191. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
ADDENDUM TO MEMORANDUM OF 8 MARCH, RPM 77-10044; CHILE: JUNTA SOLIDARITY2
We believe that relations between Washington and Santiago have deteriorated to such a low state because of the US emphasis on the human rights issue that any leverage we may have had with the Chileans has largely disappeared. There are few “closet moderates” in positions of authority in Santiago today to whom the US could look as “forces for good.” The distinction between the views of the few moderates and those of President Pinochet is perceptible, but not very great. There is little prospect of the moderates prevailing against the hardliners in any policy debate regardless of any “carrots” Washington might offer. Continuing US pressures are likely only to arouse nationalist sentiments even further and reinforce the tendency in Santiago—and elsewhere in the Southern Cone—to view the US as an antagonist.
[Page 579]Chile might eventually alter its human rights practices, but only after enough time has passed so that it will not appear to have done so in response to outside pressure. After a “cooling off” period the US might find Santiago receptive to the idea of easing certain restrictions if assured of concrete “rewards.”
Chile feels desperately in need of military equipment to counter the Peruvian buildup and might respond favorably to offers of US arms. Acquisition of such equipment would measurably improve the junta’s perception of the Chilean security situation and might provide a pretext for easing some restrictions. The junta might, for example, be inclined to drop its state of siege or ease the present curfew. The state of siege provision must be renewed twice annually and has just been extended. Quiet US assurances in the meantime might induce the junta to make the gesture of letting the state of siege run out routinely when it next comes up for review in September. By that time the government could salve its pride by simply declaring that it has determined the need for such a measure no longer exists.
Whatever policy Washington adopts, it will, for the foreseeable future, be dealing with Pinochet or someone like him. Any potential successor is likely to perceive Chile’s problems in much the same light as the current President. In the final analysis, restrictions will be eased more in response to changing circumstances in Chile—and the military’s perceptions of such change—than to outside inducements.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00071A, Box 7, Folder 27: RP M 77-10053. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Latin America Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis.↩
- See Document 189. ↩