160. Memorandum From the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs Staff Director for NSC Interdepartmental Groups (Einaudi) to Multiple Recipients1
SUBJECT
- Report on September 23 IG Meeting on Bolivia
On September 23 ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John A. Bushnell chaired a meeting of the ARA/NSC-IG to discuss the previously distributed policy paper on Bolivia (attached).2
In considering the recommendation contained in the policy paper, the IG agreed to
—Adopt the Short-Term Game Plan (V-A) for what remains of 1980.
[Page 483]—Monitor closely the situation in Bolivia. In the absence of any change in Bolivia’s policies or political personalities, meet again before the end of 1980 to review our Bolivian policy.3
Short-Term Game Plan
The IG confirmed our present policy and accepted short-to-medium term goals of: minimizing human rights abuses; greater cooperation on narcotics matters; reinstitution of the democratic process; and constructive—not destructive—economic programs, supportive of Bolivia’s return to democracy. The IG also endorsed for the rest of 1980 a short-term strategy to isolate the regime, diplomatically and politically, to promote moderation and to exert economic pressures on Bolivia.
With respect to the international development banks, it was agreed to insist on full compliance with loan conditions of projects and programs which already have been agreed upon and to oppose any applications for new loans. With respect to the IMF, it was agreed to urge the IMF staff informally to be strict in enforcing the current standby. No decision was made in regard to future IMF arrangements.
Future Policy
The IG agreed that either consolidation of the present regime or a major change in Bolivian policies—not simply a change of personalities—would require a reassessment of the approved short-term game plan, and therefore decided to meet before the end of 1980 to consider again our policy towards Bolivia.
Action Items
In addition, the IG agreed to the following measures not specified in the policy paper:
1) Make an immediate approach to the other Andean Pact nations to have Bolivia placed on the agenda for the upcoming OAS General Assembly—ACTION: State/ARA
2) Develop better information on human rights abuses in Bolivia (e.g. produce hard figures on numbers of political prisoners)—ACTION: [less than 1 line not declassified] State
3) Review the level of staffing at the Embassy in La Paz in the next month, considering security conditions at post, policy objectives, agency needs and likelihood of meeting them—ACTION: State/ARA
[Page 484]4) Prepare informal guidelines to assist in any future assessment of GOB performance—ACTION: State
(Human Rights-HA)
(Narcotics—INM)
(Democratic Process—ARA)
(Constructive Economic Programs—EB)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 2, Bolivia, 1-10/80. Secret. Drafted by Swigert on October 2; cleared by Hart (ARA/AND), Morley (ARA/PPC), Eaton, Bushnell, Graham (HA), and in draft by Wolf. Swigert initialed for all clearing officials except for Bushnell. The memorandum was distributed to ARA, S/P, HA, EB, INR, P, PM, INM, the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and Treasury, AID, CIA, ICA, the NSC, OMB, IDCA, DA, IBRD, IDB, and the JCS. In an October 8 memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron, Pastor forwarded this report and wrote: “the interagency group confirmed our short-term game plan, which involves the minimum of contact and recognition to the Bolivian government until it meets our basic concerns in the areas of human rights, democratization and narcotics control.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 5, Bolivia)↩
- See Document 161.↩
- No evidence of another IG meeting before the end of 1980 was found. In telegram 279070 to all American Republic Diplomatic Posts, October 19, the Department summarized the IG meeting and its conclusions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800499-0864) In telegram 8674 from La Paz, October 24, the Embassy responded to the policy review by noting, “We believe the policy is right on target.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800508-0478)↩