409. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1
9606. Subject: US-Pakistan Talks: Military Sub-Group.
1. S–Entire text.
2. Summary: After plenary meeting (described septel)2 military group met for an hour and a half. Session was chaired by Acting Secretary of Defense Claytor who expressed US desire to move quickly in providing assistance to Pakistan. General Aref described in some detail Pakistan’s current defense posture and its priority needs. Pakistan agreed to follow up with specific lists to be provided by their Embassy in Washington. Pakistan tentatively agreed to receive a US defense team for further detailed talks and indicated that they would get back to us on timing. End summary.
3. Secretary Claytor opened meeting by noting that US was prepared to accelerate delivery of equipment already in pipeline and wished to discuss with GOP what additional equipment was required. Claytor also indicated US was prepared to help Pakistan in strengthening its defense production capabilities. In response both General Aref and General Jilani indicated Pakistan was interested in strengthening its defense production capabilities in certain critical areas.
4. General Aref then provided a lengthy exposition on Pakistan’s strategic and defense position. He noted that bulk of Pakistan’s forces were on eastern front facing India and that forces on western side were meager and ill equipped. This was because main threat had always been from India not Afghanistan and Afghanistan had never stabbed Pakistan in back during its three wars with India. Essential point was that Pakistani force deployments in east were essentially self sufficient with a good logistical infrastructure. This was not at all true in west, where the infrastructure was virtually non existent.
5. Aref emphasized that as a result of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan now faces a different strategic situation. On the east they are facing an India which has some 30 divisions 13 of which were directly oriented against Pakistan. On the west there are now 5 Soviet [Page 921] divisions in Afghanistan and about five more stationed north of the Oxus River. In a month the GOP estimates there will be ten Soviet divisions in Afghanistan. In addition the Afghans themselves have had 13 divisions. These divisions admittedly now are being purged but with Soviet training and Soviet hardware will be rebuilt and then Pakistan will be faced with a combined Soviet/Afghan threat.
6. Aref noted that Soviet troops have fanned out to border towns on Pak frontier and there have been some air border violations since December 27. Pakistan believes but has no firm proof that aircraft were being flown by Soviet pilots because of the pattern of their maneuvers. The possibility of future Soviet incursions into Pakistan cannot be ruled out perhaps starting out as hot pursuit.
7. Aref said that Pakistan thus was in an eyeball to eyeball position with the Soviet Union. It is a frontline state. Aref outlined certain defense considerations facing Pakistan.
A. At present Pakistan cannot shift troops from the eastern front to the west. Pakistan won’t reinforce its troops in the east but won’t take any out. The east and west are separate theaters.
B. Pakistan is faced with a considerable shortage of military hardware. Much of Pakistan’s equipment is old and needs modernizing.
C. In terms of its western borders Pakistan may have to raise new formations. He stressed that at the present time Pakistan had no radar on its western borders and no integrated air defense system in those areas. Thus Pakistan’s first priorities were radar and air defense.
8. In sum Aref said Pakistan is faced with a permanent threat from the west and needed to take a long term view. For the long haul it needed to know how durable defense guarantees and defense assistance from such friends as the US would be. By itself Pakistan could not take on the USSR and needed to have a deterrent force.
9. Secretary Claytor said the US completely agreed with Pakistan’s analysis. Our objective was to deter any Soviet move into Pakistan.
10. General Aref then provided general information on Pakistan’s defense priorities service by service, stating that details would be worked out in later discussions:
Army
Anti aircraft guns
Short-range air defense missiles (Roland/RBS–70)
Long range artillery (self-propelled and towed)
APCs
Tanks (M48s or M60s)
Armored vehicle launched bridges
Engineer vehicles
Anti-tank missiles (TOW, possibly Dragon)
[Page 922]Air force
Aircraft to match MiG–23, 25, 27s
Anti-tank, gunship helicopters
C–130s
Sparrow air to air missiles
Maverick air to ground missiles
Laser guided bombs
Ammunition
Airborne warning radar (E–2C)
I-Hawk SAMs
Navy
2 submarines
Missile boats with harpoon
Naval helicopters (Sea King)
2 destroyers or frigates
11. In commenting on Pakistan’s aircraft requirements Aref reviewed the past history of our differing views of Pakistan’s needs and noted that Pakistan was now faced with a new situation. Many of its planes are obsolete and the Soviets had their most advanced planes in Afghanistan. Pakistan thus must face the gamut of the Soviet arsenal; MiG–23s, MiG–25s and MiG–27s. Aref intimated that the US was in the best position to tell Pakistan what kind of planes were needed to meet this threat.
12. At end of meeting Secretary Claytor asked if Pakistan would like to receive a team from the three services for further talks. General Aref said such a visit would be welcome and they would get back to us shortly about the timing of a visit. General Aref specifically asked that such a team include a specialist in defense production.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800021–1114. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to New Delhi, Beijing, London, Moscow, Jidda, and Paris. Drafted by Hornblow; cleared in PM and DOD/ISA; approved by Coon.↩
- See Document 410.↩