Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

410. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Posts¹

Washington, January 13, 1980, 0131Z

9863. Tokyo pass Secretary Brown and AsstSec Holbrooke. Subject: US-Pakistan Talks: Political Discussions. Ref: (A) Islamabad 219;² (B) London 482.³

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Summary: Pakistan’s Foreign Affairs Adviser Agha Shahi held wide-ranging talks January 12 with a US team headed by Secretary Vance. Shahi also called on Dr. Brzezinski⁴ and on President Carter.⁵ The principal focus of the talks was on the nature of the US security commitment to Pakistan in light of the much increased threat from Soviet-supported Afghanistan. The US side reaffirmed the relevance of our 1959 bilateral agreement to the current situation. We said we were proposing to the Congress a substantial economic assistance package and were willing to resume major military sales. As expected, the Pakistani team outlined the threat they faced in stark terms, noting the threat from both the west and east (India). The Pakistanis were asked for assurances on their nuclear intentions which we could use with the Congress in connection with the authorizing legislation. They will get back to us. We believe that the talks went well and laid the basis for a more cooperative US-Pak relationship. The GOP team seemed pleased with the seriousness of the US concern and the magnitude of assistance offered. The following account is a brief summary of the talks, for your background and, for London, Beijing and Jidda, to brief host governments. Embassy Islamabad should pass this information to Lord Carrington (ref A). End summary.

3. Pakistan Foreign Affairs Advisor Agha Shahi visited Washington January 12 for an all-day series of meetings. He was accompanied by Pakistan Ambassador to Washington, Secretary General of Defense General Jilani, and General Aref, Military Chief of Staff to President Zia. FYI: Ambassador to Moscow Yaqub Khan, also participated, but the Pakistanis do not wish this to be made public. End FYI. The US team was headed by Secretary Vance and included Acting Secretary of Defense Claytor, Deputy Secretary Christopher, Under Secretary Newsom, Under Secretary Nimetz, and other officials from State, Defense, and NSC. Shahi also called on Dr. Brzezinski and on the President. Ambassador Hummel was present.

4. Secretary Vance, in welcoming Shahi, emphasized the gravity of the threat Pakistan faced as a result of developments in Afghanistan and the importance the USG attached to supporting Pakistan at this time.⁶ Shahi’s initial statement reiterated Pakistan’s acute sense of insecurity and the need for a concrete indication of US intentions.

5. The principal themes which emerged during the discussions were:

A. Nature of US commitment: Shahi made a very strong plea that our 1959 agreement of cooperation be turned into a treaty. He argued that this would reassure the Pakistani public and be a more binding commitment in unforeseeable future circumstances. Yaqub Khan noted considerable public cynicism about the 1959 agreement, citing our restrictive interpretation of it during Pakistan’s past conflicts with India. The Secretary reaffirmed the validity of the agreement; noted that its legal force was the same as a treaty in US law; specified that the threat Pakistan now faced was the type of situation envisaged in the agreement; and argued that no useful purpose would be served in trying to turn it into a treaty. He told Shahi that we intend to use language presenting the legislation which would create a record reaffirming the agreement. He also gave Shahi a letter from President Carter to Zia strongly reaffirming this commitment in the context of the threat from Afghanistan.⁷ He offered to make the letter public if Pakistan wished, in order to provide a warning to the USSR. The Secretary agreed on a need for further discussions on threat scenarios and how we might be prepared to meet them.

B. Economic assistance: Secretary Vance told Shahi that we were requesting authority to provide a total of dols 400 million in fiscal years 80 and 81, equally divided between Economic Support Funds and FMS credits. The US side said it was re-examining the debt relief problem. Shahi emphasized that Pakistan’s principal economic concern was with its balance of payments, and stressed the importance of debt relief. Both sides agreed that further economic discussions would be held, and that the Pakistan Finance Minister should probably visit Washington within the next two weeks.

C. Soviet intentions: Shahi argued that the Pakistanis believed that, regardless of whether the Soviets had a grand design, the situation in South Asia would present them with a temptation for a forward thrust. Yaqub Khan advanced the strategic view that the Soviet salient between Iran and Pakistan could permit envelopment of the Arabian Peninsula and even East Africa. Yaqub also noted the imminent threat of “hot pursuit” incursions across the Durand Line. Such intimidation of Pakistan would fit with what he perceived to be the current Soviet mood. Secretary Vance said that we agreed the potential for such developments was there.

D. Military supply: Shahi made it clear that military supply was critical to enabling Pakistan to defend its border. The Secretary said our approach was to concentrate in the first instance on equipment relevant to the threat from Afghanistan and which could be quickly supplied. In separate military talks the Pakistanis described their urgent equipment needs and substantial agreement was reached on general priorities. A US defense team will visit Pakistan in the very near future for more detailed discussions. Septel on military sub-group discussions follows.⁸

E. India: Shahi said Pakistan still regards India as a major threat and he alluded to the Indian UNGA statement, as confirmation of Pak fears of a Moscow-Kabul-Delhi axis.⁹ He pointedly asked what would we do if the Indians, in concert with Afghanistan, brought pressure against Pakistan. Both sides agreed that everything possible should be done to encourage a stable Indo-Pak relationship.

F. Iran: Shahi said that he thought the gravity of the situation and the awkwardness of the continuing US-Iran confrontation was “gradually beginning to dawn on them”. He described at length his discussions with Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh and Ayatollah Beheshti, both of whom seemed interested in resolving the situation, but went on to state that the decision was in the hands of Khomeini. He said he urged release of the hostages to Khomeini, who reportedly remained silent.

G. Refugees: Shahi said that Pakistan was budgeting dols 50 to 60 million from its own resources for refugee relief, and both sides agreed on the urgency of more UNHCR resources. Secretary Vance said that we would expect to meet 1/3 of the UNHCR total.

H. Nuclear problem: Secretary Vance outlined the intense and continuing interest of the Congress and the US executive in nuclear nonproliferation. He said that we would need to be able to provide to the Congress assurances regarding Pakistan’s nuclear intentions when we present the authorizing legislation for aid to Pakistan. The legislation would permit aid notwithstanding the Symington Amendment. In the ensuing discussion, Shahi said that the GOP would not object to our restating publicly that Pakistan would not manufacture nuclear weapons nor transfer sensitive nuclear equipment, materials, or technology to other countries. Regarding a test, Shahi said that further clarification which we could use with Congress, would require a decision by President Zia and his advisors. He emphasized that the question of publicly foreclosing a nuclear explosion was very sensitive in Pakistan. The Secretary in his opening statement said we believe any Pakistan nuclear test under present circumstances would have deeply destabilizing consequences to the region.

I. Coordination with other countries: The Secretary said we had had preliminary discussions with our major allies and other friends of Pakistan about Pakistan’s needs. We hoped that our assistance would encourage others to be generous in helping to meet these needs. He said we would continue these efforts if Shahi wished us to do so. Shahi agreed, emphasizing the importance of the Saudi response.

6. European posts should not rpt not brief host governments at this time so as not to preempt Christopher’s briefings.¹⁰ For Beijing: septel un-related subject¹¹ should be put together with this report and shared with MFA in advance of Huang Hua departure for Pakistan. Islamabad should find way to have Carrington briefed. Jidda will receive subsequent instructions for talk with Saudis.

Vance

1. Source: Department of State, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom Subject Files, Lot 81D154, Box 16, Pakistan, February–October 1980. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent to Islamabad, Beijing, London, Moscow, Jidda, New Delhi, Paris, Bonn, Ottawa, and Tokyo. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Drafted by Schaffer; cleared in S/S–O and by Peck, Coon, and Raphel; approved by Saunders.
2. In telegram 219 from Islamabad, January 10, the Embassy reported British Prime Minister Carrington’s planned arrival in Islamabad on the evening of January 14. The purpose of the visit was to meet with Shahi and Zia, after which Carrington planned on visiting areas affected by the influx of refugees from Afghanistan. The Embassy requested that details of U.S. aid to Pakistan be forwarded to Islamabad in case such information proved useful to Carrington. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800017–0517)
3. In telegram 482 from London, January 8, the Embassy reported Carrington’s itinerary for his South Asia trip beginning on January 9. The Embassy noted Carrington’s plans to offer U.K. humanitarian aid to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800014–0764)
4. See Document 407.
5. See Document 408.
6. The text of Vance’s opening statement was transmitted in telegram 9607 to Islamabad, January 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File D800021–1122)
7. See Document 406.
8. See Document 409.
9. See footnote 1, Document 166.
10. Christopher visited Brussels, Bonn, Paris, London, and Rome January 14–16 to discuss with the European allies the response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
11. Not further identified.