Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

172. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 26, 1980, 3:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Eric Gonsalves, Secretary, Indian Ministry of External Affairs
• Ashok Gokhale, Chargé, Indian Embassy
• G. Parthasarathy, Counselor, Indian Embassy
• Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Thomas Thornton, Staff Member, NSC

Dr. Brzezinski opened the discussion by saying that the U.S. seeks to work with India to find a constructive and serious solution to the Afghan problem. He disavowed any interest in increasing tensions in South Asia or building up Pakistan against India. He pointed out that it would not be in India’s interest to see Afghanistan changed from a buffer into a wedge that threatens Pakistani stability. Dr. Brzezinski stated his assumption that India does not want to dismember or radicalize Pakistan and that it prefers to see a reasonably vital Pakistan with a secure northern border. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski went on to say that while we do not know why the Soviets moved into Afghanistan, we are concerned about the consequences. We want to work with all in the region. We will shore up Pakistan and will cooperate with Iran after the release of the hostages, with the goal of creating a fabric of security. We hope for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. (At this point Dr. Brzezinski quoted relevant passages from President Carter’s letter to Tito,² emphasizing that we had drafted it with the Brezhnev speech³ in mind.) (S)

Dr. Brzezinski outlined the USG’s hopes for a solution to the Afghan issue including prompt and complete troop withdrawal and a government reasonably representative of the Afghan people. He noted the need to preserve legitimate Soviet interests and permit them to save face. He hoped that India could play a positive role in this regard, but one that recognizes the injustice of what the Soviets are doing. (He noted our disappointment with the Indian UN statement;⁴ Gonsalves said that it did not represent the views of the current government.) Dr. Brzezinski went on to say that we hoped to work in parallel with India toward a suitable solution, although we would not be seen as working together. We expect that Afghanistan will have an Islamic government and a peacekeeping force that will reassure Soviet interests. Such a force might include non-Muslim, as well as Muslim countries—perhaps even India.) (S)

Gonsalves replied that there is considerable identity of objectives although our reasons and methods are not necessarily the same. India stands for the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity; their principal goal, apart from withdrawal of Soviet troops, is to establish a viable structure of cooperation in the subcontinent. This is impossible if foreign intervention introduces tensions. As far as modalities go, Gonsalves agreed that saving of the Soviet face is important. Mrs. Gandhi had pushed Gromyko hard on withdrawal but with little success. Gromyko had gone on at length about foreign intervention. (Brzezinski asked if he had offered any proof; Gonsalves said he would send us what Gromyko had given them.) (S)

The first requirement, Gonsalves said, is to get the Soviets to understand that a non-hostile regime is possible in Afghanistan. Elections are probably not feasible. (Brzezinski agreed.) India could not comment, however, on the mechanics at this time. (S)

Turning to Pakistan, Gonsalves said that India understands that Pakistan faces new concerns and may need new materiel. There should not, however, be an irreversible U.S. buildup in Pakistan that would result in an irreversible Soviet buildup. The matter of weapons was something that India can deal with. The threat to the integrity of Pakistan comes from within the country and arms only complicate that. He asked for American restraint. (Dr. Brzezinski noted that this is a fair point.) Gonsalves added that U.S. military responses elsewhere in the area (e.g., Persian Gulf) should recognize that arms supply cannot create stability. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski replied that he had stressed this in his public statements. While we have vital interests to protect in the region, the way to do this is not through bases and troop presence in some mechanical transfer of past experiences. We are seeking a more limited and flexible presence. Ultimately the nations of the region must cooperate in guaranteeing their own security. We will, however, support our friends. We will not rush headlong into this policy and are sensitive to the points Gonsalves has made. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that Clifford had reported a surprising meeting of the minds in his visit⁵ and we hope to continue the dialogue through the continued exchange of visits. He urged Gonsalves to consider seriously the possibility of a massive Soviet counter-insurgency operation in Afghanistan during the spring and the excesses that this would bring. (S)

Gonsalves noted the latter point but admitted that he saw no answers at this point. He said that India values continuing consultations and accepts the fact that the U.S. has inputs into Indian policy. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski responded that the reverse is also true; India is also a nation of global and regional importance. (C)

Following the meeting, Thornton met for about 30 minutes with Gonsalves, et al. Only a few new points arose: (C)

—Gonsalves was considerably less optimistic about the possibility of a government coming to power in Afghanistan that would be acceptable to the Soviets. (S)

—In response to a question, he went on at some length about Chinese attempts to assuage Indian concerns—e.g., careful briefing of the Indians before and after the Huang Hua visit to Pakistan. He did not see any easy concrete steps that could be taken. (S)

Before leaving, Gonsalves made several points that he wanted to be sure were on the record: (U)

(1) India was disturbed about reports of the McGiffert discussions in Pakistan.⁶ If, indeed, the U.S. is not arming Pakistan to the teeth, it would be best to get this point across in public. (When he turned to specifics, however, Gonsalves only mentioned arming four divisions with tanks and self-propelled artillery. Thornton noted that this would not be an unreasonable requirement for Pakistan; the usual discussion ensued.) (S)

(2) If too much equipment is supplied to Pakistan, the Indians will have to get more from the Soviets. Thornton noted the large Indo-Soviet arms deal in the works; Gonsalves minimized it as very long-term, meant only to balance recent Pakistani acquisitions. (S)

(3) India wants to allay Pakistani concerns so that they can move troops to the Afghan border. Thornton asked if the two military leaderships might get together and Gonsalves said that the Indians were trying to do this. (S)

(4) Gonsalves bore down hard on the need for the U.S. to stop the Pakistani nuclear program. He implied that a Pakistani weapons capability, plus extensive arms supply, would force India to reexamine its nuclear option. Gonsalves seemed particularly concerned about stopping European support (including technicians) for the Pakistani program. Thornton replied that we were doing all that we could but the Indians know as well as we do how difficult it is to stop up all the holes. (S)

Gonsalves concluded by expressing his pleasure at the visit and admitted that he, along with much of the Indian elite, had a very different impression of Dr. Brzezinski’s attitudes than reality portrays. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: Brzezinski: 1–6/80. Secret. The meeting took place in Brzezinski’s office.
2. Carter’s February 26 letter to Tito addressed how the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had changed the dynamic of détente. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 22, Yugoslavia: President Josip Broz Tito, 6/79–2/80)
3. Telegram 2964 from Moscow, February 22, reported on Brezhnev’s February 22 speech in which he proclaimed that the need for Soviet military aid would cease to exist if the United States and Afghanistan’s neighbors guaranteed the cessation of external interference. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800093–0373)
4. See footnote 1, Document 166.
5. See Document 169.
6. See footnote 7, Document 426.