Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

185. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, June 6, 1980, 0147Z

148264. Military Handle is Specat Exclusive. Subject: Secretary’s Luncheon for Foreign Minister Sitthi, June 3.

1. (S)–Entire text.

2. At working luncheon June 3, Secretary had lengthy discussion with Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi which focussed on Kampuchean problem and recent SRV Foreign Minister Thach visit to Bangkok, possibilities for Sihanouk, and related issues. At the table on the U.S. side were Senator Glenn, Refugee Coordinator Palmieri, Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, Ambassador Abramowitz, DAS Negroponte, NSC Staff Member Gregg and Thai Director Cleveland. Foreign Minister Sitthi was accompanied by Thai UN PermRep Pracha Guna Kasem, Thai Charge Nikorn, Sitthi’s secretary Sakthip and Embassy Pol Couns Suchinda.

3. Central points Sitthi made regarding situation within Kampuchea were that despite tough line SRV Foreign Minister Thach had taken during his recent visit to Bangkok, the Vietnamese were in an extended position in Kampuchea and were facing military and economic difficulties, whereas Pol Pot’s forces were now stronger than last fall. Vietnam had not gained control of Kampuchea, and Sitthi believed they would not be able to do so. In Sitthi’s view Pol Pot forces would survive in good condition through the wet season. Prescription for U.S. and ASEAN nations should therefore be to maintain firm, unified position based on ASEAN resolution.² Thai would also support DK seat in UN and urged our support.

4. At same time, Sitthi recognized possibility that given military stalemate he described present tense situation with attendant refugee pressures could go on for four or five years. Accordingly, he thought it increasingly important for the ASEAN/US side to search for possible political alternative of its own for Kampuchea. In this context, Sitthi said for first time that Thailand is prepared to allow Sihanouk to visit Kampuchean camps in Thailand, if all goes well during Sihanouk’s upcoming discussions with Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, which Sitthi said were scheduled for June 16. Sitthi reported that Thai had asked Lee Kuan Yew to discuss with Sihanouk possibility of visiting Thai camps, and Lee had agreed. In response to a question Sitthi said Chinese had no legitimate basis for trying to stop Sihanouk visit to refugee camps, since it would take place on Thai soil.

5. Sitthi outlined the Thai talks in Bangkok with SRV Foreign Minister Thach in terms similar to those we have already heard from him and others. He acknowledged that Indonesia and Malaysia because of their greater fear and distrust of Chinese motives as well as their concern for Thai security were anxious to move sooner than Thailand toward political accommodation with Hanoi; Thai view is that Chinese can play a constructive role for time being, Thailand does not fear SRV attack and if ASEANs hold together on firm line, Vietnamese should prove flexible within next two years. Thach had clearly tried to exploit ASEAN differences during his visit to Kuala Lumpur. Sitthi had insisted however throughout Thach’s sojourn to KL and Bangkok on full opportunity for consultation among the ASEAN partners, so as to frustrate Vietnamese splitting tactics. He underscored that at the present time the most important thing was that ASEAN continue to hang together in coming months.

6. In addition to these main points, Foreign Minister Sitthi also discussed Chinese role and refugee situation.

7. With regard to China, Sitthi said that Huang Hua when he recently visited Bangkok had reasserted need for continuing support to the DK forces and had said that other ASEAN nations were prepared to go along with this effort. Nonetheless, according to Sitthi, he had told Huang Hua that Thai would not facilitate Chinese supply of DK at this time. Regarding possibility China might teach SRV second lesson, Sitthi seemed to think Chinese would not do so in foreseeable future. Chinese he said were now emphasizing fact they were tying down 700,000 SRV troops merely by massing own troops on SRV border and helping DK. Chinese, said Sitthi, believe this is way to victory.

8. Sitthi reasserted RTG’s humanitarian approach to refugees as long as international support continued. He evinced considerable worry however, that good portion of 1.5 million Khmer in western Cambodia could be driven to Thai border in coming months by famine. Longer term outlook also grim since only 50 percent of needs at most would be produced inside Kampuchea for some time unless Heng Samrin authorities changed policies and approach. Consequent tensions provided impetus to press hard for political solution.

9. At close of discussion, Secretary toasted Sitthi with firm reaffirmation of US support for Thailand and security commitment. Noting his admiration for Thailand’s past achievements in maintaining its independence and qualities of its people, Secretary said U.S. appreciated Thai friendship, most recently illustrated in RTG’s support for Olympic boycott.³ Secretary supported Thai efforts on behalf of its own security, ASEAN unity and search for political solution. He praised continued Thai demonstration of humanitarian concern for refugees, which presented greater burden for Thailand than for any other country. He had decided to go to Kuala Lumpur, after hearing ASEAN Ambassadors urge him to do so, as demonstration of support for what ASEAN nations are doing. While we had withdrawn forces from Vietnam war Secretary concluded, we had never lost interest in region, nor in Thai and ASEAN welfare.

Muskie

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Muskie Papers, Lot 83D66, Box 2, Memoranda 1980–1981. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Paul Cleveland (EA/T); cleared by Abramowitz, Negroponte, Palmieri, and in S and S/S–O; approved by Holbrooke. Sent Immediate to Bangkok; sent Priority to Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Manila, Beijing, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Wellington, Canberra, USUN, the Mission in Geneva, London, Paris, Moscow, and CINCPAC.
2. UN General Assembly Resolution 34/22. See footnote 4, Document 181.
3. In response to the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the United States boycotted the 1980 summer Olympics in Moscow. For more information on the boycott, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXV, Global Issues; United Nations Issues.