Office of the Historian

212. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee (Intelligence) Meeting1

Washington, July 28, 1980, 3:30–5:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Intelligence Operations

PARTICIPANTS

  • State

    • Amb. David Newsom
    • Amb. David Mark

  • OSD

    • Adm. Daniel Murphy
    • Amb. Robert Komer

  • JCS

    • Gen. John Pustay

  • White House

    • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski*
    • David Aaron**

  • NSC

    • Paul Henze (Notetaker)
    • Robert Pastor***

  • Justice

    • Atty. General Benjamin Civiletti
    • Kenneth Bass III

  • OMB

    • Edward Sanders

  • CIA

    • Adm. Stansfield Turner
    • Amb. Frank Carlucci
    • John McMahon
    • [name not declassified]
    • [name not declassified]
    • [name not declassified]
  • * Present only for, and chaired, second part of meeting.
  • ** Chaired first part of meeting.
  • *** Present only during Latin American discussion.
  • **** Present only during Latin American and Near Eastern discussion, respectively.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Annual Review

The meeting was in two parts. The first hour was devoted to the annual review of sensitive collection and covert action operations as required by E.O. 12036 on the basis of briefing books distributed by the DCI to principals and collected again when this portion of the meeting was concluded. Categories of sensitivity were as agreed last year, the DCI explained. There was no disagreement with his selection of operations for review. In the discussion that ensued, no operations were identified for termination or major adjustment. Some members of the group, particularly DOD representatives, questioned the adequacy of several categories of operations (e.g., [less than 1 line not declassified]) in light [Page 512] of urgent intelligence needs. The Chairman expressed the strong view that HUMINT operations are not extensive enough and not being developed rapidly enough to meet urgent priority needs.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Jamaica.]

Jamaica:

A long and heated discussion of the situation in Jamaica and prospects for deterioration there this fall produced consensus that there was a grave problem but no agreement on covert action proposals presented by CIA. It was agreed that State would enlist maximum support from our allies (the Germans and British) for efforts to ensure free elections and reduction of violence. The Chairman asked State to hold an urgent review of Jamaica policy as a result of which decisions on specific covert action proposals could, if still considered desirable, be reached.

Several additional proposals remained to be considered. The Chairman asked that a follow-up meeting be scheduled at an early date.

  1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, SCC Meetings 1979–1980. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.↩