Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

163. Memorandum From the Special Representative of the President for Non-Proliferation Matters (Smith) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 2, 1980

SUBJECT

• US-India Nuclear Cooperation

Secretary Vance advised me that you wished to have my views on the Tarapur matter.² I believe the termination of nuclear fuel supply to India would not be in our non-proliferation interest and that it is important to take prompt favorable action on the two pending export applications.

On the first application, in the event that the NRC does not act to issue the license expeditiously, I recommend that you issue an Executive Order authorizing the shipment. On the second application, I believe that the Executive Branch should promptly submit a favorable recommendation to the NRC.

I suggest that Ambassador Goheen be authorized to advise the new Indian Prime Minister that we intend to take these two actions promptly. This should begin relations with the new Indian Government on a positive note, and the fuel shipments would provide a “bridge” of up to two years in which we may work out a longer-term arrangement with India. Failure to meet this supply obligation would not only strain relations with India at a time we face grave problems in the South Asian region, but jeopardize continuation of safeguards at Tarapur and U.S. controls over disposition of the spent fuel. Eklund, the Director General of the IAEA, has advised me that the end of safeguards at Tarapur would have a seriously prejudicial effect on the whole structure of international safeguards.

If the NRC does not act favorably on either application, you can authorize the first shipment by Executive Order (subject to Congressional reversal by concurrent resolution) on the basis that failure to supply would seriously prejudice achievement of U.S. non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security, and the second one on the same basis some months later. I believe the circumstances warrant such a determination. No waiver of the full-scope safeguards requirement of the Non-Proliferation Act would be involved, since the two pending applications come within the “grace period” provided by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.

Some members of Congress may be inclined to try to override this action. To help head off such an effort, at the time we inform the new Indian Government of the decision to move ahead on the two pending applications, we should seek an understanding that there has been no change in India’s nuclear policy.

Beyond the present two Tarapur licenses, I believe the issue of fuel supply to India should continue to be addressed in the context of U.S. non-proliferation policy and objectives.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 1–3/80. Secret. In a January 3 covering memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski concurred with Smith’s views and recommended that Carter continue the nuclear fuel supply to Tarapur. Carter checked and initialed the Approve option on Brzezinski’s memorandum and initialed at the top of the memorandum. (Ibid.)
2. At a December 28, 1979, NSC meeting, Carter withheld his approval of the December 27 PRC recommendation to expedite the shipment of nuclear fuel to India (see Document 161) and requested a memorandum on the subject from Smith. (Minutes of NSC Meeting, December 28, 1979; Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 57, NSC–025, 12/28/79, Iran/Afghanistan, Pakistan) For a portion of the minutes of the NSC meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 107.