Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

226. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 23, 1980, 1:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Vice President’s Meeting with Romanian Deputy Prime Minister Cornel Burtica (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• The Vice President
• Phillip Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce
• O. Rudolph Aggrey, U.S. Ambassador to Romania
• H. Allen Holmes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
• Denis Clift, Special Assistant to the Vice President
• Frank Tumminia, Officer in Charge of Romanian Affairs, Department of State
• F. Stephen Larrabee, NSC Staff Member (Notetaker)
• Cornel Burtica, Romanian Deputy Prime Minister
• Nicolae Ionescu, Romanian Ambassador to the U.S.
• Boris Ranghet, Counselor, Romanian Embassy
• Ion Timofei, Interpreter

The Vice President opened the meeting by welcoming Deputy Prime Minister Burtica to Washington. He informed him that the President was aware that Burtica was carrying a letter from President Ceausescu and that the President had asked him to bring Burtica by to deliver the letter.² (U)

Deputy Prime Minister Burtica thanked the Vice President. He said that he had had good discussions with Secretary Klutznick, who was an old friend of Romania. He had also had productive discussions at State and with STR.³ (At this point the meeting was interrupted, and the Vice President took Deputy Prime Minister Burtica in to see the President, who accepted the letter and asked Minister Burtica to convey his greetings to President Ceausescu.)⁴ (C)

Resuming the discussions again, the Vice President stated that the President would respond to President Ceausescu’s letter through our Ambassador in Bucharest⁵ and that he, the Vice President, would report his conversations with Burtica directly to the President. Burtica’s visit, in his view, was an indication of the good relations between Romania and the United States. Recalling President Ceausescu’s visit to the United States in 1978, he said that the United States took a great deal of satisfaction from the strengthening of bilateral relations which had occurred in the interval. As far as trade was concerned, he noted that he had been one of the original authors of MFN for Romania. This, in his view, was a symbol with some substance and an indication that we were now on a good course. (C)

Deputy Prime Minister Burtica thanked the Vice President very much, stating that the Romanians too were highly appreciative of the development of good relations between the two countries. Since President Carter’s meeting with President Ceausescu, relations had developed considerably. The current session of the Joint Commission was a good example of the way in which both countries could cooperate. He stressed, however, that both countries needed to find new possibilities for expanding cooperation. After the granting of MFN, commercial exchanges had developed favorably, but it was unwieldy to have to review the question of MFN each year. The Romanians wanted to see a solution of the MFN question on a permanent basis, as in the case of China. (C)

The Vice President noted that the U.S. favored this as well. The question was really one of timing. There was considerable positive feeling toward Romania, but the question was really when we should move. (C)

Burtica emphasized that the Congressmen with whom he had met felt that the time was appropriate to move on the question of MFN. He had found considerable good feeling toward Romania in Congress, particularly as a result of Romania’s independent stand on Afghanistan. Senator Jackson in particular was positively disposed toward granting MFN on a permanent basis.⁶ (S)

At this point Secretary Klutznick interjected that Senator Jackson was favorably disposed to yearly renewal not multiyear renewal. (C)

The Vice President commented that perhaps the attitude in Congress was changing and that we ought to look into this. The Vice President also noted that when Ceausescu came in 1975 he had gotten into a tiff with Senator Jackson and that Jackson had found that Ceausescu was not easily pushed. (S)

Burtica replied that in the meantime Senator Jackson had been in Romania and had come away with a positive impression. (C)

The Vice President promised that the U.S. would take another look at the question of granting MFN to Romania on a permanent basis. (S)

Turning to economic relations, Burtica commented that Romania had a large number of very important negotiations, especially with General Electric.⁷ If this deal were to be concluded, it would extend to the year 2000. The Romanians basically agreed on all points except counter-trade. Burtica stressed that such a deal would be easier to conclude if MFN was granted on a permanent basis. This created uncertainties. (S)

The Vice President asked if Burtica meant that Romania needed access to U.S. markets. (C)

Burtica responded that Romania had to be able to pay for what they had to buy in the United States and that was why they needed MFN. Romania also had an important joint venture with Control Data Corporation. (C)

The Vice President joked that the Minister was very smart; Control Data was from Minnesota. (C)

In referring to contacts with U.S. firms, Burtica noted that the two main problems were with MFN and export licenses. (C)

Secretary Klutznick replied that the U.S. had the issue of licenses under review. (U)

Turning to international affairs, Burtica said that he would briefly like to inform the Vice President about Ceausescu’s views on a number of important world problems. Romania was concerned about the deterioration of the international situation and felt that we should do everything possible not to allow it to further deteriorate. There were a number of factors which had contributed to this. However, he stated that he did not want to apportion blame. It was important, he stressed, that we try to resolve matters by political means. In regard to CSCE, Romania felt that everything had to be done to ensure that the Madrid Conference took place. He then noted that there were a number of steps which could be taken to improve the atmosphere. The Romanians hoped that SALT II could be ratified. They also felt that theater nuclear weapons should be withdrawn before they were installed. (C)

Burtica stressed that Romania did not want an imbalance in Europe, but rather wanted to see new steps toward military disengagement in Europe as well as steps toward a reduction of armaments and defense spending. Regarding Afghanistan, he emphasized the need for a political solution, a cessation of foreign support for anti-government forces, and a withdrawal of Soviet troops. He stressed that the problem in Afghanistan could not be solved by pressure tactics. The Soviets would not yield to pressure. Only a dialogue could lead to a solution. (C)

Regarding Iran, Burtica said that Romania wanted to see a reduction in tensions. Economic sanctions would only lead to greater rigidity, both in Afghanistan and Iran. President Bani-Sadr, he said, was having problems with the students. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, was taking a more realistic position. The Romanians believed that pressure simply fed the most extremist forces. (C)

Burtica then turned to the question of a new economic order, noting that Romania desired to cooperate with the American side to find practical solutions. Such cooperation was necessary because otherwise conflicts in the region would increase. (C)

The Vice President thanked Minister Burtica for his observations. He stated that the United States was very interested to see GE get the contract. This would help to strengthen and broaden the bilateral relationship. As far as Madrid was concerned, the United States wanted to see the follow-up conference on security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE) go forward and was planning to attend the Madrid session as scheduled. The Vice President regretted that it had been necessary to defer SALT II, noting that after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan there was no way we could have obtained ratification. He assured Minister Burtica, however, that as soon as it was politically feasible the Administration would try to get the SALT II Agreement ratified. (C)

The Vice President then turned to the question of TNF, pointing out that for nearly fourteen years the question had been quiescent. However, recently the Soviets had begun deploying the SS–20, which was a MIRVed, mobile, highly accurate missile, at a rate of several a month. They had also begun deploying the BACKFIRE bomber which was a theater nuclear weapon. As a result, NATO had no choice but to take the decision which it took at the December 12th Ministerial. (C)

The Vice President stressed that we continued to attach importance to MBFR and hoped to eventually see a Phase I Agreement. As far as Afghanistan was concerned, he noted that the U.S. position was well known and that there was no need to repeat it for Minister Burtica. Iran was a heart-breaking situation. The hostages were innocent victims and their captivity was a violation of international law. The United States had been patient and restrained. We had had repeated talks with Iran. The Iranian government had repeatedly been unwilling or unable to deliver on its commitments and the situation was becoming almost intolerable. As a consequence, we had asked our friends to join with us to impose sanctions under the UN Resolution. We were trying to force the Iranians to see the folly of their ways. However, it was becoming increasingly clear that the Iranians had no intention of letting the hostages go and were determined to humiliate the United States. He assured Deputy Prime Minister Burtica that he would report the Minister’s views to the President. He then asked the Minister to give his views on what would happen in Yugoslavia after Tito died. (C)

Minister Burtica stressed that in the Romanian view there would be no major changes. The Yugoslavs had achieved a system that maintained a balance and satisfied the needs of the different republics. Sometimes the various nationalities quarreled among themselves, but they were united against any outside threat. The real problem in the long run would be whether a genuinely collective leadership would emerge or whether there would be a return to one-man rule. (C)

The Vice President commented that it was hard to see how anyone could possibly replace Tito. (C)

Minister Burtica agreed, but noted that in China people had thought that it would be hard to replace Mao. In Yugoslavia some personalities would be found. In this connection, he cited the example of Stane Dolanc. Dolanc was an extremely able and good politician. Before he became Executive Secretary of the Presidium, no one had known him. However, he had done an excellent job. Thus, in Minister Burtica’s view, it would be possible to find some personality eventually who could lead Yugoslavia. He did not think that the Soviets would intervene directly in Yugoslav internal affairs because the Soviets knew that the Yugoslavs, like the Romanians, would not sit idly by and allow themselves to be occupied. (S)

The Vice President concluded the meeting by thanking Minister Burtica for his visit and conveyed President Carter’s best wishes to President Ceausescu. (U)

1. Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Box 67, Foreign Countries—Romania, (1980). Secret. Drafted by Larrabee. The meeting took place in the Vice President’s office in the West Wing of the White House.
2. Ceausescu’s letter, dated April 17, stressed Romania’s desire to strengthen security, collaboration, and stability in Europe through the CSCE process. Ceausescu also expressed his belief that a solution to the Middle East could only be reached after Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and the creation of a Palestinian state. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 16, Romania: President Nicolae Ceausescu, 1/79–6/80)
3. Telegram 109956 to Bucharest, April 26, reported the April 22 conversation between Christopher and Burtica at the Department. Burtica, the telegram reported, “raised bilateral issues of U.S. export controls, access for Romanian vessels to Hampton Roads, and multi-year MFN.” After renewing Romania’s request for access of its vessels to Hampton Roads, Burtica was informed that the administration had reviewed the issue intensively but that it was not possible to agree to the Romanian request. The two officials also discussed the hostage crisis in Iran, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800206–0636) The conversation between Klutznick and Burtica on April 22 was reported in telegram 114649 to Bucharest, May 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800216–0360)
4. The President met with Burtica in the Oval Office from 1:20 to 1:25 p.m. (Carter Libary, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary, April 23, 1980)
5. In telegram 137585 to Bucharest, May 24, the Department instructed Aggrey to request a meeting with Andrei and deliver Carter’s response to Ceausescu. Carter assured Ceausescu that, despite deteriorating U.S.-Soviet relations, he was “determined to maintain a dialogue with the countries of Eastern Europe and to pursue a differentiated approach to each of them,” and in particular with Romania. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800255–1010)
6. Burtica’s conversation with members of Congress, including Senator Jackson, was reported in telegram 121462 to Bucharest, May 8. “While discussing this year’s MFN waiver” the Department reported, “DPM Burtica never confronted Jackson on the issue of multi-year MFN. We do not know if this was by design or simply inadvertence, but Jackson was prepared to tell the Romanians that no chance existed for change in the trade legislation or procedures to permit multi-year MFN.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800227–1123)
7. In an undated memorandum (drafted on March 28) from Vest to Clift, Vest summarized U.S. support for General Electric’s proposal to supply the Romanians with two turbine generators for their nuclear plant at Cernavoda. (Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Box 67, Foreign Countries—Romania, (1980))