Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

252. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• State Visit to the United States by President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, March 7–9, 1978

I. OBJECTIVES

President Tito is paying his third visit to the United States—probably his last. Our objectives are to honor him as one of the towering figures of his era; to build stronger and broader ties with Yugoslavia which will carry us through the post-Tito transition period; to discuss a wide range of global issues in hopes of reaching closer understanding; to discuss a few bilateral issues in hopes of resolving them. There are no crises in our relationship at present.

During the talks, we should reaffirm our steadfast support for Yugoslavia’s independence from Soviet domination and for its unity and territorial integrity. We should indicate that we respect Yugoslavia’s policy of nonalignment and Tito as a founder of that movement. We should also encourage further the process of bilateral consultations at the highest level as well as more active contacts at every level.

Tito will want to discuss mainly global issues: East-West relations, detente, the Belgrade CSCE meeting, disarmament, Eurocommunism, nonalignment and world economic issues. He will also wish to discuss the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, China, Korea, and perhaps other world trouble spots. On bilateral matters, he may raise the nuclear fuel export license for Krsko (KERSH-ko) power station, ExIm Bank financing, bilateral military exchanges including progress in our new arms transfer relationship.

II. SETTING

Defying generalization, Yugoslavia is Balkan, Mediterranean and Middle European in essence; with a history going back through the Roman era but a state only in this century; Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Moslem; bearing the marks of both the Turkish and Austro-Hungarian Empires, as well as indigenous kings and despots; a contemporary state poised strategically and politically between East and West, and playing a world role far beyond what size or power would dictate.

Site of the spark that ignited the First World War, Yugoslavia arose out of that war as a state welded—or patched—together from pieces of the Kingdom of Serbia, of the crumbled Turkish Empire and of defeated Austria-Hungary. Little more than twenty years later it fell victim to German and Italian invasion, and was torn by Civil War between the communist-led Partisans under Tito, the Mihailovic forces built from remnants of the pre-war regime and the Ustashi forces in the Nazi puppet “Independent State of Croatia”. In vicious and tragic fighting against the occupiers and each other almost 2 million Yugoslav lives were lost—about half at the hands of other Yugoslavs.

Marshal Tito came out of the war an authentic national hero, able to form in Yugoslavia the only post-war communist regime in Europe not imposed by Soviet arms or subversion. But, good communist that he was, Tito worked closely with Moscow until forced to demonstrate that he was an even better nationalist. The historic break with the Soviets in 1948–49 has profoundly affected Yugoslavia’s course for the 30 years that have followed.

An outcast in the communist world after 1949, and threatened by Soviet power, Yugoslavia found the United States prepared to support its independence with military and economic assistance programs totalling $2.9 billion from 1949 to 1965. With the security this offered, Tito embarked on policies which have largely formed today’s Yugoslavia and which explain its importance as a country. Internally, he set in train political and economic trends which have made Yugoslavia a maverick in communist theory and practice. While still a one-party state, Yugoslavia no longer comes close to the totalitarian communist stereotype of a highly centralized system characterized by virtually total suppression of individual rights. Externally, Tito joined with India’s Nehru and Egypt’s Nasser to create the nonaligned movement, thereby giving focus to the growing number of newly-independent and underdeveloped states seeking a voice in the post-war world. Sole survivor of the three and, by now, the only remaining national leader of the Second World War generation, Tito stands as an elder statesman and leader of the nonaligned and the third world.

The economy—and the underlying economic philosophy—start from premises which are unorthodox in communist practice. Unlike the rest of communist Europe, industrial property is not state-owned or managed via a government bureaucracy. Rather, industrial and economic activity is carried on through a “workers’ self management” system which at least in theory places ownership of enterprises in the hands of those who work in them (except in agriculture, a percentage of which is in private hands, and in retail marketing and small manufacturing, some of which is privately-owned). These enterprises operate under a broad economic policy and planning mandate, but with substantial independent management authority which they share with the workers’ self-management organs (having a voice in selection of managers, production, investment and wage policy) within each enterprise. This unique system, coupled with Eastern Europe’s only real banking system and active participation in international markets, has given Yugoslavia a dynamic industrial quasi-market (albeit somewhat inefficient) economy which is, in many respects, far removed from the statist economies of its Eastern European neighbors.

As a self-proclaimed leader of the nonaligned movement, Yugoslavia participates actively in a host of international bodies and often seeks the role of spokesman or mediator on issues which concern the nonaligned and the third world. Yugoslav positions on most international questions reflect both the leadership’s philosophical proclivities and their sense of what will reinforce Yugoslavia’s position in the nonaligned movement. While these motivations more often than not lead Yugoslavia to positions different from ours, there have been some recent signs of a tendency to play a moderating role between opposing positions, such as the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. This is illustrated in Yugoslavia’s recent actions on Middle East developments. Without dropping their long-standing support for the Arabs, the Yugoslavs have moved significantly to express openly the view that the existence of Israel must be accepted and assured. Tito has recently lent his personal prestige to this position in messages to Arab leaders.

In the contemporary dynamics of today’s world, with East-West issues at the surface at the CSCE in Belgrade, with Eurocommunism near the surface in Western Europe, and with an array of issues facing us all in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere, Yugoslavia will inevitably retain an importance and, thus, have an interest to the United States well beyond its nominal place in the world.

Whether Yugoslavia’s importance will survive Tito’s departure from the scene—a prospect which must be considered despite his remarkable longevity—will depend on both internal and external forces. Yugoslavia’s leaders have had to contend with nationalist strains among the ethnic and religious groupings, as well as with wide disparities among the republics in economic development. Tito’s passing will remove the greatest single symbol of national unity and could threaten the nation’s stability. It is difficult to predict what the Soviets might be tempted to do in such a situation in the interests of bringing Yugoslavia back into communist conformity. Clearly the Yugoslavs are totally committed to preserving their independence. Equally clearly, their leaders are aware of the risk of Soviet interference, and believe that Western interest, engagement and commitment to Yugoslav independence could be their best insurance against Soviet meddling in a time of transition.

In this context, a stable structure of U.S.-Yugoslav relations in the present may well help to insure a future which the Yugoslavs desire and which would serve our interests.

III. KEY ISSUES

1. Bilateral Relations

U.S. Objectives: To convince President Tito that the US supports Yugoslav independence from Soviet domination; that we seek a cordial relationship with Yugoslavia; that we are interested in Yugoslavia’s economic well being; and that we are prepared to continue expansion, consistent with PD–13, or our military sales relationship.

Yugoslav Objectives: To indicate that Yugoslavia is trustworthy and sincere in its dealings with the US; that it maintains a balanced foreign policy through its commitment to nonalignment; and that Yugoslavia firmly desires to avoid economic or military dependence on the Soviet bloc.

Essential Factors:

Bilateral relations have improved significantly in the past year with the visits to Belgrade by the Vice President and the Secretary of Defense, and to Washington by Kardelj. We seek to continue this process by developing ties which will survive the post-Tito transition. The Yugoslavs are quite willing to credit your Administration for this new relationship; they see in Washington a policy and a view which are more open, relaxed, confident and tolerant of the views of others.

US-Yugoslav economic relations have generally been good in recent years. Two-way trade has expanded to almost $700 million, and the US is Yugoslav’s fourth largest trade partner (after the USSR, the FRG and Italy). Yugoslav exports to the US enjoy either MFN or preferential (GSP) tariff treatment. American investment in Yugoslavia—the first Communist nation to welcome foreign capital—has grown to about $150 million and there are now some 20 joint ventures, including a $750 million petro-chemical complex being built jointly by Dow Chemical Co. and its Yugoslav partner. Yugoslavia wants to expand trade with the US, in part because of its very large trade deficit with the EEC, in part because the Soviet Union’s share of its total trade has grown uncomfortably high. Recently, a dispute over Yugoslav guarantees for ExImBank loans threatens to maim ExIm’s important loan and guarantee program which has stimulated US firms to invest in Yugoslavia’s economy. This dispute is still being negotiated by ExIm Chairman Moore, bearing in mind Yugoslav laws and ExIm’s needs.

Since Secretary Brown’s visit to Belgrade in October, our arms sales have expanded markedly although the total figure remains relatively small. FMS sales for FY 78 could reach $10 million or a little more compared to $267 thousand in FY 77. While various items are still being reviewed, six Yugoslav requests for advanced or sensitive weapons have been denied. The Yugoslavs have expressed disappointment that we refuse to sell them high technology or to provide data on weapons still being developed.

Points to be Made:

—We welcome the improvement in relations which has occurred over the past year and we seek further ways to strengthen ties.

—The exchange of letters and briefings in recent months has been helpful and we value Tito’s views.

—We look forward to more active exchanges across the spectrum of our relationship, including visits to the U.S. by Yugoslav legislative representatives and political leaders.

—We continue, as in the past, to support Yugoslavia’s independence, unity and territorial integrity, and we respect its commitment to non-alignment.

—We strongly support the expansion of U.S. trade and investment ties with Yugoslavia.

—On the Exim guarantee problem (if Tito raises), assure him that Chairman Moore is anxious to solve the problem, as indicated by the flexibility he has displayed, and suggest that discussions be resumed as soon as possible so that this issue does not affect our excellent trade relations.

—We welcome the establishment of a bilateral working group (below the Cabinet level) to discuss the whole range of economic questions on a regular basis.

—We are pleased with the expanded cooperation in military sales and feel that it reflects the improvement in overall relations between our two countries.

—Since the visits of Secretary Brown and General Cemalovic, arms transfers have increased significantly, and we expect this encouraging trend to continue. As a result of these meetings and the following discussions between technical experts of both countries, several advanced weapons systems have been offered to and accepted by Yugoslavia.

(If they raise the question of denial of certain high technology systems):

—There are obvious constraints on both countries in this relationship, but the important thing to emphasize is the progress we have made and to work for improvement.

—We have offered several first line systems to Yugoslavia, and the denials were not discriminatory, given restraints we have placed on arms transfers.

2. Terrorism

U.S. Objectives: To seek to minimize the impact of anti-Yugoslav emigre activity on our bilateral relationship; to affirm publicly and privately that the U.S. supports neither the methods nor the goals of anti-Yugoslav terrorists; to gain Yugoslav support for effective international measures to eliminate terrorism in all forms.

Yugoslav Objectives: To urge more effective U.S. action to prevent anti-Yugoslav acts by emigre terrorists and to prosecute those responsible.

Essential Factors: The activities of anti-Yugoslav emigres in the U.S. have bedevilled our relations for years, and the prospect of massive demonstrations against Tito could seriously undermine whatever gains derive from the visit. The number and seriousness of anti-Yugoslav acts over the past two years are alarming, but in two cases the perpretrators were convicted and given stiff sentences. On the international level, Yugoslavia acknowledges the seriousness of the problem but has been reluctant to break stride with the nonaligned majority and the radical Arabs by agreeing to tough measures.

Points to be Made:

—We support neither the separatist goals nor the terrorist means of anti-Yugoslav extremists.

—(if necessary) We deeply regret the presence of demonstrators during this visit, but urge that their importance not be exaggerated. We have a highly diverse population, and the “anti” voices often ring loudest. But the vast majority of Americans support good relations with Yugoslavia and feel great respect for President Tito.

—We are actively concerned about the number and seriousness of anti-Yugoslav incidents in this country and will make every effort to catch the perpetrators.

—The seriousness of this issue on the international level requires effective action by the entire world community without regard to the alleged motives of the terrorists.

—Our position is not politically motivated; we oppose terrorism in all forms and for whatever alleged purposes.

—We seek Yugoslav support for effective UN action to suppress international terrorism.

3. Nuclear Non-proliferation and the Krsko Fuel License

U.S. Objectives: To convince Tito that our efforts to obtain additional assurances covering the export of fuel for the Krsko (KERSH-ko) reactor do not discriminate against Yugoslavia; to seek Tito’s support for our non-proliferation objectives.

Yugoslav Objectives: To ensure that Yugoslavia’s access to nuclear technology is not restricted by the nuclear “have” nations and to urge prompt approval for the Krsko fuel export license.

Essential Factors: The IAEA Agreements under which the U.S. agreed in 1974 to supply Yugoslavia with a reactor and fuel for the Krsko Nuclear Power Station do not meet all the criteria contained in the legislation on nuclear exports, specifically, US approval rights over retransfer and reprocessing of US-supplied equipment, US supplied fuel, and non-US fuel used in the Krsko reactor. We have therefore been seeking these additional U.S. approval rights. The Yugoslavs, who are adherents to the NPT and cooperating members of the IAEA, have indicated their willingness to accept universally applicable safeguards and controls which result from new international agreements, but they have resisted what they regard as unilateral U.S. attempts to impose discriminatory conditions on existing arrangements. They have also said that they are unwilling to “tie their hands” with regard to a future option to reprocess. (We are aware of no current Yugoslav plans to recycle or reprocess.) In May 1977 we approved the export of the Westinghouse reactor,² in order not to delay the Krsko project, on the basis of Yugoslav commitments not to retransfer U.S.-supplied equipment and to negotiate the disposition of spent fuel. Following two rounds of negotiations, we appear to be close to agreement on additional assurances covering U.S.-supplied fuel and on a Yugoslav commitment to continue to negotiate on any non-U.S. fuel used in Krsko. (We believe that such an arrangement would result in NRC approval of the pending fuel license.) Since Tito has been personally involved in this issue, final Yugoslav agreement will depend on his approval.

Points to be Made:

—Place Krsko in the broader context of U.S. international policies on disarmament and non-proliferation, and note that U.S. and Yugoslav objectives on non-proliferation are virtually identical.

—Note that our non-proliferation policies are not discriminatory and that we are not asking more from Yugoslavia than from other countries.

—Praise the spirit of cooperation shown by the Yugoslav side during the recent negotiations.

—Indicate that our negotiations appear to be close to mutually satisfactory resolution which should provide more than adequate time for the first shipment of fuel to be exported this autumn.

4. East-West Relations and Europe: CSCE, U.S.-Soviet Relations, SALT, Eurocommunism, (MBFR)

U.S. Objectives: To assure Tito that we continue to pursue detente and meaningful arms restraints with the Soviet Union; that we support the CSCE process and the improvement of East-West relations; to explain our policy on Eurocommunism.

Yugoslav Objectives: To argue for more understanding and accommodation between the U.S. and USSR, particularly on disarmament issues, with the goal of reducing bloc confrontation in Europe; to urge greater U.S. tolerance for West European communist parties.

Essential Factors: Politically and strategically balanced between East and West, Yugoslavia is a potential victim of any great-power confrontation, and therefore seeks to keep both superpowers at arms length. But it sees itself as a potential bridge of understanding and its importance grows in times of lower tension. In the longer view, the Yugoslavs may envisage for themselves a pace-setting role in a restructured Europe without “blocs,” in which communists have a more prominent role in the West and dissent and diversity are more broadly tolerated in the East.

Points to be Made:

—We recognize and appreciate the great efforts which Yugoslavia, and Tito personally, made in hosting the Belgrade CSCE meeting. We understand Yugoslavia’s disappointment at the outcome, and regret that the consistent efforts by both of our delegations could not produce a substantive concluding document. We believe, however, that the Belgrade meeting has been a success and that its results will benefit detente.

—While we do not seek confrontation with the Soviets or others, we feel that all aspects of the Helsinki Final Act, including human rights questions, are legitimate subjects for international discussion. We are pleased that our two delegations were able to work so closely together in Belgrade.

—U.S.-Soviet relations continue to represent a mixture of competition and cooperation. We seek a SALT II Agreement which is fair to both sides, and are pleased with the progress on other arms control questions (e.g., Comprehensive Test Ban). Our goal is the actual reduction of nuclear weapons and their eventual abolition.

—On MBFR (if Tito raises), we and our allies want to see progress toward reducing the opposing forces in Central Europe; any agreement should enhance political and military stability in Europe, and should be equitable; we will continue to keep Yugoslavia informed about the progress of the Vienna Talks.

—On Eurocommunism, as we have said many times, we will not interfere in the domestic electoral processes in this matter. We do have certain concerns, however, about the possibility that communist participation in Western governments could weaken Western unity and harm the European balance.

5. Multilateral Political Issues: Nonalignment, UN Special Session on Disarmament, Puerto Rico

U.S. Objectives: To voice understanding and respect for Yugoslavia’s policy of nonalignment; to encourage the Yugoslavs to take U.S. views into account as they develop their own positions on multilateral issues; to avoid unnecessary irritations on matters of importance to us (e.g., Puerto Rico); to endorse the UN Special Session on Disarmament.

Yugoslav Objectives: To convince us that nonalignment makes sense for Yugoslavia and many other countries; that the success of the movement does not harm U.S. interests; to urge that we consult more actively with the nonaligned in our own policy deliberations.

Essential Factors: Nonalignment is a fundamental component of Yugoslav foreign policy and is regarded as indispensable to preserving Yugoslavia’s independence and world status. The Yugoslavs feel that the U.S. has previously been either indifferent or hostile to the movement, but they see in your Administration’s approach to Third World issues a welcome shift toward greater understanding for nonaligned views. Meanwhile the movement itself is showing signs of strain under the pressure of radicals within the movement and open conflicts between member nations. Yugoslavia seeks to maintain internal cohesion within the movement and to remain in the mainstream. Belgrade is hosting the Nonaligned Foreign Ministers meeting this summer in preparation for the 1979 Nonaligned Summit in Havana, and is apparently working with others to maintain the relatively constructive and non-confrontational stance adopted at the Colombo summit in 1976. The UN Special Session on Disarmament next June was largely a Yugoslav initiative which we supported. As President of the last regular General Assembly, the Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister will preside at the Special Session. On Puerto Rico, we sought an affirmative Yugoslav vote on the most recent motion in the UN Decolonization Committee to defer the question of Puerto Rico for another year, but the Yugoslavs abstained, as they did in the previous two years.

Points to be Made:

—We respect Yugoslavia’s policy of nonalignment, and seek the views of the nonaligned on matters of mutual interest.

—We look forward to bilateral consultations on multilateral matters, including the Special Session of Disarmament, and we will make a strong and positive contribution to the success of the session.

—In the spirit of our improving relationships, we should both avoid actions which cause difficulty for the other. In this connection, the status of Puerto Rico is a United States domestic question and we hope that Yugoslavia will use its influence within the nonaligned movement and in other multilateral fora to see that it is not discussed as an international question.³

6. International Economic Issues, North-South Dialogue

U.S. Objectives: To assure President Tito that we welcome a positive North/South dialogue, including the negotiation of key economic issues in appropriate functional fora and the discussion of global relationships in the new UNGA Committee of the Whole.

Yugoslav Objectives: To stress the political need for greater sharing of economic benefits by industrialized countries with LDCs and to urge us to be more forthcoming on specific LDC demands; perhaps to press for more frequent bilateral consultation on North/South issues.

Essential Factors: Yugoslavia and President Tito in particular have been historic leaders of the “Third World.” They can justly claim a large measure of the responsibility for initiating the variety of multilateral economic discussions which we today call the North/South dialogue. Yugoslavia’s leadership among LDCs on economic issues has decreased as its own economy has developed and as the number of LDCs in the G-77 has increased. While the Yugoslavs publicly support the demands for a New International Economic Order, they have been willing to compromise and can thus play a useful role as a moderator of extreme views.

Multilateral discussions are going forward in many fora (the MTNs in GATT, Common Fund in UNCTAD, etc.), but the main focus now is on the new UN General Assembly Committee of the Whole, which will “oversee” the North/South dialogue. An organizational meeting of the Committee took place February 13–17, and the first substantive meeting is scheduled to take place in May.

Points to be Made:

—The U.S. supports an international economic system of progress and cooperation based on equity, growth and, above all, justice.

—The U.S. is willing to discuss any issue of the North/South dialogue so long as negotiations are confined to the functional fora where they can be considered by technical experts in an atmosphere relatively free of political debate.

—In our view, the UNGA Committee of the Whole got off to a good start by agreeing at its organizational meeting in February to discuss specific issues in a global economic context and to avoid intervention in the ongoing negotiations in functional fora.

—It is very important for the new Committee of the Whole to demonstrate that nations can examine the economic issues which affect us all in a spirit of cooperation, rather than confrontation.

7. Middle East/Horn of Africa

President Tito will be interested in your latest assessment of developments and the prospects for resolving the disputes in these two trouble spots. He will want to hear your presentation before responding, and would like to discuss both questions in some detail, following the lines of his recent letters to you.

8. Southern Africa

U.S. Objectives: To gain Yugoslav support for U.S. efforts to work toward a peaceful and just solution in Southern Africa.

Yugoslav Objectives: To urge more direct pressure on Pretoria and Salisbury to bring about majority rule; to encourage more active U.S. contact with the “liberation” forces.

Essential Factors: As one of the last “colonial” issues, Southern Africa is obligatory as a topic “for the record.” Yugoslavia has long had close ties with the African liberation movements and strongly supports majority rule. It has been impressed and pleased with U.S. recent efforts toward this goal, but Tito will urge that we do more.

Points to be Made:

—We oppose racism and apartheid in all forms and are pursuing policies which we hope will lead to peaceful and just solutions to problems of Namibia, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and South Africa.

—The recent proximity talks on Namibia in New York, while not conclusive, registered some progress; further talks are expected.

—We regard reports from Salisbury of an internal “settlement” to be premature.

9. China/Korea

U.S. Objectives: To appear responsive to Tito’s desire for frank exchanges on China and Korea; to seek his views on both countries; to convince Tito that we are seriously interested in seeing the Korean problem moved toward resolution but not at jeopardy to our South Korean allies.

Yugoslav Objectives: To convey Tito’s impressions from his visits to China and North Korea last summer and to seek current US views; to urge that the U.S. deal directly with North Korea to try to unstick the Korean question; to act as go-between in exchanges between the U.S. and North Korea.

Essential Factors: Tito was enthusiastically welcomed in both countries last summer and Tito later wrote to you about his visit. He is now interested in hearing our views on Chinese domestic developments, on Sino-Soviet relations and on US-China relations. Concerning Korea, he wrote to relay Kim Il-song’s proposals for direct US-North Korean contacts or for tripartite (US, North and South Korea) talks, on condition that South Korean President Park be removed from office. Tito has argued that Kim is more realistic than he seems and that we should respond in kind. Yugoslavia’s affinity for the North Koreans derives largely from Pyongyang’s participation in the nonaligned movement. For our part, we see no indication that North Korea’s position has changed and we see the proposal for direct contacts as an effort to undermine our relations with the ROK. Interestingly, however, two of Pyongyang’s staunchest supporters—East Germany and the USSR—have recently hinted that the North should show some flexibility, in answer to our efforts to reduce friction.

Points to be Made:

—The Chinese, with the conclusion of the Fifth National People’s Congress, have moved further toward restoring the vitality of their government and party following Mao’s death.⁴

—Despite some evident reduction in hostility, we expect no significant change in Sino-Soviet relations. The Chinese have frequently reaffirmed that their general line remains unchanged; and both sides have continued routine polemics.

—On our own relations with China, we are continuing to work toward our goal of full normalization, but there have been no significant developments since your visit to China last fall. The central question remains the problem of Taiwan, which is an issue with significant domestic aspects in each country.

—On Korea, we believe that our publicly stated policy contains certain elements of flexibility, and we continue to watch for some sign of movement from the other side. We remain firmly committed to the security of South Korea, and we will not take actions which would result only in tactical gain for the North at the expense of the South.

—We have seen signs that some of the states which traditionally support the North may have suggested that Pyongyang consider a more flexible approach to the resolution of questions which contribute to the tense atmosphere on the peninsula.

—Has the North’s approach to the situation changed in any way? For example, would they be willing to support moves toward contacts between their supporters and the South in exchange for reciprocal moves on our part, as we have proposed?

—What measures could supporters of both Koreas take to stimulate a resumption of the dialogue between North and South Korea?

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 15, Yugoslavia: President Tito, 3/6–9/78: Briefing Book. Secret; Nodis. Carter underlined scattered words and phrases throughout the memorandum. The memorandum was attached as Tab A to Brzezinski’s March 3 memorandum; see Document 251.
2. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved the export license application for a Westinghouse reactor on May 20, 1977. (Telegram 116633 to Belgrade, May 20, 1977; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770180–0624)
3. Cuba and other socialist countries were attempting to use the Puerto Rico issue against the United States in the UN Special Committee on Decolonization. The U.S. Government maintained that as long as Puerto Rico could vote for independence, the issue was an internal matter and the UN had no jurisdiction.
4. The Fifth National People’s Congress was in session from 1978 until 1983. On March 1, 1978, the Congress adopted the 1978 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, which restored some judiciary, political, and citizen rights removed by the 1975 Constitution.