44. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State1
131. Subject: Codel Bingham Meeting With Castro.
1. Summary. During Jan 6 meeting with Codel Bingham, President Castro expressed pessimism about US-Cuba normalization. He reminded the Codel that although he had harshly criticized the US in his Jan 1 speech,2 he had not attacked President Carter. He outlined at length the standard Cuban positions on Africa, China, the trade embargo, and US property claims. Although the Codel made a strong pitch for the release of the remaining US political prisoners, Castro merely reiterated his proposal that the US first release Puerto Rican nationalists. End summary.
2. On Jan 6, Codel Bingham’s second day in Havana, all nine Congressmen and one staff member were invited to late evening meeting with President Castro.3 Highlights of the meeting, which lasted almost four hours, follow:
3. US-Cuban relations. Castro discussed his recent speech in which he lambasted the United States in such strong terms that USINT Chief Lane walked out. Castro characterized his criticism of the US as “hard” but “not insulting.” He emphasized, however, that his speech was critical of the United States rather than of President Carter. He reminded the Codel that Carter is the first US President to make some favorable gestures toward him (Castro).
4. Castro said recent US actions make him skeptical about the normalization process. He said the SR–71 overflight, the continuing trade embargo, recent “exceptional” US naval maneuvers, and “hysteria” over the MIG-23s had forced him to speak out against the United [Page 100] States. He contended that the MIG-23s have been in Cuba for over a year and that they are tactical, defensive weapons.
5. Castro said Cuba wants detente and has made positive gestures toward the US. But some people in the US wish to “poison the climate” of US-Cuban relations. Every time some progress is made, they manufacture a new crisis. He recalled the Shaba incident, saying with great emotion that Cuba had nothing to do with the Katanganese invasion and that he was “betrayed” by the leaking in Washington of his confidential assurances to USINT Chief Lane. What happens now, he concluded, depends on the US. If the US position is as it seems, then he must prepare the Cuban people for a long struggle.
6. China. Castro expressed concern that our normalization of relations with China may have been designed to counter the Soviet Union. He praised the Soviets, saying they are interested in peace and never interfere with Cuba’s policies, nor encourage hostility toward the US. In contrast, China is chauvinistic, aggressive and expansionist; the Chinese want weapons from NATO and nuclear power plants from France and the US. Moreover, China’s foreign policy is unprincipled and therefore unstable. The Chinese preach one thing and the next day do another.4 Castro warned that, for these reasons, the US may well have problems in the future with China.
7. The Horn of Africa. Congressman Bingham asked Castro if Cuba has become involved in Eritrea. Emphatically stating that Cuba played no part in the Eritrea conflict, Castro launched into a lengthy review of the history of Cuba’s involvement in Ethiopia. He claimed that the US offered weapons to Somalia on 15 July 77. Barely a week later, Somali troops invaded Ethiopia. Ethiopia was then on the verge of collapse, but the US press ignored the situation there. Cuba was asked to provide assistance, did so, and “is not ashamed of it at all.” Castro argued that after repelling the Somali invasion, Ethiopia showed great restraint by not proceeding across the border into Somalia. He added that Somali troops did not withdraw voluntarily from the Ogaden, as the Somalis claim, but were completely destroyed. Cuba would much prefer to send doctors instead of troops, Castro continued. As conditions requiring a Cuban troop presence disappear, Cuba will no longer have an interest in remaining. But the decision to withdraw, he emphasized, rests only with two governments—Ethiopia and Cuba.
8. Southern Africa. Castro expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of the OAU and other multilateral organizations. He recalled that the OAU had been unable to save Angola and did nothing for Ethiopia. [Page 101] Similarly, the OAS had not prevented the US from going into the Dominican Republic, and the UN has been unable to achieve a Namibian settlement or to wipe out apartheid. The only ones who can solve the Namibia problem, he said, are the Namibians themselves. (Castro offered no comment on Rhodesia.)
9. Trade embargo. Castro attacked the embargo, calling it immoral and illogical. (Note: Congressman Bingham had remarked earlier in the day to Minister of Foreign Trade Fernandez Font that the term “bloqueo” (blockade), which the Cubans habitually use when referring to the embargo, seemed inappropriate for describing the US policy on trade with Cuba. Perhaps having learned that Bingham had raised this point, Castro for the most part employed the term “embargo” rather than “bloqueo.”) Congressman Bingham asked how Cuba might view a partial lifting of the embargo. Castro avoided a direct reply, instead restating his objections to the maintenance of the embargo. Similarly, he shed little light on how Cuba would view a lifting of the embargo only on medicines, noting only that such a move would be tactical and not a solution. He commented that the one-time offer of medicines made earlier by the US was a “restricted” offer which Cuba had been unable to accept.
10. US property claims. Asked about compensation for US property seized in the early days of the revolution, Castro responded, “I believe these questions should be discussed when the embargo is lifted.” He said he thought mutual indemnification for the US claims and Cuban counterclaims (for damages allegedly suffered from the embargo, the Bay of Pigs, and other anti-Castro actions) would be the best solution, “but of course I am willing to discuss this.” He later reiterated that unless the US merely wants a “symbolic solution” (he repeated this phrase twice), mutual indemnification would be the best solution. Comment. Castro seemed to be suggesting that if the US would be willing to accept a token, i.e., small, payment, Cuba would drop its counterclaims. End comment.
11. US political prisoners. The Codel made a strong appeal for the release of the remaining US prisoners, emphasizing that this would significantly improve the climate of US-Cuban relations. Castro immediately linked this issue to the normalization process. He pointed out again that Cuba has made several recent gestures toward the US, such as allowing the dual nationals to leave Cuba. In contrast, the US carried out an intelligence overflight, violating Cuban airspace, which Cuba called “irritating” and “a serious offense.” He implied that the only card he has left in his hand to play is the US political prisoners.
12. Castro said the Lunt case (in which Congressman Gilman was particularly interested) is very serious because Lunt was recruited by the CIA. However, he said, Cuba wants a solution to the US political [Page 102] prisoner problem. He said he has already proposed a formula to resolve it, namely, that the US first release the Puerto Rican nationalists. He said he was not proposing an exchange—there need be no negotiations, no publicity. Parole for the Puerto Ricans would not be required, only that the US discreetly “eliminate” (i.e., reduce) the sentences. If the US would make this gesture, Cuba could then make a gesture toward US by releasing the US political prisoners. Castro concluded this topic by saying, “now you have made an appeal, and I have proposed a solution.”
13. Comment. Castro appeared tense and testy during the first hour or so of the meeting, perhaps anticipating hostile questions from some members of the Codel. But as late evening turned into early morning, he warmed to the occasion, and the meeting broke up on a cordial note. End comment.
14. Codel has cleared this cable.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 12, Cuba 1/1–11/79. Secret; Immediate. Repeated for information Immediate to Havana.↩
- In telegram 5 from Havana, January 3, the Interests Section reported that Fidel Castro gave a New Year’s Day speech in which he declared that Cuba would never change its African policy and that he was not intimidated by the American embargo. He also characterized the United States as a racist, criminal society. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790003–0702)↩
- In telegram 511 from Havana, January 25, the Interests Section reported that the congressional delegation included Jonathan Bingham (D–NY), William Clay (D–MO), Benjamin Gilman (R–NY), Robert Lagomarsino (R–CA), Dawson Mathis (D–GA), Richard Nolan (D–MN), Edward Patten (D–NJ), Steve Simms (R–ID), and Guy Vander Jagt (R–MI). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790041–0085)↩
- An unidentified hand wrote in the margin at the end of this sentence, “And the Soviets don’t?”↩