Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand¹

Washington, June 7, 1980, 0041Z

149603. Subject: Secretary’s Pre-Luncheon Conversation With Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi, June 3, 1980.

1. (S)–Entire text.

2. Secretary welcomed Foreign Minister Sitthi for a private conversation in his office prior to luncheon. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, Ambassador Abramowitz and Messrs. Bernhard and Billings² were present on U.S. side. Mr. Sakthi accompanied Sitthi.

3. Secretary said he had not been in Thailand since 1965, however, he retained special interest in the country, was concerned about security problems there and was especially anxious to help Thai cope with refugee problem. Secretary lauded Thailand for its humanitarian help to Kampuchean people, noting high praise and support for Thailand in Congress; it was highly unusual he said for Congress to increase aid appropriation as it had for Thailand.

4. Sitthi thanked Secretary for inviting him and for giving him a chance to express RTG views. He expressed delight at news Secretary would go to Kuala Lumpur and said Secretary’s attendance would be greatly appreciated by ASEAN FonMins.³ Secretary said he looked forward to exchange of views. Secretary told Sitthi he had also asked Senate Majority Leader Byrd to visit Thailand on his way to China, and Senator Byrd had agreed to go sometime in early July. Sitthi was delighted.

5. Secretary then asked Minister Sitthi to give him an analysis of the situation in Kampuchea, and Sitthi described situation as follows:

6. Kampuchean war has reached stalemate militarily. Pol Pot’s forces appear to be in stronger position than ever before and estimate is they number around 30,000–40,000—the Chinese say 60,000. These troops are well-disciplined and have high morale. They have inflicted and will continue to inflict severe damage on Vietnamese/Heng Samrin forces. Fighting is expected to intensify during upcoming rainy season and Vietnam will suffer a great deal more. DK probably has sufficient arms through dry season, but Chinese say ammo is a problem.

7. Sitthi said when he met Huang Hua in May latter had said that as long as Vietnamese troops remain in Kampuchea, the problem will be nonnegotiable; and Chinese will continue to support Pol Pot. Thailand, said Sitthi, especially present government, had for the moment taken position that they would not give military support to Democratic Kampuchea nor let Thailand be used by the Chinese to send military aid to DK. When told of this decision Huang showed his disappointment and had said privately to Sitthi that he was quite “embarrassed.” Sitthi said he urged China to try to establish a sea route.

8. Sitthi said that Thach had taken very hard line when he recently visited Bangkok, describing situation in Kampuchea as irreversible. SRV is trying every way to get Heng Samrin recognized. Vietnam, however, is fully aware that it has immense problem in Kampuchea and the longer the fighting goes on the more Vietnamese will suffer. They probably would like to find a way out, but they are very arrogant. FonMin said Thailand and ASEAN are trying their best to convince India to withhold its pledge of recognition of Heng Samrin. And at same time ASEAN is trying to convince its allies that assistance to Vietnam at this time would not help gain peaceful solution. Western countries should require Vietnam to comply with ASEAN’s UN resolution.⁴

9. As for Thai/Kampuchea border situation, Thai believe that at present Vietnam has no capability to invade Thailand and would be afraid of political implications of such a move. Thailand is confident in her ability to defend herself, but assistance from the U.S. was much needed. Sitthi did not rule out possibility of some fighting along the border but said that it would not be on large scale.

10. Sitthi said that among members of ASEAN there were differing views; some like the Indonesians are more afraid of China than Vietnam. This is why Thai Prime Minister and Sitthi had recently toured ASEAN countries. As a result of the ASEAN visit, Thailand was able to consolidate position of its ASEAN partners. ASEAN now shared common stand and would speak with same voice in support UN resolution and ASEAN-EC political announcement,⁵ calling for total troop withdrawal and self determination in Kampuchea. Sitthi said it does not matter who runs Kampuchea as long as the people elect them and foreign troops are out. Thailand and ASEAN dislike Pol Pot but it is necessary to retain seat in the UN for DK. The principle of non-intervention must be respected; recognition of Heng Samrin would condone SRV aggression.

11. Sitthi underscored that cornerstone of Thai foreign policy is ASEAN solidarity. Upcoming KL meeting would be very crucial. ASEAN must map out its strategy for the future.

12. Sitthi said that during his talk with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Thach had said the U.S. has inherent weaknesses. It is too wealthy and is afraid to lose its wealth, it is afraid to act. Vietnamese are poor and are willing to endure hardship.

13. Sitthi said Thailand and ASEAN would like to have better understanding of long range U.S. policy toward the region. He had been delighted to learn that U.S. will assume its responsibility of assuring peace and stability in the region and the world. Thailand wanted very much for U.S. to help make her strong. Being the front line state Thailand must be ready to defend herself. ASEAN nations have told Thailand that they can go as far as Thailand is willing to go and will base their policies on Thailand’s. Sitthi stressed the need for more U.S. support to Thailand, saying that recent increases in FMS were appreciated but more was needed, including grants for Thai along border, dislocated because of security problems and general unrest in area. Whereas Vietnam received more than 950 million dols from the USSR last year, Thailand received very little or nothing from its friends.

14. Sitthi said that Prime Minister Prem had authorized him to inform U.S. officials that Thailand is willing to make available the use of facilities for U.S. Air Force, but preferred not to have too many American troops in Thailand. Arrangement for the use of such facilities must be pursued discreetly. The Thai would want grant assistance if this were done.

15. Most crucial subject to focus on was aid to Democratic Kampuchea. Sitthi asked what steps should be taken with regard to Chinese request to send military aid to Pol Pot through Thailand. Should Thailand ignore the request or should Thai help them and would U.S. agree to it? Secretary replied this was hard question. Thailand must pursue its interest. Perhaps there might be other ways to send military aid to Pol Pot aside from through Thailand. Sitthi explained that aid could be sent by sea by way of Koh Kong but that would be extremely difficult and dangerous. He concluded that Thailand was very much concerned with this subject; she must be very careful not to create mistrust among friends; but at the same time must keep resistance forces alive.

Muskie

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country File, Box 74, Thailand, 6/80. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Jakarta, Manila, Beijing, Tokyo, Canberra, Wellington, New Dehli, and the White House.
2. Berl Bernhard served as Muskie’s adviser; Leon Billings was Muskie’s executive assistant.
3. Muskie met with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers June 27–28 after their Ministerial meeting in Kuala Lumpur June 25–26. See Document 188.
4. UN General Assembly Resolution 34/22. See footnote 4, Document 181.
5. EC and ASEAN Foreign Ministers met in Kuala Lumpur March 6–7 to sign an economic cooperation agreement. On March 7, they issued a joint statement condemning the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. (Henry Kamm, “14 Nations Assail Soviet and Hanoi,” New York Times, March 8, 1980, p. 4)