Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

26. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

RP 78–10293

Washington, September 1978

Dissidence in Eastern Europe

Key Points

• The new wave of dissidence in Eastern Europe last year, although now considerably diminished, shows no signs of vanishing. It has been most intense in Poland and Czechoslovakia, somewhat less so in Romania and East Germany. (U)

• The dissidents, few in number, are generally outspoken, nonconformist intellectuals. They have developed and sustained their causes and have attracted some popular support, particularly in Poland, where those who protest are relatively well organized and well led. (U)

• The East European regimes, however, have kept the domestic impact of dissident activity within bounds. They have made it clear that a price must be paid for active dissidence—loss of job, harassment, physical abuse, police detention, or a jail sentence. There is no evidence that the dissidents’ causes have been taken up by influential party or government officials. (C)

• The formulation of regime policy toward dissent could, however, become a serious source of discord within local leaderships, particularly as a new generation of leaders displaces the old. The toleration of any measure of dissent will remain a risky course, both for the national leaders and for their relations with the USSR. (U)

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

Dissidence in Eastern Europe

The Roots of Dissidence

The authoritarian systems in Eastern Europe invite dissent by continuing to place a wide range of human endeavor within a political straitjacket, by refusing to tolerate criticism, and by insisting that whatever change takes place be initiated by an inherently conservative, bureaucratic structure. Above all, the formal repudiation of the most onerous Stalinist controls has made possible the systematic expression of dissent. (U)

The roots of dissident activity reach back into the mid-1950s and the search for new political, social, and economic blueprints initiated by Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalinism. Many of today’s dissidents either participated in, or are spiritual heirs of, those efforts to revise ideology and the Stalinist system that was built in its name. The present-day dissidents, unlike the earlier “revisionists,” do not consider ideological reform as the key to systemic reform, but they do seek, as did their predecessors, to expand the range of individual freedoms allowed by the authorities. (U)

In the early days of de-Stalinization, dissent against various aspects of the Stalinist system was generally tolerated and even officially encouraged. Candid discussion and innovative proposals were permitted both for their cathartic value and as proof that Stalinism had been rejected. Over time, some of this activity became officially unacceptable. “Dissidence” that went beyond the bounds set by local Stalinist leaders still clinging to power or that led to “radical” demands for freedoms was banned. (U)

In some instances, the advocates of reform became involved, willingly or accidentally, in scheming against local Stalinist leaders by political moderates, which was made possible by the concurrent political struggles in the Soviet Union. In Poland, for example, revisionist Marxists like Leszek Kolakowski publicly battled against dogmatism and helped bring to power in 1956 a “reformist” party leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka. Similarly, the fight by Hungarian writers to end censorship in late 1955 was closely linked with the efforts by backers of reformer Imre Nagy to bring down Stalinist party leader Matyas Rakosi. (U)

The spontaneous ferment of de-Stalinization was also at work in East Germany and Czechoslovakia in the mid-1950s, albeit more subdued. In East Germany, a young Marxist philosopher, Wolfgang Harich, led a small group of party members in advocating economic and political reforms, “true independence” (that is, an escape from Soviet hegemony) for East Germany, and eventual reunification of the two German states. Unlike developments in Poland and Hungary, however, the actions of the East German dissidents were of little consequence. Harich made his move too late (after the suppression of the Hungarian uprising when there was a general turn to orthodoxy) and did not make common cause with party chief Ulbricht’s opponents in the Politburo. (U)

Efforts after 1956 to suppress revisionism, and to tighten the allowable bounds of de-Stalinization, gave rise to the first readily identifiable dissidents, since many of the “revisionists” refused to abide by the new restrictions. In Poland, where revisionism had run the deepest and where many revisionists were for a time allowed to air their views in official publications, Gomulka—initially considered a reformer—gradually followed a more conservative course. By 1963 Gomulka’s retrenchment in the cultural and ideological spheres prompted writers and other intellectuals to react with what have become classic dissident tools. (U)

In early 1964 well-known Polish intellectuals published the “Letter of 34,” in which they protested censorship and other controls on book publication. Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, two young Marxist scholars who had studied under Kolakowski, subsequently circulated a 90-page open letter criticizing Gomulka personally and calling for the creation of a “true socialist state.” In May 1965 the Warsaw branch of the Writers’ Association demanded that censorship be abolished. In October 1966 Kolakowski commemorated the 10th anniversary of Gomulka’s rise to power with a public condemnation of “repressions and lack of democracy in Poland.” In reprisal he was expelled from the party. Other writers who protested Kolakowksi’s expulsion were, in turn, also expelled. Gomulka’s increasing problems with the dissident intellectuals came to a head in early 1968, when a ban on staging a classic Polish drama with anti-Russian overtones led to a writers’ “revolt” and to student riots. Amidst an ensuing party factional crisis, Kolakowksi and others were forced to emigrate, and many student leaders, including Kuron and a newcomer to dissident activity, Adam Michnik, were jailed. (U)

While Gomulka was tightening up in Poland, Czechoslovakia’s Stalinist leader Novotny, under the pressure of Khrushchev’s second round of de-Stalinization and the weight of a stagnating Czechoslovak economy, belatedly undertook the de-Stalinization that he had avoided in the mid-1950s. As in that earlier period, the general feeling that dogmatism was being rejected, albeit in a hesitant way, encouraged spontaneous talk of revisionist policy alternatives to prevailing neo-Stalinism. Much of the pressure on Novotny to go further than he wanted came from Slovak intellectuals and journalists, whose public criticisms and calls for reform came to be viewed as “dissidence.” More important, these dissident acts were probably encouraged by Slovak party leaders who wanted to force Novotny to redeem a Slovak nationalism that had been labeled bourgeois during the Stalinist purges. (U)

Novotny, beginning in 1963, presided over a relatively widespread de-Stalinization that countenanced substantial revisionist discussion, startling freedoms in the arts, and permitted, at least for a time, considerable frankness in the media. It was during this period that such revisionist theoreticians as Zdenek Mlynar developed theories of how to build a “democratized” Communism, ideas that were to be put in practice in 1968. The period also had its outright dissidents who fell victim to Novotny’s periodic efforts to retrench or at least to set limits to de-Stalinization. (U)

In 1966 Novotny began to take a tougher stance toward nonconformist intellectuals, especially the writers. In so doing, he was following the lead of the Soviets, who in February of that year had tried and convicted the nonconformist writers Sinyavskiy and Daniel. These trials sent shock waves through the Soviet and East European intellectual community and marked the beginning of sustained dissidence in the Soviet Union. (U)

The East German regime also responded to the pressure of Khrushchev’s second de-Stalinization with moderation of its cultural policies, but with greater hesitation, abrupt policy shifts and considerably less domestic effect than in Czechoslovakia. For example, the nonconformist East German songster Wolf Biermann, who was criticized and stripped of party membership in early 1963, was allowed to publish his poems and perform his songs in 1964 and, in late 1965, was abruptly banned from performing and was labeled an anti-Communist. Another victim of this regime ambivalence was Robert Havemann, an eminent scientist who was prohibited from teaching in 1964 and then retired in 1965 because of his outspoken views. (U)

Many revisionist ideas were put into effect in Czechoslovakia during the “Prague Spring” of 1968. Perhaps surprisingly, this institutionalization of reform ideas did not lead to greater dissident pressures for similar changes elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact quashing of the Czechoslovak “experiment” in August was protested by dissidents in other East European countries, but it also stifled hope that popular agitation for a “humane” type of Communism would bear fruit. That hope has been rekindled by the convergence of circumstances during the past two years. (U)

New Stimuli to Dissident Activity

The 1975 Helsinki accord and efforts of the East European regimes to show a measure of compliance with its human rights provisions raised some popular expectation that authoritarian controls might be loosened, and stimulated dissident efforts to that end. There was a widespread anticipation among East Germans in the summer of 1976, for instance, that because the accord signified “international recognition” of East Germany, the regime could not, or would no longer, block foreign travel on the grounds that travel was predicated on such “recognition.” (U)

Even more important, the decision to review implementation of the Helsinki agreement in Belgrade in 1977 prompted some dissidents to conclude that a Communist desire to show a good record in Belgrade might make regimes susceptible to pressures for internal reforms. Other dissidents were well aware that Moscow intended Helsinki to signify only Western recognition of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. As a result, they apparently emphasized the human rights commitments of the accord as a way of inducing the West to reconsider its support for the agreement or at least to force the Soviets and their allies to observe human rights as a price of Western recognition of Soviet hegemony over the area. (U)

The calculation that pressure might lead to some changes for the better was fortified by what many dissidents saw as important Soviet concessions regarding national independence made to the “Eurocommunists” at the Berlin conference of European Communist parties in June 1976. For example, the East German dissident philosopher Robert Havemann, who considers himself a Eurocommunist of the Spanish variety, seized upon the conference as a vindication of his longtime advocacy of a Communist system that included domestic pluralism and a “true” sovereignty in foreign affairs. Some Polish dissidents also concluded that the time was ripe for the East Europeans to strive for greater autonomy from Moscow. Indeed, public, that is to say, dissident pressure was seen as an effective way to lead the regime toward seeking “true sovereignty.” (U)

The vigorous US human rights policy enunciated in early 1977 gave some impetus to dissident activity and emboldened persons to speak out who otherwise might have remained silent. Many dissidents probably welcomed the US position because they believed it would help expose the vulnerabilities of the East European regimes with regard to human rights. Those who were already actively pressing a cause and considered international attention important for both its success and their own protection no doubt calculated that the US human rights policy would serve these ends.² (U)

East European dissidents were also encouraged by publicity and support from West European media, politicians and government leaders, public organizations, influential intellectuals, and maverick Communist parties.³ This support has generally been a consequence of the US initiative, of a naturally keen interest in developments close to home, and of domestic and regional political pressures. Some, particularly East European, emigres may have seen in the US-led, Western human rights campaign evidence of a new, more confrontational policy toward Eastern Europe, which they welcomed. (U)

Against this international backdrop, region-wide trends and developments in individual countries gave a direct stimulus to dissidence. By mid-1976 many dissidents were undoubtedly aware that all of the Warsaw Pact countries faced difficult economic problems, and probably calculated that the regimes were thus more vulnerable to pressures for concessions. (U)

The economic factor was most important in Poland, where the workers’ riots in June 1976 dramatized popular dissatisfaction and revealed the regime’s political weaknesses. Polish dissidents had already become more active by late-1975, when they were successful in modifying government-proposed changes in the constitution. In September 1976 they seized upon the issue of the release of imprisoned rioters to show the need for political reform.⁴ This attracted popular support and, in turn, helped stimulate other dissident activity in Poland and, perhaps, elsewhere in Eastern Europe. (U)

In Czechoslovakia, the well-publicized Charter 77 manifesto was triggered by the publication in the Czechoslovak press in the fall of 1976 of the UN human rights covenants. Czechoslovak dissent, in general, has been fed by the despair of those reformers who had been purged and ostracized since 1968. Many of these persons may have gained new hope that the stagnating economy would impel the leadership to rehabilitate, among others, purged economic and managerial functionaries. In East Germany, Rudolf Bahro’s wide-ranging critique in August 1977 of the “system’s” deficiencies examined at length the country’s economic shortcomings. (U)

Who Are the Dissidents?

The dissident activists in Eastern Europe have traditionally come from the educated, articulate stratum of society, a broadly defined intelligentsia. They are politically dedicated, idealistic men and women of all ages whose zeal and commitment make them willing to pay the substantial personal price that the regimes exact for openly nonconformist behavior. (U)

The broad spectrum is evident in the Polish dissident ranks, which includes academicians, lawyers, writers, journalists, retired non-Communist politicians and soldiers, Catholic priests, and university students. In East Germany, the voices of dissent have been scientists-turned-political philosophers, popular entertainers, writers, and frustrated emigrants. Czechoslovak dissidents, largely those persons who helped generate or implement the reform ideas of 1968, include philosophers, writers, dramatists, entertainers, and politicians. In Romania, aside from a few writers and scholars and a group of Baptist clergy, the majority of dissidents have been would-be emigrants or, more recently, members of discontented national minorities. (U)

While the dissidents have had some success in expanding their numbers, they have generally failed to enlarge their circle⁵ of political activists beyond a small portion of the intelligentsia and have been unsuccessful in politicizing other segments of the population. [classification not declassified]

The most success at attracting a broader following has been evident in Poland. One dissident group initially championed a cause—help for and the release of jailed workers—that garnered considerable popular support. This and another dissident organization have enlisted students into dissident work and may have won popular good will through efforts to counsel people about their everyday problems. The second group also claims to have financial backing and considerable moral support from private farmers (an important class in Poland where three-quarters of the farms are in private hands) and retired, probably World War II, military veterans.⁶ Some of the changes that Polish dissidents advocate are looked on favorably, if passively, by liberal members of the Communist Party establishment. Despite considerable effort, however, the Polish dissidents have not enlisted much worker support. The influential Catholic Church, moreover, has not backed them, even though some Catholic priests, seeking to win greater religious freedom, are also dissidents. [classification not declassified]

Despite the rapid increase in the number of Czechoslovak dissidents, they continue to be mostly drawn from the intelligentsia. In Romania, Goma’s “following,” swelled from seven to 300 in less than six months. This was largely illusory, however, because most persons subscribed purely as a device to get out of the country. (U)

There are a number of reasons why dissidents fail to attract meaningful support. The vast majority of East Europeans obviously considers the personal cost of participation far too high and believes there is only a slim chance that dissident activity can produce change. Political apathy and anti-intellectualism among workers and a frequent aloofness among intellectuals are the major factors that have kept these two key segments of society apart. The regimes naturally exploit and encourage these attitudes. Liberals within the establishment intelligentsia may sympathize with certain dissident objectives but, more than likely, they consider many of the goals and methods unrealistic, if not dangerous. Those dissidents who have long been open critics are sometimes viewed, justifiably or not, as gadflies, whose failure to produce change is proof of their futility. (U)

Frequent personal and philosophical differences among dissidents have weakened their overall cause. This diversity and disunity helps in part to explain why some in the regimes are relatively tolerant of dissidents; a fragmented movement cannot draw wide support. (U)

What Do They Want?

The dissidents seek a variety of changes in the existing systems of rule in Eastern Europe. Some advocate sweeping reforms that would in fact constitute revolutionary changes in the way the Communist systems function. While none of the dissidents challenge outright the leading role of the party, as this would make them vulnerable to charges of treason, some of the dissidents, notably those associated with one of the leading Polish groups, incline strongly toward West European Christian democratic views. Those pressing for the broadest changes include most Polish dissidents, some East Germans, and many Czechoslovak Chartists. Their political platforms typically embrace the following demands: (U)

• A “real” multiparty system or some formal mechanism for greater interest group representation within a one-party system (usually, but not always explicitly, within a so-called Communist framework).

• The abolition or significant relaxation of censorship.

• The reduction of centralized, bureaucratic controls, especially in the economic and government administrative spheres.

• Greater independence from the USSR. Nonetheless, most dissidents recognize, however reluctantly, the imposed necessity of some type of close relationship with the Soviet Union.

• Respect for human and civil rights already delineated in domestic laws and international accords signed by East European governments. (U)

Aside from the “programmatic” dissidents, there are those who seek more modest changes. Thus, the Romanian Goma speaks out for a de-Stalinization patterned after what he calls the “livable life” in Hungary and Poland. Many of the Czechoslovak dissidents want rehabilitation—not necessarily of their political views, but of themselves and their families—and the opportunity to live a more normal life. Then there are the more narrowly focused “one issue” dissidents such as the East German writers, who want more freedom to write what they wish, and the Romanian Baptists, who want more freedom to preach. Finally, there have been some, such as many signatories of Romanian writer Goma’s manifesto, who have taken to dissent as a device to facilitate emigration. (U)

Several prominent dissidents—the East Germans Havemann and Biermann, the Hungarian Agnes Heller, and the Czechoslovak Zdenek Mlynar—consider themselves ideological brethren of the Eurocommunists. Others—such as the Poles Kolakowski and Michnik—are skeptical that Eurocommunism will turn out to be different from the Communism practiced in the Warsaw Pact states. Nonetheless, all have welcomed the Eurocommunists’ support in the struggle for more independence from the Soviets. (U)

The dissidents frequently differ on ways to bring about change. The East German Bahro, for example, appeals to “men of conscience” within the establishment to work for change. Some Polish dissidents believe popular pressure on the leadership can induce it to initiate reforms. Other Poles do not believe the system can reform itself and have tried to establish a de facto pluralism by founding, without regime approval, publications, groups, and societies that speak to and on behalf of specific interest groups. The Polish dissidents so far claim to be satisfied with these small steps which they feel will slowly erode regime control. They have shunned violence, realizing that this would give the regime cause for repression and would dissipate the limited public support they now enjoy. (U)

Some dissidents have formed secret organizations to avoid regime reprisals. A secret Polish group,⁷ [6 lines not declassified]. In East Germany, the anonymous manifestos that appeared early this year claimed to represent the views of amorphous groups but, more than likely, were the work of a very few individuals. [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

Such secret groups can presumably exist for a long time because their members pay little or no personal cost for belonging. They could also play an important role during a period of political transition, when uncertainty and change are in the air. Generally, however, anonymous dissent has little impact, if only because there is a tendency among the population to view it as a possible police provocation. (U)

There has thus far been little active cooperation and almost no advance coordination among dissidents in different East European countries. The few known instances of such contacts across national boundaries have usually been instigated by Polish dissidents. [less than 1 line not declassified] group has periodic contacts with dissidents in the USSR.⁸ The most brazen and ambitious effort at cooperation occurred in August 1978, when Polish and Czechoslovak dissidents met in southern Poland to discuss possible joint actions and then issued a communique.⁹ [classification not declassified]

Nonetheless, many dissidents see disadvantages in such personal contact. It is difficult to arrange, and may expose dissidents to serious legal charges, such as conspiracy. Any attempt at coordinated actions across national boundaries would arouse deep suspicion in Moscow and induce Soviet pressure on the East Europeans to crack down. Existing evidence that dissidents respond to or imitate the activities of dissidents elsewhere in the region most often indicates only that they are well informed of each others’ activities by Western media broadcasts. (U)

Impact of Dissent

The dissidents have not altered in any fundamental way the East European regimes’ style of rule, nor have they induced the governments to adopt more conciliatory domestic policies. If anything, there has been a shift—slight in Poland, pronounced in Czechoslovakia—toward tougher internal controls. Indeed, the dissidents seem to have brought upon themselves varying degrees of harassment and repression. Nor has dissidence helped generate serious political discord within the party leadership that could provide the vehicle for political change.¹⁰ [classification not declassified]

Nonetheless, the mere existence of dissidence has been an embarrassment to regimes that insist on making a show of unanimous popular support and try to conceal the repressive features of their system. At least initially, dissent confronted the regimes with a challenge that had to be assessed and kept within bounds.¹¹ It has probably caused some differences within leaderships over tactics¹² to be used in muzzling dissent, although these differences have not been obvious or persistent. The more organized dissidents—those in Poland and Czechoslovakia—probably created some strains, albeit limited, between the regime and segments of the populace by strengthening endemic popular antipathy toward such institutions as the police, bureaucracy, and the censor. The dissidents frequent use of legalistic tactics in challenging regime practices has made the authorities, in turn, more attentive to legal procedures in dealing with the dissidents. [classification not declassified]

The dissidents’ protests against repressive and restrictive regime policies—including tough police countermeasures that substantiated the initial allegations—provided an issue that, within the context of the Helsinki review process and the US emphasis on human rights issues, placed the East European regimes on the defensive in foreign affairs. How best to throttle dissent reportedly caused some differences for a time between the Soviets and East Europeans.¹³ The Soviets have clearly been inclined toward a more heavy-handed approach than most of their East European allies.¹⁴ [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

Some of the East European regimes clearly saw dissent as a potentially troublesome obstacle to their desire to maintain or expand economic and, in some cases, political relations with the United States. Consequently, the regimes’ handling of dissident activity appears in some limited ways to have taken the US human rights interest into account. The Polish decision in February 1977 to grant amnesty to workers jailed the previous summer in connection with disturbances over proposed price increases was announced less than a week after the United States expressed concern for Soviet and Czechoslovak dissidents. The move was an unexpected capitulation to dissident demands, and was probably intended to enhance Warsaw’s image in Washington and reduce the possibility that the dissident question might intrude on bilateral relations. To be sure, Poland has consistently handled its dissidents more subtly than most other East European states, but the regime’s moves probably reflected more its concern with domestic political factors than a wish to please the United States. [classification not declassified]

Similarly, the Hungarian regime’s decision not to punish 30 would be dissidents who in February 1977 supported the Czechoslovak Chartists may have been taken in the hope that this would deter the creation of a dissident movement that could have an adverse impact on relations with Washington. Budapest clearly hoped that the new US administration would be more inclined than its predecessors to return Hungarian national treasures and grant Hungary most-favored-nation trading status. The Hungarian decision to invite American religious leader Billy Graham to Hungary in late 1976 was unquestionably intended to draw attention to Budapest’s relatively moderate domestic policies at a time of sharply increased dissident activity elsewhere in Eastern Europe. [classification not declassified]

The Romanian regime was acutely concerned that US attention to human rights could impede renewal of its most-favored-nation status. More importantly, Bucharest was worried that this might set back its “special relationship” with Washington that has been of major political use in fending off the Soviets. As a consequence, the Romanians—except for a brief crackdown in the spring of 1977, when they apparently feared that there would be a dramatic increase in dissidence—have encouraged dissidents to emigrate. The Ceausescu regime has not shown, however, an inclination to adopt more enlightened domestic policies, and remains perhaps the most repressive in Eastern Europe. The regime has privately played down agitation for increased cultural and linguistic rights by the Hungarian minority, calling it a Moscow-inspired, Budapest-engineered tactic to tar Romania’s image. [classification not declassified]

The Czechoslovak Government, despite its interest in settling several longstanding bilateral issues with the United States, has not moderated in any way its “hard-line” inclinations and has almost completely ignored US sensitivities when dealing with its dissidents. [classification not declassified]

Western publicity and support for dissidents has been largely responsible for whatever successes and impact the dissenters have made. Media coverage of their activities, when relayed back into Eastern Europe, has provided important, if indirect lines of communication between dissidents within a country and across national boundaries. This coverage has bolstered morale and has often been the only way for the dissidents’ cause to be publicized within their own country. As a consequence, most dissidents have made a special effort to funnel news to the West. Most frequently, their “connections” have been friends and colleagues who have emigrated: Poles in London and Paris, Romanians in Paris, East Germans in West Germany, and Czechoslovaks in Rome and Vienna. [classification not declassified]

Outlook¹⁵

Although dissident activity in many East European countries has declined considerably since early 1977, it is likely to persist throughout the region. Many of the factors that propelled the recent surge of dissent will still be at work. Economic problems may worsen and provide dissidents with renewed hope that some of their proposals for political reform will be heeded by regimes weakened by or preoccupied with dissatisfied consumers. While such hopes may be misplaced, the combination of dissident pressures and a sluggish economy could create acute domestic instability. [classification not declassified]

The situation is especially acute in Poland, where intense popular dissatisfaction over consumer supplies is likely to continue over the next several years, and where dissidents see their job of pressing for political change as a long-term endeavor. In Czechoslovakia, recent dissident activity has been tied to the 10th anniversary in August of the Soviet-led invasion, but it will continue to exist at least as long as the regime fails to come to terms with the large number of people who were purged after 1968. The dilemma for the Prague regime—how to rehabilitate people without rehabilitating their ideas—is complex, and may be unsolvable without changes in the leadership. In Romania, the direct link between dissidence and emigration that was established last year should help perpetuate dissent in a country where a spartan and harshly totalitarian life makes emigration particularly attractive. [classification not declassified]

Other factors that could perpetuate and intensify East European dissidence include:

• • A difficult leadership succession problem in the USSR that engenders either hope for moderate policies or fear of orthodoxy.
• • Continued political sparring between the Soviets and the Eurocommunists.
• • The second Helsinki accords review conference to be held in Madrid in 1980. This will remain a factor even though the dissidents’ expectations may have been reduced by the limited accomplishments of the Belgrade review conference.
• • The continued unsettling effect of Western contacts with, and presence in, the region. The area’s economic needs argue against any cutback in Western ties.
• • Uncertainties surrounding the succession to Tito in Yugoslavia. [classification not declassified]

On the personal level, the camaraderie of the struggle, the excitement of matching wits with the authorities, and the hope that is renewed by even a small success will also propel dissident actions. [classification not declassified]

The authorities may calculate, perhaps with reason, that time is on their side in the contest. The psychological and personal financial price that dissidents have to pay is difficult for most to bear for a sustained period. Their failure to get results not only adds to their personal discouragement, but makes it difficult to maintain popular interest. [classification not declassified]

At least in Poland, however, the dissidents can already claim to have accomplished much, and are working to secure more. If they continue to be allowed relative freedom, their activity could give rise to the claim that a new norm of what is allowable has been wrested from the regime. This, in turn, could encourage other dissidents in Eastern Europe to emulate the Poles, a prospect that could be destabilizing for the area as a whole. A prolonged period of active Polish dissent would increase the risk that chance and miscalculation could lead to violence and possibly to a Soviet intervention. [classification not declassified]

At present, East European dissidents can be seen most properly as a small hard core of political “radicals” who do not have the popular support or political leverage to force a change in any of the East European states or to effect a national uprising. Unlike many of the “revisionists” and dissidents of the past, they do not have access to the official media, and are not operating in an environment of acute political discord. The motive force for abrupt political change has most frequently been political factionalism within the establishment (Nagy versus Rakosi; Gomulka versus Ochab; the Slovaks versus Novotny). Dissidence, when it preceded such change, was an indicator of existing political disarray and, frequently, a tool of factional maneuvering. If history is any guide, dissidence will come to play an important role in forcing political change only when it combines with economic problems that acutely affect the consumer and at a time of political upheaval within the ruling elite. [classification not declassified]

[Omitted here are the country-specific Table of Contents and country studies for Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Romania.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00634A, Production Case Files (1978), Box 9, Folder 11, Dissidence in Eastern Europe (A Research Paper), Secret/NF, Copies 23,51. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. The paper was prepared in the Eastern European Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis. Paragraph classification and handling restriction marks are handwritten. The paper included country studies for Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Romania. A note on the paper indicates: “Hungary and Bulgaria are omitted, since neither has exhibited significant dissent. Hungary remains virtually untouched by dissidence” while dissidence in Bulgaria “came to light only in March 1978 with the appearance of a ‘Declaration 1978’ which claimed to speak for dissent group, ABD. Whether such a group exists or what ABD means is not known.”
2. This was not the unanimous view, however. Other dissidents apparently were wary of the American policy and, recalling what they consider past US inconsistency toward Eastern Europe, were skeptical that Washington would press its objective with consistency or determination. Those who consider themselves Communist reformers rejected the helping hand of a “capitalist” state for ideological reasons; others felt vulnerable to charges of being “agents of imperialism.” [Footnote is in the original.]
3. For some dissidents, support by Eurocommunists has not been consistent enough. Thus, a prominent Czechoslovak dissident publicly acknowledged Eurocommunist support, but said that it “could be more effective and courageous.” He called on the West European Communist parties to publish political material by exiled East Europeans and to establish direct contacts with dissidents in the East. [Footnote is in the original.]
4. Polish leader Gierek’s talk, in the immediate wake of the riots, about the need for “democratization” probably helped some dissidents to believe that chances for reform were good. As time passed, however, the regime talked less about the need for political changes. [Footnote is in the original.]
5. An unknown hand underlined “failed to enlarge their circle” in this sentence.
6. An unknown hand underlined “financial backing and considerable moral support from private farmers,” “and retired,” and “military veterans” in this sentence and wrote “STATE MEMCON” in the left-hand margin next to it.
7. An unknown hand wrote “STATE MEMCON” in the left-hand margin next to the first two sentences in this paragraph.
8. An unknown hand highlighted this sentence in the left-hand margin.
9. The Poles apparently consider this as the first in a series of cooperative efforts. They have also been trying to encourage Hungarian dissident intellectuals to become outspoken and to use samizdat publications to express their views. [Footnote is in the original.]
10. An unknown hand underlined this sentence and wrote “1” in the left-hand margin next to it. The “1” corresponds to a handwritten note at the bottom of the page that reads “ANALYSIS.”
11. An unknown hand underlined this phrase and wrote “2” in the left-hand margin corresponding to “VARIOUS STATE CABLES” at the bottom of the page.
12. An unknown hand underlined this phrase.
13. An unknown hand underlined “reportedly caused some differences for a time between the Soviets and East Europeans” in this sentence.
14. An unknown hand wrote “ANALYSIS” in the margin below this and the next four paragraphs.
15. An unknown hand wrote “ANALYSIS” next to this section title.