’s trip to Brazil, see Document 165.
18. For the text of Carter’s March 30 remarks before the Brazilian Congress, see Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, pp. 634–636.
19. Not found.
20. Brzezinski highlighted the second sentence of this paragraph, underlined the phrase “you may want to phone him on this,” and wrote, “check status and let me know if to call.” For Christopher’s decision on Brazil and OPIC, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 108.
21. [text not declassified]