Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

416. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, January 20, 1980, 0710Z

454. Subject: GOP Position on U.S. Assistance to Pakistan: Secretary’s Testimony Before SFRC.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. This is an action message. This message should be available to Department principals by opening of business Monday, January 21.

3. I was called late last night by Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz, who had obviously just returned from meeting with President Zia. He expressed deep concern over any unilateral U.S. announcement of aid package to Pakistan. I asked for appointment with Foreign Secretary first thing this morning (Jan 20) to get full and more precise statement of GOP position, which I have now done.

4. Gist of GOP concern as expressed by Shahnawaz is that U.S. decision to proceed with legislation in Congress on $400 million aid package is, as we have already been informed (Islamabad 453),² considered by GOP as a unilateral act. If consultations with Congress or legislative action leads to public record showing that U.S. has requested or been granted by Congress $400 million aid package, GOP will be obliged to make public statement that it is not associated with this decision. Pakistan is prepared to challenge the Soviet Union once it is determined that sufficient resources are available to do so; but this is a decision which must be made by Pakistan. GOP considers that question of assistance is still under negotiation. It would be particularly unfortunate if we found ourselves taking public positions on U.S. assistance on eve of Islamic Conference.³ Results of conference could even be damaged by perception that Pakistan’s call for Islamic meeting is linked to U.S. aid package.

5. I told Shahnawaz I wanted to review once again in precise detail the reasons for our decision to proceed quickly with Congress, and I went over points made by Deputy Secretary to Pakistani Ambassador (State 14110).⁴ (Shahnawaz expressed some annoyance that conversation has not yet been reported by Sultan Khan.) I laid particular emphasis on the importance of putting $400 million package in context of larger assistance from variety of sources and importance of U.S. taking the lead to accomplish this end. Shahnawaz said that while there might be persuasive reasons for taking the action we have at the Washington end, consideration must also be given to negative results that could ensue on this end. He repeated that before calling down the wrath of the Soviet Union on its head, Pakistan had to make its own judgement of its capabilities. GOP considered that visit by U.S. military team was part of process of determining Pakistani requirements. We had spoken of “ridicule” of U.S. offer but point is that if $400 million aid offer becomes a formal part of the public record, it is others who will ridicule it. He would be interested in knowing how soon Congress will act and how much of our testimony before Congress will be on the public record.

6. At an appropriate point in the conversation I emphasized the multilateral and continuing nature of our effort by advising Shahnawaz that GOP should immediately request increased assistance from Japan as follow-up to Ambassador Habib’s discussions in Tokyo (State 15264).⁵ This was a concrete example of efforts we were making. I also took occasion to inform Shahnawaz that we would be seeking GOP agreement to use U.S.-owned rupees for local costs of refugee relief and to maximize U.S. food and dollar imports (State 15189).⁶

7. Finally, I said that GOP concerns would, naturally, be transmitted immediately to Washington, I believed GOP had a complete and precise picture of U.S. position. Important next step would be an early meeting between President Zia and Ambassador Hummel. I said that I could reconfirm that Ambassador would be arriving tomorrow, Jan 21. Shahnawaz said he would do his best to arrange meeting with President that afternoon and he thought that it could be done.

8. Comment: It would be useful to have Department’s best estimate of timing of legislative action on aid request. GOP obviously hopes that portions of our testimony before Congress dealing with exact amount of aid package can be kept off public record, at least for the time being, and particularly until after Islamic Conference in Islamabad which begins on Jan 26.

9. Department may wish to pass this message to other interested posts.

King

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097–0686, N800002–0143. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.
2. In telegram 453 from Islamabad, January 19, the Embassy reported that Shahi’s initial response to the U.S. intention to proceed with the submission to Congress of the assistance package for Pakistan was that if the package were submitted, Pakistan’s concurrence should not be assumed. Shahi also expressed doubt that aid from other countries would be forthcoming. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800032–0457)
3. The Islamic Conference met January 26–29 in Islamabad. See footnote 3, Document 422.
4. See Document 415.
5. Telegram 15264 to Islamabad, January 20, transmitted the results of Habib’s discussions with the Japanese Government regarding assistance to Pakistan. After Habib suggested Japan should contribute $335 million for 1980, the Japanese expressed willingness to consider larger contributions if done through a consortium and urged that the Consortium meeting, planned for May, should be held sooner. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800033–0451)
6. In telegram 15189 to Islamabad, January 19, the Department reported the results of a series of discussions between UNHCR and officials from the Department of State and AID. In addition to other aid, U.S. officials offered to use at least 5 million of U.S.-owned rupees to aid the estimated 500,000 Afghan refugees in Pakistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800033–0297)