Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

221. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State¹

Bucharest, January 28, 1980, 1637Z

680. Subject: Newsom Discussions With Romanian President Ceausescu. Ref: State 24016.²

1. Secret-entire text.

2. Summary: Under Secretary Newsom January 28 presented letter from President Carter to President Ceausescu³ and had lively two hour session, during which President Ceausescu expressed continuing criticism of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan while indicating personal puzzlement over motives for their actions, other than presumed Soviet reaction to foreign backing of Afghan rebels. In lively give and take discussion Ceausescu: (1) was skeptical that U.S. counter actions to Soviets or sanctions in Iran would have desired effect; (2) expressed confidence in prospects for Yugoslav stability post-Tito: (3) felt U.S. should “do a lot more” re Palestinian issue and, despite counter arguments, promoted idea during current Camp David negotiations of parallel initiative involving Soviets, and relating to Palestinian rights; (4) emphasized Romanian hopes for continuation of CSCE, specifically stressing military disengagement and nuclear missiles issue; (5) cautioned U.S. about promoting relations with China at expense of Soviets or other nations. Ceausescu was careful throughout to balance criticism of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with reiteration of his general principles of detente and caution to U.S. not to aggravate situation through its reaction to Afghan and Iranian situation. End summary.

3. Under Secretary Newsom had two hour discussion with President Ceausescu on January 28, accompanied by Ambassador Aggrey and Suddarth.⁴ Ceausescu was joined by Foreign Minister Andrei, interpreter, and note taker. Major points of discussion are summarized below.

4. Newsom opened discussion by presenting President Carter’s letter which interpreter read to Ceausescu, who expressed regards and best wishes to President Carter and indicated Ceausescu has been working on reply to President’s letter regarding Afghanistan⁵ which he will send soon.⁶

5. General discussions: Ceausescu while being specific on several points, continued his well-known approach of articulating Romania’s application of non-aligned principles to general world situation. He indicated that international situation has worsened as a result of a process begun long ago and that great powers, including China, should make efforts to retrieve the situation by pursuing detente, and taking into account independence and sovereignty of all states. Ceausescu enumerated following factors resulting in deterioration: (1) slow progress of SALT II; (2) Camp David has created impression on Soviets they are being ignored in Mid-East peace process; (3) situation in Afghanistan, partly result of fact that U.S. in the past only paid attention to military rather than social and economic matters in Iran.

6. Afghanistan: Ceausescu was careful to emphasize that in citing above factors, he was trying to find causes but not rpt not justify Soviet actions in Afghanistan. He indicated he fails to understand why USSR sent troops. Ceausescu felt that outside support for anti-regime forces in Afghanistan was a factor in Soviet decision to intervene. He believes that a US-Soviet agreement could be reached perhaps, on the basis of Soviet withdrawal on one hand and cessation of outside support for anti-regime forces on the other. Ceausescu indicated current US action against Soviet Union is not rpt not moving process towards a solution; on the contrary, it could aggravate tensions and have unpredictable results. In reply, Newsom mentioned that President Carter wants to continue detente in areas where constructive action is possible, such as chemical warfare, CTB and CSCE. US response, however, reflects strong public reaction to Afghanistan situation in which Soviet invasion has made major change in balance of influence in that area. US President cannot exclude possibility that Soviets have ambitions in South West Asia wider than in Afghanistan and US, as a great power, must insure it has strength to meet such challenges. Newsom emphasized that we would like to find non-military means of resolving problems but we cannot be indifferent to the fact that others are using military force. No strong nation can afford to be unprepared in such situations.

7. Yugoslavia: Ceausescu was relatively up-beat regarding prospects for Yugoslavia. He said “I do not believe that Yugoslavian situation gives rise to worries,” indicating that the good Yugoslav social order has good prospects for maintaining Yugoslav independence, which he implied would be case even following Tito.

8. European security: Ceausescu stressed Romania’s desire to strengthen European security with particular emphasis on continuing CSCE. He mentioned specifically that Romania wants a solution to problems of military disengagement including problem of “nuclear missiles.” Newsom indicated US support for CSCE and stressed in larger context that President has not withdrawn SALT II Treaty.

9. Iran: Ceausescu reiterated Romanian view that sanctions are not most effective means of resolving [garble], chiefly because they will aggravate difficult Iranian internal economic situation. Newsom explained that President Carter, because he chose to seek a peaceful resolution, felt the need to use all UN machinery and such action was also important to maintain support from an angry US public opinion for his Iranian policy. Newsom stressed US had postponed formal implementation of sanctions until Islamic Conference is concluded, that we welcome apparent election of Bani-Sadr;⁷ if it appears we can make immediate progress on release of hostages, implementation of sanctions could be reviewed.

10. China: Ceausescu welcomed US-China relations but cautioned that they not be to detriment of relations with USSR, stressing need for collaboration if not friendship and avoidance of confrontation. He also stressed that US-China relationship should not be at expense of interest of other peoples, implying Kampuchea. In reply, Newsom took note of his concern but pointed out that US public and Congress want stronger US relations with China and do not believe we can delay this development simply because our relations with Soviet Union are deteriorating. Consequently, our policy to China may seem more positive under present conditions than is the case, given US-Soviet relations.

11. Mideast: Ceausescu spent considerable proportion of discussion on Middle East negotiations and criticism of Camp David and U.S. role. While supporting Egyptian-Israeli steps in Camp David, he said that “present Camp David course has no chance for success, at least concerning the Palestinian problem.” He said that U.S. “could do a lot more on this issue” and that a representative movement towards comprehensive peace is necessary not only for stability in Middle East but also for securing normal supply of oil. He decried fact that Jordan, Syria and PLO have been left out of process. With respect to possibility of amending 242 to add concept of “Palestine rights”, which Andrei raised with Under Secretary yesterday,⁸ Newsom used talking points in reftel with Ceausescu. Romanian President listened intently but adhered to position that some parallel action to on-going Camp David negotiations is necessary. He indicated some way must be developed to assure Palestinian participation and suggested that this a sphere where an initiatve could be developed with Soviet participation despite problems of Afghanistan. He also suggested idea of Geneva type international conference resumption. (Andrei later told Newsom Romanian idea was for post-Camp David conference to resolve issues not yet resolved.)

12. In reply, Newsom spoke about U.S. approach and our desire for achieving sufficient results in autonomy negotiations to attract Palestinian participation. Ceausescu listened patiently but evinced skeptism over results with a Romanian expression roughly equivalent to “inshallah”. Sensing his intense interest in the subject, Newsom promised to keep Ambassador Aggrey informed as appropriate regarding progress of Ambassador Linowitz’ negotiations, so that GOR could be informed.

13. Given Ceausescu’s great stress during discussions on non-interference of great powers with small nations, Newsom could not resist temptation to indicate that we are not in a position, regardless of impression of U.S. power, to force or order another nation to do what it does not consider to be in its interest. We have the difficult and lonely task of persuading Israel to grapple with complex autonomy issues as well as questions of settlements and status of Jerusalem and to achieve sufficient results to bring Palestinians into negotiations. Ceausescu interrupted Newsom’s presentation to point out that Romania also is addressing these problems with the Israelis and Arabs.

14. Comment: We did not detect any significant change in Ceausescu’s well-known position on international issues during discussions. His criticism of Soviet behaviour in Afghanistan came through strongly, although carefully couched in terms of non-alignment and balanced but implied criticism of U.S. security measures in reaction to Afghan situation. Only new elements were Ceausescu’s suggestion that U.S. acquiesce to an initiative regarding Palestinian rights which would involve the Soviets and his stress on CSCE issue of military disengagement with specific reference to nuclear missiles. Ceausescu received Under Secretary graciously and engaged in a lively give and take on the major current international issues. He seemed genuinely pleased with letter and consultation. We believe he has a better idea of current U.S. policy assessments which could be helpful in permitting him to chart accurately the course of cautious non-alignment which he is pursuing despite proximity to the Soviet Union.

Aggrey

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870105–0306; N800002–0439. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Newsom recounted the meeting with Ceausescu in his memoirs, describing Bucharest in January as “one of the drabbest cities I have ever visited.” (Newsom, Witness to a Changing World, p. 319)
2. In telegram 24016 to Bucharest, January 27, the Department provided talking points on Middle East issues. Saunders informed Newsom that because of opposition to Sadat and Begin, the U.S. Government requested postponement of UN Security Council deliberations on a resolution dealing with the Palestinian question and that Yassir Arafat seemed to have decided against forcing a debate. The Department instructed Newsom to stress in his discussions with Ceausescu that the United States remained committed to finding a solution, and that the ongoing negotiations on autonomy offer the best chance for success. The Embassy concluded: “We urge that no initiative be taken to revive discussion of a resolution to supplement [UNGA Res.] 242 in the next several months.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870105–0315)
3. See Document 220. Carter’s January 24 letter was delivered to Newsom in London prior to this trip to Bucharest. In it Carter commended Ceausescu for speaking forcefully against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. See Document 219.
4. Roscow Seldon “Rocky” Suddarth, Newsom’s Executive Assistant.
5. On December 29, 1979, Carter approved a letter to several world leaders, including Ceausescu, concerning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. On December 31, in another letter concerning the NATO dual-track decision, Carter added a handwritten postscript again expressing concern about Afghanistan and inviting Ceausescu to inform him of his views. See Document 219. The December 31 letter was transmitted in telegram 420 to Bucharest, January 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800005–0442)
6. No response specific to Carter’s December 29 letter on Afghanistan was found. In telegram 1033 from Bucharest, February 7, Aggrey reported his conversation with Andrei earlier that day regarding Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko’s visit to Bucharest. Andrei informed the Ambassador that Ceausescu told Gromyko that Romania saw Afghanistan as the greatest cause of international tension, that an urgent solution was necessary, and that such a solution would be cessation of all outside support for anti-government forces and withdrawal of Soviet troops. Andrei also reported that Gromyko said Soviet troops would be withdrawn once outside support ceases. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800066–0451) On March 12, the Embassy in Islamabad reported in telegram 2311 that it received information of a possible mediation offer from Romania between Pakistan and the Soviet Union in order to reach an accommodation on Afghanistan. The offer had been made by Pungan while visiting Pakistan in February. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800132–0761) In telegram 2123 from Bucharest March 14, the Embassy responded that Romania would like to broker the Afghan problem. The Embassy wrote: “While it is clearly not in a position to settle the dispute, Ceausescu is in his own inimitable way trying to act as a middleman in order to serve Romania’s national interests, world peace, and his own ego—all of which are in this instance compatible.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800130–0957)
7. Abdulhassan Banisadr was invested as President of Iran on February 4, 1980.
8. In telegram 643 from Bucharest, January 27, the Embassy summarized the conversation between Andrei and Newsom which took place earlier that day. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870105–0322) In telegram 645 from Bucharest, January 28, the Embassy expanded on the points made by Andrei in his conversation with Newsom. The Embassy concluded that “Romanians clearly seek to pursue as much of a traditional non-aligned policy as their geographic and political position will permit” and that Newsom’s discussions with Andrei showed the extent of strain that remains in Soviet-Romanian relations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800048–0954)