Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

394. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Pakistan and Yugoslavia¹

Washington, December 26, 1979, 2314Z

331577. Subject: Soviet Move Into Afghanistan.

1. (Secret–Entire text)

2. We have reports of a large scale Soviet airlift into Kabul on December 25–26 suggesting that the Soviets have begun to move additional combat units with field equipment, e.g., field kitchens, ambulances, etc., into Afghanistan. The airlift, possibly involving several hundred aircraft to Kabul and elsewhere, is apparently continuing. Continued mobilization of Soviet forces north of the Afghan border suggests that this airlift may be a precursor to the movement of even larger units across the border. The buildup of ground forces and the massing of airborne units in areas adjacent to Afghanistan probably amounts to at least five divisions and there are indications of further mobilization beyond this level.²

3. For Islamabad: Ambassador should inform the GOP at highest available level of the information in para 2 and seek any confirmation it may have. We note from press that Agha Shahi has left for Tehran. Request that GOP urgently pass information to Shahi and ask him to raise issue with Ghotbzadeh and others with whom he has contact. If GOP concurs in our view that these developments are a threat to Iran or the region, it may wish to have Shahi convey this thought to Khomeini on GOP behalf along following lines:

The substantial increase in Soviet troops in Afghanistan could pose a threat to Iran and to Iran’s revolution. Khomeini should now consider seriously whether the prolongation of his confrontation with the United States is in the interest of Iran or his revolution. The United States, before the seizure of the hostages, was prepared to seek satisfactory relations with the Revolutionary Government. It is now in the wider interests of Iran and of Islam for the Revolutionary Government to reconsider its position on the hostages in the face of new and potentially threatening Soviet moves.³

4. For Belgrade: Please share info para. 2 with GOY at an appropriately high level and request any confirmation from their sources. You should also suggest that GOY consider instructing its representative in Tehran to discuss this information with key Iranian contacts, suggesting that a release of the hostages at this time would help Iran and the world concentrate on the larger threat to regional security and principles of non-alignment posed by this naked show of Soviet force in Afghanistan. FYI: We will be making a similar approach to Yugoslav Ambassador here. End FYI.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to all NATO capitals, Kuwait, New Delhi, Dacca, Beijing, USUN, and Moscow. Drafted by Schaffer; cleared in EUR, S/MS, IO, and S/S and by Saunders; approved by Newsom.
2. For documentation on the December 26–27 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and U.S. actions in the immediate aftermath, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Documents 93–117.
3. In telegram 15280 from Islamabad, December 27, Hummel described Shahnawaz’s reaction after Hummel carried out his instructions from Washington. According to Hummel, Shahnawaz was “instantly receptive to idea of passing on to Shahi such information” about the situation in Afghanistan. However, Hummel noted: “As for specifically using information on Soviet actions to persuade Iranian Government to reconsider its position on hostages, he said this will be very tricky. He agreed to convey U.S. request urgently to Shahi but emphasized that using info about Soviet actions to assist on hostage issue will require most ‛delicate’ handling lest Iranians ‛smell’ U.S. hand causing effort to turn counter-productive.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2161, N790010–0455)