Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

171. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, February 14, 1980, 1248Z

3236. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subject: Putting Gromyko Visit in Perspective. Ref: New Delhi 3188.²

1. Summary

Joint Indo-Soviet statement (text reftel) confirms that primary result of Gromyko visit was an agreement to disagree about the Soviet troop presence in Afghanistan and the consequences flowing from that presence. Although the two parties failed to find common ground on this issue, neither had seriously anticipated that agreement would be possible. It would be false to conclude at this point that Gromyko’s visit represents a major setback to Indo-Soviet relations or that Mrs. Gandhi now supports Western views of the situation in South Asia. The firmness with which the GOI represented its position, however, is indicative of the tenacity of Mrs. Gandhi, the confidence which her election victory gave her and her determination to avoid involvement in disputes between the super powers. End summary.

2. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s visit to New Delhi ended at 11:00 a.m. February 14, two hours later than originally planned. This delay allowed Gromyko time for a 45-minute call on Mrs. Gandhi. It also permitted the two sides to complete the text of a bland and awkwardly phrased joint statement which makes ample use of boiler plate language and is all but devoid of substance. It bears the earmarks of a Soviet draft but makes no concessions to Soviet priorities on Afghanistan and related issues.

3. No change in positions

Neither party made any headway in changing the established position of the other on Afghanistan. The statement avoids mentioning that country by name and vaguely refers to talks which “reviewed the international situation including the developments in the region and around it.” According to G.K. Reddy, diplomatic correspondent of the Hindu, the original Soviet draft was not acceptable to India since the language on Afghanistan did not include references to inviolability of frontiers and non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations.

4. The only points on which the two sides were able to agree were their determination to develop their relations further, their decision to maintain an exchange of opinions on issues of mutual interest, and their conclusion that the talks had strengthened their mutual understanding.

5. No change in basic relationship

Despite the transparent effort to find a few points of agreement, it would be false to conclude from the joint statement that Indo-Soviet disagreement on Afghanistan portends a falling out between the two countries or even a major change in the relationship which has existed between them since the 1971 treaty. The preservation of that relationship—including economic development projects, arms sales and cultural exchanges—is in the interest of both countries and will be an integral part of their respective foreign policies. Both sides will have an opportunity to demonstrate this fact late next week with the arrival in Delhi of Vice Premier Ivan V. Archipov in his capacity as co-chairman of the Indo-Soviet Joint Commission. The rumored visit of Minister of Defense Dmitry F. Ustinov in March or April will provide another occasion to demonstrate the continuity of the Indo-Soviet relationship. Both parties may search for other occasions in the next two months to show that their relationship remains unchanged.

6. The visit and Mrs. Gandhi

What emerges from this visit is not a cooling of the Indo-Soviet relationship but rather concrete evidence of a confident and tenacious Mrs. Gandhi who has now had an opportunity to show the Soviets and the world that she is to be taken seriously. She is determined to become a force in the international arena while at the same time steering clear of any involvement in super power disputes. Her electoral victory provided her with a mandate, which, she believes, gives her a free hand in formulating both foreign and domestic policy. Since approving (or at least acquiescing in) the January 11 statement by the Indian UN delegate,³ Mrs. Gandhi has quietly backed away from the Soviets, first abstaining in the UN vote⁴ and then issuing the statement in Parliament of January 23⁵ and the Giscard communique several days later.⁶ During this process, she politely declined to be identified with the U.S. position. She has resisted what presumably was strong pressure from the Soviets. This will win for her plaudits from her party (particularly the Sanjay faction) and will be greeted by segments of the opposition as well. It also separates her from both the CPI and CPM, both of which have supported Moscow on Afghanistan.

7. The likelihood that the scenario of the past two days would be the result of the Gromyko visit appears to have been anticipated by the Soviets from the start. The buildup for the visit in the leftist press emphasized the long standing nature of the Indo-Soviet relationship and only secondarily discussed the Afghan situation. Other issues which might have been expected to play a prominent part in Indo-Soviet consultations (economic cooperation, trade, Kampuchea) received virtually no attention at all. Even anti-US propaganda took a backseat to extolling the virtues of the Indo-Soviet relationship.

8. Even though the Soviets recognized this probable outcome, they obviously concluded that the nature of the Indo-Soviet relationship was such that consultations of some sort between the two governments were a sine-qua-non. Gromyko visited Desai almost immediately after the Janata government took over in March of 1977.⁷ To do less upon the return of Mrs. Gandhi to the Prime Ministership would have been peculiar. In addition, the stream of foreign visitors to New Delhi in the post election period to establish contact with Mrs. Gandhi set a pattern which the Soviets had to follow.

9. Similarly on the Indian side there was clear recognition by late January that a common position on Afghanistan was unlikely to result from the Gromyko talks. But the Indians, too, accepted the need for the meetings and made no effort to postpone them or to strike from the agenda the one obversely troublesome subject.

10. The results of the Gromyko visit thus come as no surprise. Both sides will now try to pick up the relationship in less contentious areas. The difference over Afghanistan cannot be forgotten, but neither side is likely to highlight it.

Goheen

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800092–0944, D800079–0716. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Beijing, Bombay, Calcutta, Colombo, Dacca, Kathmandu, London, Paris, Moscow, Madras, Tokyo, CINCPAC, USNATO, Islamabad, and Kabul.
2. Telegram 3188 from New Delhi, February 14, transmitted the text of the Indo-Soviet joint statement, which was signed at the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet talks held in New Delhi February 12–14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800079–0469)
3. See footnote 1, Document 166.
4. See footnote 5, Document 413.
5. Telegram 1578 from New Delhi, January 23, transmitted excerpts from Reddy’s January 23 address to the Indian Parliament regarding foreign policy. Reddy declared that “recent developments in Afghanistan highlight the re-emergence of the Cold War. This is a matter of grave concern. The countries of the region should be allowed to devote their energies to the promotion of regional stability and co-operation with one another. The resources of the region are enormous and should be utilized for the welfare of the people there. To subject these countries to big power rivalries is totally unacceptable to us.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800039–1009)
6. According to telegram 1904 from New Delhi, January 28, the joint Indo-French communiqué, issued on January 27 during Giscard’s 5-day visit to India January 25–30, “declared use of force in international relations and intervention in internal affairs of other countries as ‛inadmissible’” and “called on all states to refrain from actions which could intensify great power rivalry and bring back ‛Cold War.’” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800050–0622)
7. In 1977, Gromyko visited India April 25–27. Telegram 6222 from New Delhi, April 30, 1977, reported on the visit. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770152–0328) He met with Desai on April 27. See footnote 6, Document 66.