Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

106. Telegram From the Consulate General in Rio de Janeiro to the Department of State¹

Rio de Janeiro, January 26, 1980, 0527Z

313. Subject: General Goodpaster’s Mission to Argentina: General Report.

(C–Entire text)

1. I believe discussions of the last three days have opened opportunities for US-Argentine relations which seem promising for both governments to follow up. During the talks I sought to impress on the Argentine officials both the seriousness with which we would view the erosion of the US grains embargo² and the desire to strengthen cooperation with Argentina as a serious and responsible country of the West.

2. The Argentine officials, I feel, approached the talks in a positive, business-like manner. President Videla, recalling his meeting with Vice President Mondale,³ emphasized his desire for better relations. But all the senior Argentine officials also stressed the Argentine view that much of Argentina’s support of US initiatives had gone unacknowledged and that US policies had frequently failed to take into account Argentina’s severe domestic problems and to recognize improvements when they occurred.

3. The Argentine leaders responded well to my presentation on Afghanistan. They appeared fully to share our view on the seriousness of the Soviet move, our concerns for its broader strategic implications, and the need for Western unity. While they repeatedly questioned the appropriateness and probable effectiveness of the “boycott” (undoubtedly in good part for tactical reasons), they seemed genuinely impressed with the range, weight and seriousness of the measures the U.S. has taken or initiated. One further report: In their response, they also noted Argentina’s own recent struggle with left-wing terror and insurgency which had brought them, in their terms, only “isolation and disgrace.”

4. Grains exports. While standing their ground on the public position they had taken, in essence the Argentine leaders gave a political and moral commitment that they would seek to prevent direct Soviet purchases substantially greater than normal levels. On the other hand, they made clear that, given this public posture (and the political repercussions in Argentina if they were perceived as giving in to U.S. pressure) they would be willing to do this only through informal and private arrangements; and they declined to take responsibility for transshipments beyond their borders, which they alleged were uncontrollable by the GOA. To the extent they make good on their word, the danger of massive direct Soviet purchases would have been averted, but this leaves us rpt us with the equally serious problem of indirect purchases. The Argentines said they would not object to our pursuing this problem with other governments and trading companies, and they gave some indications of cooperation on additional information, but they are clearly reluctant and this will require follow-up. (Additional detail will be the subject of septel.)⁴

5. Human Rights. The forthcoming OAS report⁵ clearly is of intense concern to them, as is the US government’s own report.⁶ They had admitted the IAHRC because they expected that it would acknowledge the reforms and improvements made by the national leadership, along with the dismal record of their “dirty war.” (In private, they stated bitterly that the commission staff has been unhelpful and partial, citing the personal background of some of its key members.) They asked whether we could be of help in the next phase of the commission’s deliberations. We, of course, stressed the independence of the commission and our inability to influence the commission in its review of the GOA’s comments on the draft report (due in the commission next month.)

6. We emphasized that the US interest was not in Argentina’s international censure but in the improvement of human rights. (The tension which was previously in evidence was reduced considerably by this statement.) There was a good discussion of the forthcoming UNHRC meeting; we indicated that the US, while concerned to maintain the integrity of the commission’s work, would support moderate approaches on agenda items affecting Argentina. The Argentines said they would not oppose the proposal in the UNHRC for a general procedure for dealing the question of human rights of persons detained or imprisoned. They expressed some concern that an attempt might be made (possibly by Canada) to introduce a resolution specifically censuring Argentina; we repeated that the US had no intent to censure Argentina.

7. With respect to the complaints against Argentina under the confidential 1503 procedure,⁷ the Argentine officials requested US support for a decision by the commission to keep the Argentine situation under review, in view of continuing and prospective improvements in Argentina’s Human Rights situation. We stated that this was not the current US position and that we would have to refer their request to Washington.

8. Nuclear issues. The Argentine leaders, as would be expected, displayed a strong interest and sensitivities over US policies and actions in this area. Foreign Minister Pastor stated that their program was for peaceful uses only; Argentina had no desire to exercise a nuclear option and would do so only if required by world-wide or regional developments (he mentioned Brazil and Chile). He said that the ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty must await the conclusion of an appropriate safeguards agreement with the IAEA, negotiations for which are now under way. (I understand there may be difficulties with the kind of agreement the Argentines wanted.)

9. The Argentine officials raised a number of questions about our representations to the Swiss and the FRG. We stressed that the US objective had not been to stop the sales or to deny technology but legitimate concern over safeguards arrangements as Argentina is about to close the nuclear fuel cycle. Pursuant to your instructions we stated that the US would shortly submit a reply on the assurances we require in order to supply the pending shipments of nuclear fuel for Argentina’s research reactors.

10. Military relationship. We detected considerable interest in the resumption of a relationship among our Armed Forces. In response to their question, we stated that we could see no possibility of lifting of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment at this time, but that the ultimate goal of the restoration of mutually acceptable military relations was an interest both countries shared. As first steps towards this goal we suggested the possibility of visits and joint exercises, personnel exchanges and consultations on security matters. They evidenced interest in all of these.

11. General consultations. In the discussions there seemed to be agreement that increased consultations were required as a means of deepening and improving our relations.

12. The Argentines raised numerous other points which will be reported in septels and memcons.⁸

13. An atmosphere of cordiality was maintained throughout even when contentious points were discussed. My overall assessment is that the talks had a positive effect.

Dewitt

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800002–0385. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.
2. Carter announced a grain embargo against the Soviet Union on January 4. (Edward Walsh and Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. to Withhold Grain From Soviets,” Washington Post, January 5, 1980, p. A1)
3. See Document 90.
4. The Embassy reported on Goodpaster’s meetings with Martínez de Hoz on grain exports in a series of four messages: telegram 692 from Buenos Aires, January 24; telegram 317 from Rio de Janeiro, January 26; telegram 868 from Buenos Aires, January 30; and telegram 869 from Buenos Aires, January 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870104–0714; N800002–0400; N800002–0504; P870104–0675)
5. The IAHRC report was released in April 1980. (Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, Washington, D.C.: General Secretariat, OAS [1980])
6. See Document 105. The U.S. Senate and House Foreign Relations Committees released the 1979 human rights country reports on February 4. (Department of State Bulletin, March 1980, p. 59)
7. Reference is to the U.N. Economic and Social Council Resolution 1503, adopted May 27, 1970, that established a procedure by which a human rights complaint against a member nation could be filed with the United Nations. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1970, pp. 530–531)
8. See footnote 4 above. In telegram 316 from Rio de Janeiro, January 26, and telegram 609 from Brasília, January 28, the Embassy reported on Goodpaster’s meeting with Videla. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800002–0399 and P870105–0186) In telegram 828 from Buenos Aires, January 29, and telegram 827 from Buenos Aires, January 29, the Embassy reported on Goodpaster’s meetings with Foreign Minister Pastor. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870104–0691 and P870104–0699)