Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

393. Record of a Meeting of an Interagency Working Group¹

Washington, December 7, 1979

A PRC Working Group (NSC, State, CIA, DOD/ISA, JCS) met at the White House on December 7, to consider the non-nuclear aspects of U.S.-Pakistani relations. (S)

Political

The meeting opened with a discussion of where Pakistan is headed. It was generally agreed that the U.S. has, at most, minor influence on the course of events in Pakistan and that course, in the longer term, is threatening. Our policy operates within two constraints: for the short-term, at least, we need to maintain a significant, if reduced, involvement with Pakistan in order to further our various interests there. We do not want to look as if we are abandoning Pakistan. In the longer-term, however, we expect Zia to fall and do not want to go down with him as we did in Iran with the Shah. (It was pointed out, however, that the Iranian model may not be relevant. The opposition in Pakistan is criticizing us for doing too little for their country, rather than too much for Zia.) It was generally agreed that there is very little pro-American sentiment left in Pakistan, especially among younger people. (S)

State will prepare a study along these lines that can serve as background for the next PRC on Pakistan. (C)

Security

State proposed that there be no more ship visits to Karachi until at least the end of the Iranian problem. DOD has no requirements for the next month or two, barring unforeseen emergencies. The matter will be reviewed again early in 1980. (S)

The sale of Gearing destroyers is probably moot. Congress has reportedly decided that these ships should be kept in the Naval Reserve. In any event, there was not much enthusiasm for the sale at this time. (C)

There was general support for a State proposal to permit the sale of equipment required for the last stages of the Pakistani tank rehabilitation program (about $400,000). There has been no stop in the military sales pipeline, but State is informally holding all new requests for sales until we have a clearer idea of just what happened at (and the Pak role in) the Embassy burning. This will take two weeks at most. If State wants to continue the hold beyond that time, we will consider the matter further. State and DOD will look into the status of possible Pakistani requirements for riot control equipment (e.g. tear gas). While this could be useful for protection of embassies, there are serious dangers that it would be used in domestic political strife. NSC asked that there be no such sales without further consultation. The question of the sale of a destroyer tender was left unsettled. Unless DOD poses an objection, this sale will also be held up pending the outcome of the review of the Embassy burning. (S)

We will hold off on security consultations under the 1959 agreement until the Iranian situation is more stable. (S)

Economic

PL–480 negotiating instructions should be readied by early January. At NSC request, a hold has been put on discussing them with the Pakistanis. NSC will look into this further. (S)

It was agreed that the human rights problems that we have been having with Pakistani loans from the IFIs are not affected by the burning of the Embassy and all agencies will support a positive vote on the two agreements coming up in January. (S)

The AID pipeline of some $64 million continues to flow and will do so at least until 1982. It was questioned, however, whether a staff of over 28 people in Islamabad is not excessive for this. (See below.) (S)

State finds that the recent Pak arrangement with the IMF does not meet the criteria that would warrant a debt rescheduling exercise.² NSC asked if State could consult a bit with Treasury and others to see if we couldn’t use this partial step as an opening for some preemptive discussions between the Pakistanis and their creditors. (S)

Staffing

In addition to reservations about the size of the AID mission, it was suggested that the DAO/ODRP offices, already scheduled to be merged, might be reduced in size from the present combined level of about 15 persons. It was generally agreed that the present reduced staffing pattern would provide useful background against which to judge permanent staffing needs. State also said that it proposes to move most of the regional offices out of Karachi. Although many of these moves have been triggered by the events of November 21, most agreed that staff reductions in Embassy Islamabad and Karachi seemed to make good management sense. Both institutions seem to reflect an earlier period of U.S.-Pakistani relations. Nobody saw this, however, as a punitive exercise against the Pakistanis. (S)

PRC

There was considerable doubt about the wisdom of holding a PRC as early as mid-December on the Pakistani nuclear question. The matter will be reviewed.³ (NSC action.) (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 37, Pakistan: 1/80. Secret. The record was sent to Brzezinski under a December 10 covering memorandum from Thornton, who noted that he had chaired the meeting and suggested that Brzezinski “might want to read the first two sections.” Thornton continued: “Generally, the outcome is that we put things on hold until we have a better fix on just what the Paks did and did not do on November 21. We should have that in a week or so and there is nothing that urgently needs doing before then.” “ZB Has Seen” is stamped in the upper right-hand corner of Thornton’s memorandum. (Ibid.)
2. In telegram 13117 from Islamabad, November 20, the Embassy reported the details of the deal made between Pakistan and the IMF, in which Pakistan agreed to a program of fiscal restraint and no devaluation of its currency in exchange for IMF financial assistance. The Embassy commented: “The deal with the Fund will probably permit Pakistan to get through the year narrowly without defaulting, selling gold or other drastic steps.” Noting, however, that the deal was “only a first tranche arrangement on soft terms in which the Fund acquiesced when the GOP balked at a stabilization program,” the Embassy reported the doubt of a member of the IMF negotiating team that Pakistan “would in fact live up to its budgetary commitments and said the Fund would have to depend on the donors to maintain pressure.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790534–0462)
3. In his December 10 covering memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton noted: “The group was skeptical about holding a PRC on Pakistani nuclear matters following Gerry Smith’s return. There don’t seem to be many decisions to make in that area, and there is nothing of PRC quality in the attached paper. I suggest that we hold off until we have the outcome of the study of the Embassy fire. There will probably be some significant issues arising from that; together with the nuclear items, they might make an adequate menu for the PRC.” (See footnote 1 above) The PRC met on December 27; see Document 397.