101. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Ecuador, Argentina, and Nicaragua1
212082. Subject: The Secretary’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Pastor
1. Confidential–Entire text.
2. Summary: Secretary Vance had extensive exchange of views with FonMin Pastor in Quito.2 Pastor expressed concern over developments in Nicaragua and the “dangerous” Central American situation. He said that Argentina hopes to proceed toward democracy in near future but not until it gets its house in order. He appealed for better ties with USG and asked that issue of human rights not be sole criteria in our relationship. Secretary Vance expressed appreciation for Argen [Page 330] tina’s vote in OAS on Nicaragua,3 and noted that U.S. values highly its friendship with Argentina and considers it a friend—an ally. He characterized human rights problem a “festering sore” in our relationship. On Nicaragua, Secretary Vance stressed need to push new government into direction of being independent, unaligned country. With respect to Central America, he pointed to need for collective hemispheric effort to persuade these countries to move in a responsible way. Turning to the nuclear issue, the secretary pressed Pastor hard on the urgency of Argentina ratifying treaty of Tlatelolco as President Videla had assured President Carter would be the case. Pastor responded that Tlatelolco would be ratified after GOA completes arrangements for purchase of heavy water plant and “few other steps.” End Summary.
3. During reception at national palace in Quito August 10, Secretary Vance, accompanied by Assistant Secretary Vaky and Mr. Pastor of NSC (with DCM Fimbres as notetaker) had an extensive exchange of views with Argentine Foreign Minister Pastor. Full text of memorandum of conversation of that meeting follows:
CENTRAL AMERICA
The Secretary asked how the GOA saw the Central American situation and what steps the foreign minister believed should be taken in this area.
In response, the foreign minister gave an historic sketch of the spread of communism, beginning with its birth in 1917 and its extension to China and Eastern Europe. He asserted communism had reached Nicaragua and now threatened Salvador and Guatemala. He characterized the Central American situation as very dangerous. He believed the new Nicaraguan Government is under special instructions from Cuba to lay low and to seek as much help as possible from an array of sources. As Nicaragua recovers on the basis of this assistance it will become a severe menace to its neighbors. Again, broadening his perspective, he said that Argentina is aware that in Colombia, for example, terrorism is boiling under a calm surface. There are also signs of great instability in Bolivia, as well as in Peru.
In synthesis, a red stain is spreading over a large number of countries, and a greater number of countries are “intense pink”. He continued that Argentina knows the problem better than others because of its internal struggle. The GOA knows the techniques that communists use in subverting governments. To counter communism Argentina is taking steps in areas such as the universities and is revamping its [Page 331] economy. The GOA hopes in the near future to proceed along the democratic path but not until it is certain that the problems that befell Peron will not revisit the country.
He maintained that the crucial question is that the southern cone countries recognize the U.S. as the leader of the West. Argentina, especially, has a similar constitution to that of the U.S. and wants to be treated as an ally. The GOA does not want the only thing to matter in bilateral relations to be the issue of human rights. In addressing this issue, the government has done everything in its power: for example, it has invited a visit by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. If this commission applies objective criteria, it will see marked progress in the country and that the trend is one of improvement. This matter of human rights should be put in perspective and should not be interposed as a barrier between the two countries.
Argentina recently supported the U.S in the OAS and will continue to do so. Although the views of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay do not completely coincide with those of the U.S., these countries are the U.S.’ true allies in the hemisphere. After the U.S., the four most important countries are Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela and Argentina. If this group can establish better communication with the U.S., indeed they have a healthy desire for collaboration with the U.S., they can serve to guide the smaller Latin American countries.
The Secretary responded that the U.S. appreciated Argentina’s recent vote in the OAS. Argentina is considered a friend—an ally. The U.S. valued highly its friendship with Argentina and expected this to continue into the future. He frankly characterized the human rights objectives as a festering sore. This and other issues should be dealt with as friends and allies. The U.S. shared the Foreign Minister’s view regarding Argentina’s important role in the international community. But, the Secretary concluded, the U.S. cannot ignore that human rights is a festering sore in our relations. Turning to Nicaragua, the Secretary said no doubt there are some Marxist/Leninists in the new government and that Cuba supports the Government of National Reconstruction. But there are also moderate elements in the GNR; consequently, the country can go either way. Nicaragua has to be pushed in the direction that we want, to become an independent and unaligned country. The Nicaraguan situation also affects its neighbors who are also under political tension. The U.S. feels that collectively the hemisphere has to help these neighboring countries face their problems. If these tensions are not eased and there continues to be suppression of rights, there will likely be an explosion offering Cuba new opportunities. The Latin American countries should see what they can do about this and try to move in a constructive way since we all have a common responsibility for the good of the hemisphere.
[Page 332]The Foreign Minister said his Andean group colleagues had reported to him that Nicaragua will need a long period of reconstruction which will absorb all the energies of the new government and that the new leadership will have no time to think of extending its Marxist views. But, the minister wondered what the result would be if it is the Sandinistas who distribute humanitarian aid and channel recuperation assistance. Who will get all the credit for this effort, he asked, but the Sandinistas. The result can only be that the leftists will end up enlisting the majority of the people in their behalf so that in two or three years, should the GNR accede to elections, the Sandinistas would be the logical winners and communism would take over.
The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister if he had an answer to this dilemma. The Foreign Minister replied that he did not have an answer. He went on to comment that Nicaragua’s neighbors lacked faith in the U.S. He asserted these neighbors want and need the U.S. to be forthcoming in assistance to them to assure that Nicaragua over time will not be able to topple them. The minister said he perceived this in his talks with his Central American colleagues. He felt there should be greater communication on ideas of how to stop Nicaraguan encroachment in Central America.
The Secretary said that he felt Honduras had a good chance to survive any threats. But with respect to Salvador, the time is short to respond to that country’s political problems. The Secretary said he felt that unless Salvador responded quickly its government was in peril.
The Foreign Minister said that he was concerned at news that the U.S. is seriously studying providing military aid to the GNR. He thought the effect would be indirectly to arm Cuba.
The Secretary responded that the general question had been raised, but there have been no specific requests and that is where the matter now stands. The U.S. will continue to do provide humanitarian aid, both from a moral necessity and from the practical influence it could give the U.S. in the future through extending a helping hand. The U.S. also hopes to channel any reconstruction assistance through those ministries run by moderates. Frankly, he observed, short-term aid and reconstruction assistance can be extended both to meet immediate human needs and to serve our longer-range objectives.
The Territorial Sea
The Foreign Minister asked about a wire service account regarding a shift in the U.S. position on waters beyond the traditional three miles. Reportedly, the U.S. would deliberately exercise transit rights beyond the three miles and within the 200 miles to affirm its views on this issue.
The Secretary said he had not seen the news account and was not aware what it might refer to. He commented that it might be a garbled story coming out of the LOS negotiations.
[Page 333]Treaty of Tlatelolco
The Secretary said that he had understood from the Foreign Minister’s predecessor that Argentina would move on Tlatelolco,4 and he asked about the status of it.
The Foreign Minister said he wanted to be frank. Argentina had various sources of energy, among them nuclear plants solely intended for peaceful ends, for the development of the country, and to complement the country’s hydroelectric capacity. Argentina had now reached the stage of being able fully to implement its energy plan. An obstacle to this is the strong pressure being applied with respect to safeguards. He believed the GOA’s point of view is a just one. If Argentina can complete its energy objectives it has no objection to full and complete safeguards. Argentina is fully determined to sign Tlatelolco but wants to be in a position to take a few steps to fulfill its energy plan. It hopes to finish negotiations for a heavy water plant in the next two months. Once these measures are achieved, Argentina plans adherence to the ban on biological warfare and to the treaty of Tlatelolco.
The Secretary said he had not understood there were conditions in the previous joint communique.5
The Foreign Minister noted that at the time the circumstances he referred to had not existed.
The Secretary again asked when Argentina could sign.
The Foreign Minister repeated this could be in a couple of months after Argentina has arranged purchase of the heavy water plant. The Secretary observed that he had not understood that Argentina was pressed on the matter such that it could not abide by the communique. He assumed Argentina’s stated intention would be carried out as indicated in the communique. The Foreign Minister’s response was the first indication of a different view prevailing in Argentina. President Videla had told President Carter that Argentina would ratify Tlatelolco and this was reflected in the communique.
The Foreign Minister insisted the “central concept” had not changed; what was different were new circumstances which Argentina had to take into account before signing.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790369–1171. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to all American Republic diplomatic posts. Drafted by Adams; cleared in S/S-O and in draft by R. Pastor and Bremer; and approved by Vaky.↩
- Vance and Foreign Minister Pastor were in Quito for the OAS General Assembly.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 100.↩
- See Document 93.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 68.↩