Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

85. Telegram From the Embassy in Bulgaria to the Department of State¹

Sofia, July 28, 1977, 1335Z

1630. Belgrade also for CSCE Del. Subject: Exit Interview With the Foreign Minister. Ref: A) State 167342;² B) State 153477;³ C) Sofia 1246;⁴ D) Sofia 1580;⁵ E) State 175102;⁶ E) State 153477;⁷ F) Sofia 1455.⁸

1. In accordance with instructions, I used farewell protocol call on Foreign Minister Mladenov July 27 for review of some pending bilateral matters and especially of CSCE implementation. Ambassador Gotsev, Chief of Fourth Department, attended. In view of nature of the occasion, Mladenov was extremely affable and (with exception of complaint about MFN “discrimination”) gave positive or soft responses to all points which required responses. He did not, for instance, in connection with CSCE Basket III discussion, refer to RFE.

2. In discussing bilateral relations I began with positive comments on family unification authorized ref A, remarking I would return to that subject in connection with CSCE. I noted recent positive developments such as Zhivkova visit, opening of Thracian exhibit in New York, and prospects for agricultural cooperation exemplified by Shopov visit. Then I referred pointedly to Puerto Rico issue (ref B and F), noting that within its possibilities Bulgaria had tried to be helpful last year on a subject we regard as internal US matter, and therefore one which could have disturbing effect on our relations. I also referred in positive terms to Bulgarian willingness to enter into early negotiations with Bondholders Protective Council.

3. Next I took occasion to follow up on the demarche with Vice Minister Tsvetkov (ref C) on subject of authentication of documents, explaining (when Mladenov said he “had not seen my note”) that we had not yet made any formal representations because we simply could not believe that Bulgaria would place itself deliberately in violation of our consular agreement. I had to bring this matter to Mladenov’s attention because my friendly demarche to Tsvetkov June 9 had been without effect and recently some affidavit authentications by our Consul had again been refused. It would be unfortunate if my successor as one of his first items of business had to charge Bulgaria with breach of an international agreement. Mladenov undertook to look into matter immediately, saying Bulgaria always scrupulously fulfills its international obligations.

4. Next I presented verbatim the remarks on CSCE as per para 2 ref E, with one change: Instead of saying “We believe further implementation efforts on your part will contribute towards creation of a more positive atmosphere at the main meeting” I said “We believe further implementation on your part and our part”, to remove note of sanctimoniousness and possible impression of arrogance contained in the original phrase, and particularly because there are further positive steps which we intend to take and to which I was later able to refer. Mladenov clearly took in the link between our desire for “constructive and non-polemical” meeting and need for more Bulgarian efforts at implementation.

5. Going into specifics I said on divided families that while great strides had been made, there remain some cases of urgent humanitarian concern (ref D) where delay or inaction must be due to misunderstandings or administrative mix-ups. I then handed Mladenov two lists, one containing seven “approved” cases from the 1975 list which for various reasons are stymied, the other containing fourteen new cases. I singled out one case from each list to illustrate the varied nature of difficulties. Mladenov said categorically that any difficulties must be administrative since the political decision had been taken to let such people go.

6. In this connection, Mladenov made a rather revealing remark about the Marev case which, he said, had required an extraordinary effort because of “existing laws and regulations”. He had had to have personal discussions with the Minister of Justice and the “Attorney General” and since the laws did not allow the case to be resolved expeditiously, “we had to make some alterations” in order that such “private cases” should not impair relations. (I read this to mean that with Mladenov’s help the party overrode the Ministries of Interior and Justice.)

7. Next I referred to what more we might do in the field of visits, in accordance with para 3 (a) ref E, followed by remarks about Basket II as per ref D,⁹ and remarks about deficiencies in Basket III implementation, notably with regard to publications (despite the cosmetic changes made by the Bulgarians), also as per ref D. Finally I said that with respect to facilitation of travel we are currently carefully considering steps we might take to reciprocally facilitate both private and official travel, as per para 3 (b) ref E.¹⁰

8. The positive remarks that Mladenov made in reply were of the kind suitable to the occasion of leave-taking. He thought it was fair to say that “never, since World War II” have relations between Bulgaria and the US been better. (Comment: This is of course not saying much since for ten years they were worse than with any EE country other than Albania, and the Bulgarians began moving toward normalization only about four years ago, probably at the prodding of the Russians.)

9. On CSCE, Mladenov said he welcomed our statement about the utility of bilateral consultations and of our general attitude toward the main Belgrade meeting. In usual manner he stressed Basket I, admitted shortcomings in Basket II (“not everything can be rectified immediately”) but counter-charged with respect to MFN; and with respect to Basket III said: “We are making progress on divided families, but do not think they are the main content of Basket III.” He said Bulgaria is not unconcerned about Basket III, and what I had said under instructions would be given full consideration.

10. Then he said something of a more general nature. He reminded me that in recently expressing thanks (at Ruse) for hospitality shown to his daughter, Zhivkov had talked to me not as President but “as a father”. If existing “discriminations” could be removed (MFN), he foresaw a much higher level of interchanges of all sorts, not only in business; and he felt that contacts during the last three years had served to remove many misunderstandings and demonstrated that good things can come from high Bulgarian and American officials meeting and talking together.

11. I interpret this last remark to mean that the Bulgarians, while not wishing to be too explicit for fear of a rebuff, are looking for some sort of high-level contact between Zhivkov and the President or between Secretary Vance and Zhivkov. Zhivkov has several times referred favorably to his “meetings with President Ford” at Helsinki¹¹ (where there was only the most perfunctory contact), and there is no question in my mind that he and Mladenov are eager for the kind of legitimation that such a real meeting would involve. At the same time, they also have in mind the occasions, which still rankle, when President Ford and his Secretary of State visited Belgrade and Bucharest, practically overflying Bulgaria, without stopping here.¹²

12. This is my reading of the Bulgarian attitude. As for our own interest, there are two aspects: one is what we might expect to get out of a high-level visit here. Certainly we cannot expect any substantial change in Bulgaria’s overall orientation. The other aspect is more complicated. It is not that the Bulgarians have anything urgent to talk with us about at a high level, but they know that their country is the only one in Europe with which we maintain diplomatic relations that has not been visited by an American President, Vice President or Secretary of State. So the second aspect involves, in their view, the removal of what they see as a “discrimination”.

13. I think it would be inappropriate for me to make a recommendation on this matter so shortly before my departure from Sofia. One thing, however, I can recommend. Foreign Minister Mladenov will be at the UNGA starting September 25. I believe it would be helpful in getting my successor off to a good start here if Secretary Vance could reserve a quarter hour for a bilateral with Mladenov in New York.

Herz

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770270–1157. Confidential. Sent for information to Belgrade, East Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, and Warsaw. Herz also met with Todor Zhivkov on June 28. (Telegram 1634 from Sofia, July 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770272–0120)
2. In telegram 167342 to Sofia, July 18, the Department instructed Ambassador Herz not to raise the issue of a new chancellery site with Zhivkov during his farewell call on the Bulgarian leader. Rather, Herz was to commend the Bulgarian leader for improvements on family reunification cases and express appreciation for the success of the Zhivkova visit to the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770256–0629)
3. In telegram 153477, July 1, sent to posts in countries that were part of the UN Committee on Decolonization (Committee of 24), the Department expressed the hope that a vote on Puerto Rican independence may be avoided in 1977. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770235–0100)
4. On June 10, the Embassy in Sofia reported in telegram 1246 that the Bulgarian Government had informed its Consulates in the United States that all affidavits of support for Bulgarian citizens wishing to travel to the United States would no longer be acceptable unless notarized by the Bulgarian Embassy in Washington. The Embassy reported that it had informed the Foreign Ministry that such policy would contravene Article 35 of the Consular Convention the two countries signed in April 1974. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770207–0700)
5. The Embassy reported in telegram 1580 from Sofia, July 21, the talking points Ambassador Herz planned to raise with Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov in his upcoming conversation. As part of the discussion, Herz informed the Department, he planned to present Mladenov with a list of unresolved cases of family reunification. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770259–0995)
6. In telegram 175102 to Sofia, July 26, the Department instructed the Ambassador to stress with Zhivkov and Mladenov the “many bilateral US-Bulgarian exchanges on CSCE implementation [which] have proved mutually beneficial.” Herz was also instructed to emphasize with the Bulgarian leadership the “importance we attach to further bilateral efforts to implement the Final Act” before the main CSCE meeting in Belgrade. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770266–1272)
7. See footnote 3 above.
8. In telegram 1455 from Sofia, July 7, the Embassy reported that it had delivered the Puerto Rico démarche to the Bulgarian Government and that it had thanked Bulgaria for the helpful role it “(claims to have) played” on the question in 1976. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770242–1011)
9. In telegram 1580 from Sofia, July 21, the Embassy reported that with respect to Basket II, “much remains to be done” and “restrictions on appointments and access remain significant problems and greatly hamper trade expansion.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770259–0995)
10. Telegram 175102 to Sofia, July 26, instructed Ambassador Herz to “limit your remarks to statement that USG is currently carefully considering steps we might take to reciprocally facilitate both private and official travel.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770266–1272)
11. Zhivkov met with President Ford during the signing ceremonies for the Helsinki Accords. (Telegram 1989 from Sofia, September 13, 1975; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750318–0459)
12. President Ford visited Bucharest and Belgrade following the signing of the Helsinki Accords August 2–3, 1975, and August 3–4, 1975, respectively. In Romania he met with President Ceausescu. In Yugoslavia he met with President Tito and Prime Minister Bijedic. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973–1976, Documents 36–38 and 73–74.