278. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Horelick) to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci)1
SUBJECT
- Yugoslav Contingency Planning [classification not declassified]
1. On Friday morning, 18 January, I attended a Mini-SCC on Yugoslavia chaired by David Aaron. Attendees included Assistant Secretary Vest, EUR/State, Jim Sienna and Maj. Gen. Bill Bowman, DoD, Lt. Gen. John Pustay, JCS, as well as representatives from Treasury, and various NSC staffers. [classification not declassified]
2. The purpose of the meeting was to lay down guidelines to organize the government’s preparations for the contingency of President Tito’s death. An Interagency Working Group (IWG) at the Assistant Secretary level headed by George Vest was established to coordinate USG policy during the immediate period following Tito’s death. Defense, CIA, Justice, Commerce, and Treasury will participate as needed either in the full group or in special subgroups. I attended the first meeting of that working group late Friday afternoon. [classification not declassified]
3. A USG Contingency Study for Yugoslavia has been available since shortly after the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and has been periodically updated. This is a continuing operation. As part of that planning exercise routine documents (official statements, messages to the new Yugoslav leaders) have already been prepared. Special anti-terrorism measures are being studied.2 [classification not declassified]
4. Because of the extreme sensitivity of any military or logistical support contingency planning, this aspect of the preparations is being very closely held to a small subgroup of the Interagency Working Group on which we are represented. PM has been charged with preparing an updated military contingency planning document suitable for [Page 913] serving as a policymaking tool.3 An analysis of US and NATO options should be ready for review by January 25. Meanwhile DoD is preparing logistical contingency plans to meet the situation in which the Yugoslavs might ask us for increased military supplies.4 [classification not declassified]
5. We have all been asked to keep a very low profile with respect to any contingency military planning, the fact of which should not be discussed publicly. Public discussion of such would be deeply resented by the Yugoslavs and at this stage would be unnecessarily provocative to the Soviets. Accordingly, while generally alerting relevant offices and analysts in NFAC and keeping tabs on intelligence support work that has already been commissioned in INR and DIA, I do not recommend at this point the establishment of any formal mechanism for intelligence support of military contingency planning. Once intelligence requirements become clearer later this week, we can see whether ad hoc responses will suffice or whether some more permanent mechanism needs to be created. [classification not declassified]
6. The closest political monitoring of Yugoslavia is, of course, going forward. For the time being, the only specific tasks laid on CIA by the IWG were (a) to provide a brief update on the state of the Yugoslav economy, with special reference to its credit standing. Work done by OER in support of NIE 15–795 provides a solid basis for such a paper and I have asked OER to provide a summary and update of the economic section of that estimate for delivery to the IWG by COB today; (b) DoD and CIA have been asked by David Aaron to provide him with a report on the status of US-Yugoslav intelligence exchanges. To the extent that such exchanges have occurred, they have been handled primarily by DoD and Ambassador Eagleburger and I shall coordinate a reply with State and DoD; (c) I assume also that the DDO will be represented in some way in anti-terrorist planning which is now [Page 914] underway and being coordinated through Bill Odom of the NSC Staff. [classification not declassified]
7. Attached at Tab A is a preliminary checklist of activities which the SCC has charged the IWG with conducting in connection with the prospect of succession in Yugoslavia.6 [classification not declassified]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R, Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 52, (SCC) Yugoslavia, 1980. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Sent through NFAC Deputy Director Clarke. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the NIC, D/OSR, and D/OPA.↩
- See Document 274.↩
- On January 22, Bartholomew sent a memorandum to Vance in preparation for a January 23 VBB luncheon meeting. At Tab 1 of the memorandum, covering Yugoslavia, Bartholomew suggested that, while the immediate crisis brought on by Tito’s failing health might have subsided, the additional time be used to “strengthen the West’s ties with Yugoslavia in tangible ways” and “further prepare for post-Tito scenarios, including covert or overt Soviet intervention.” The memorandum listed three areas of particular attention: economic; military cooperation; and Soviet intervention scenarios. (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 2, Vance/Brown/Brzezinski Luncheons 1–3/80) Larrabee sent a similar memorandum to Brzezinski on January 22. (Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 34, Meetings—Vance/Brown/Brzezinski: 1/80–2/80) The Yugoslavia discussion in the VBB was postponed to February 8.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 275.↩
- See Document 269.↩
- Attached but not printed is a January 18 preliminary checklist of activities following Tito’s death.↩