The attached Memorandum was prepared on an inter-agency basis under the
chairmanship of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs in response to
various National Security Council requests.
—the approach we propose to further our objectives in major policy
areas;
—certain issues on which we would particularly welcome the President’s
further guidance.
To make the report as manageable as possible, major issues are
highlighted in the Memorandum itself, with additional detail in
individual tabs.2
Attachment
Memorandum Prepared in the Department of
State3
THE PRESIDENT’S LATIN AMERICAN INITIATIVES:
Initial Assessment and Follow-up Strategy.
A precedent-setting OAS General
Assembly and Mrs. Carter’s success have confirmed the new directions
the President set forth on Pan American Day.
We now have hard evidence that human rights concerns have genuine
support in Latin America—from a number of governments as well as
from many ordinary citizens.
To consolidate that support will require sustained action and
progress on some intractable underlying issues.
This memorandum reviews our evolving strategy to give practical
effect to the President’s statements, summarizes activities underway
on major issues, and requests policy guidance on some key
choices.
The OAS
General Assembly
At Grenada in June:
—A new issue—human rights—dominated debate.
—After years of fighting alone on major issues against a united front
of other members, this time half of Latin America, including the
entire Caribbean, lined up with us.
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—Our key resolution, which commended the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission and proposed steps to facilitate its work, passed
undiluted with the backing of thirteen other governments.
The politics of success were delicate.
—Our coalition was difficult to assemble. The Secretary of State met
with eighteen Foreign Ministers. Our USOAS delegation had to work well and hard to the
last.
—Opposition was strong and concentrated. Led by Uruguay and Chile,
and behind the scenes by Brazil, the Southern Cone was backed by
most Central American states, and fell only two votes short of
blocking our resolution.
—Mrs. Carter’s trip was almost
certainly decisive in obtaining the support from Peru and Ecuador
that proved critical.
Latin American solidarity has broken over the human rights issue. But
there are disadvantages as well as advantages:
—The unconvinced, Brazil and Argentina in particular, have the power
to hamper us in important ways.
—Our human rights policy cannot be fully successful unless we succeed
in reaching countries where major abuses exist. This will take time,
skill, persistence and patience.
Our conclusion is that we have made a major step forward in obtaining
regional support for human rights. The direction is set, and set
well. But we still have a long way to go. We must now keep our
coalition together and find ways of broadening it.
The Months Ahead
The support we received for the aspect of human rights we stress
most—individual freedom—came from conviction. This conviction,
however, included the expectation we would also support the aspect
of human rights emphasized most in Latin culture—socio-economic well
being.
The Grenada Assembly put us clearly on notice that we cannot escape
the economic dimensions of human rights. Our resolution on
protecting the sanctity of the person received one vote more than an
absolute majority—but a Colombian resolution calling for promotion
of human rights through economic cooperation was carried by
acclamation.
Giving substance to the President’s new directions from now on will
require action more than rhetoric. Progress on economic issues will
be critical to allay fears that we are defining human rights
narrowly to divert attention from basic North-South issues of growth
and equity.
Starting from a far lower base than we do, and less able to cope with
escalating oil and other import costs, many nations of Latin Amer
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ica face a cruel choice
between cutting deeply into economic growth—and thus the social
change it facilitates—and incurring increasingly heavy external debt
to sustain more moderate growth levels. Like most other developing
countries, they are not looking for handouts, but for ways to
develop effectively and in an ultimately self-sustaining
fashion.
In moving ahead, we cannot return to a “special relationship” with
Latin America. Rather, we must apply global policies with the kind
of attention, effort and individual sensitivity that will enable us
to sustain our current hemispheric coalition and give us some
meaningful chance for progress with the others.
Promoting Human Rights
The development and application of our global human rights policy,
now under review in PRM–28,4 is a case in
point. One of its major dilemmas is sharply defined in this
hemisphere. It is:
How can we promote human rights in those countries whose
governments have poor human rights records?5
Attitudes toward this issue are as complex and sensitive as the issue
itself. In fact, the issue presents a recurring dilemma more than a
general policy choice, for country specific criteria and interests
other than human rights have to be weighed each time we move from
abstract premises to decisions on particular cases.
The President should be aware, however, that two aspects of this
issue have recently aroused considerable debate and have serious
implications for how many Latin American governments will evaluate
and react to our initiatives on human rights.
—The first is how to help meet basic human needs without endorsing a
government’s repressive practices. We have to be careful not to
appear to be so rigid on political rights that we appear to deny
pressing socio-economic rights.
—The second is how to use available executive discretion on military
relationships, and specifically whether to reduce further our
already declining military ties in countries where repressive
military regimes are in power. The pivotal role of military officers
and the uniformed services in the domestic and foreign affairs of
most Latin American countries—and our own interest in regional peace
and coop
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eration—make the
necessary introduction of human rights concerns into our military
relationships a particularly sensitive issue.
In sum, just as we must seek to balance political and socio-economic
human rights, so we must weigh the appearance of implicit support
for repressive military acts against the possibility of influencing
military institutions on a wide range of matters, perhaps including
human rights as well as regional tensions.
These two issues highlight a more general problem. We have found it
easier thus far to deny assistance on human rights grounds than to
provide it. Clearly, we increasingly need to find ways of engaging
individual countries, including both governments and private groups,
in positive activities that recognize good performance and stimulate
improvements in human rights conditions.
In the weeks and months ahead we intend to explore ways in which all available policy instruments can be used,
in all countries, to actively promote our
fundamental commitment to human rights and peace. We need carrots as
well as sticks for the long haul ahead.
We believe this approach is the surest way to achieve our objectives
and would welcome the President’s thoughts on this matter as we move
into a more active phase.
Action Areas
Tabs 1 through 10, prepared on the basis of extensive inter-agency
deliberations, summarize our approach and action program by
issue.
In addition to specific comments the President may wish to make on
individual items in the tabs, his sense of priorities—and in some
cases guidance—would be particularly useful to us on the
following:
I. Consultations (Tab 1)
In this critical area, we are acting to:
A. Embark upon a major program of visits by senior officials to Latin
America; and
B. Establish an inter-agency coordinating procedure, under the
Department of State, to assure that these visits and contacts are
mutually supportive of overall Administration policy objectives.
II. Human Rights (Tab 2)
Assistant Secretary Todman
cabled basic guidance to all our Embassies in Latin America on June
17.6 Human Rights
Evaluation Reports,
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spelling
out short and long term strategies for every Latin American country,
are in preparation.
We are acting now to:
A. Use our voice and vote in the international financial institutions
in support of human rights objectives.
B. Strengthen the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, possibly
including visits to Paraguay, Haiti, and other countries—and to the
U.S.
C. Intensify consultations with like-minded hemispheric states on
means to improve compliance in offending states.
D. Explain, and mobilize support for, our human rights policy among
religious, business, professional and ethnic communities in the
U.S.
III. Economic Issues (Tab 3)
In this key area, we plan to:
A. Urge agencies to continue to use every appropriate occasion to
press both developed and developing countries to adopt forthcoming
postures on trade issues in the MTN.
B. Assure that Administration studies now underway on assistance
policy, IMF facilities and
international financial institutions7 clearly focus
on two questions essential to our relations with the LDCs:
—the extent to which the U.S. should provide, or support, more “fast
disbursing, balance of payments assistance” and which bilateral or
multilateral instruments we should use for this purpose.
—the desirability of more flexible criteria and conditions on the
part of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in using its facilities, particularly the
anticipated $10 billion new Witteveen facility,8 in
assisting developing and other countries with balance of payments
difficulties.
IV. Cultural Affairs (Tab 4)
We strongly recommend that the President approve in principle the
development of a significantly expanded high-visibility cultural
exchange program reflecting our emphases on human rights and on the
role of the individual citizen in foreign affairs. This effort would
require a supplemental appropriation for FY–78 (of $6 to 7 million),
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and sustained increased funding in future
years. If the President agrees, we would conduct further feasibility
analyses and prepare submissions for OMB review.
V. Science and Technology (Tab 5)
We recommend that the President consider an expanded S&T program
for Latin America. Some of the benefits are long range, possibly
difficult to justify to the Congress and relatively expensive;
nevertheless, they are of considerable interest and potential
usefulness. Our top priorities, described in more detail in Tab 5,
are:
—A Technology Cooperation Package ($10–20 million per year)
—Remote Sensing Projects ($15–20 million per year)
—Advance Communications Technology ($20–25 million per year)
The President’s general guidance on priorities and possible funding
would allow us to develop further feasibility analyses and prepare
submissions for OMB review.
VI. Other Major Issues
Additional topics for review and guidance
include: |
Nuclear Non-Proliferation |
Tab 6 |
Conventional Security Issues |
Tab 7 |
Terrorism |
Tab 8 |
Narcotics |
Tab 9 |
Finally, Tab 10 gives a status report on those items raised with Mrs.
Carter not covered
elsewhere.
Follow-up Procedures
We have established inter-agency working groups to ensure that the
initiatives taken in support of your April 14 speech are developed
and implemented in a coordinated manner. We will when necessary
provide reports on progress achieved and decisions required on
individual issues. Reports already planned or requested are listed
in the tabs.
We are also beginning reviews of policy toward two major subregional
areas.
(1) The Caribbean—where sound development initiatives are required to
promote human rights, sustain democracy, and help manage the
mini-state problem; and
(2) The Southern Cone—whose countries are of fundamental importance
to us on human rights and nuclear transfer issues and in the
regional balance generally.
In summary, we have taken the initiative in Latin America. And the
inter-agency participation in the follow-up process (listed in
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Tab 11) demonstrates that we
are beginning to coordinate in ways that will sustain the
momentum.9