162. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1
23794. Subject: India, Afghanistan, Pakistan. Refs: A) State 333360;2 B) New Delhi 23716.3
1. (S) Entire text.
2. Summary. MEA Secretary Gonsalves called me in this morning on two related matters: The Prime Minister’s probable reply to President Carter’s message of 29 December, and GOI concerns about reported US arms aid to Pakistan.4 The GOI, he said, stood on its stated opposition to external interference in any country and had been in touch with the Soviets through diplomatic channels to urge the withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan as well as the avoidance of other actions that might further destabilize the region. He then expressed concern at reported US offer of arms to Pakistan and said GOI hoped US would not turn to military solutions. End summary.
3. Knowing that I would be leaving for Washington tonight, MEA Secretary Gonsalves invited me to meet with him this morning on matters relating to the Afghanistan situation. He said MEA officials would be meeting this afternoon with PM Charan Singh on a reply to President Carter’s message of December 29 requesting a firm public statement against the Soviet takeover in Afghanistan (reftel A). Because the PM’s letter might not be completed before I left, Gonsalves said [Page 426] MEA thought it might be helpful to review its thinking with me now. The GOI, he said, stood on its expressed opposition to the intervention of foreign forces into other countries (reftel B). In addition he wanted me to know that the GOI has made its opposition to the Soviet actions known to the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels and that it intends to continue to press through these channels for the removal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan and Soviet avoidance of any other steps that might add to the instability of the region.
4. Gonsalves then turned to reported US support for Pakistan, highlighted in this morning’s Delhi press. Knowing India’s concerns, he said, the GOI would have appreciated consultation by US prior to our decision to arm Pakistan as reported in the press. The US should recognize, he said the “gut reaction” of Indians on this score. More specifically, he said, the GOI questions the advisability of building up Pakistan militarily for the following reasons: The Pak military forces are already considerably larger than when they had also to defend Bangladesh; the types of armaments we are reported to be offering seem to go beyond Pakistan’s defensive needs vis-a-vis Afghanistan and hence may constitute a threat to India; there is also of course Pakistan’s use of US arms against India on four previous occasions; the Pakistan Government is currently so unstable domestically that giving it further arms could be considered “irresponsible”; and finally, both Pakistan and we should recognize India’s effort to prove a lack of threatening intent toward Pakistan. In sum, he said, the GOI wished to urge US not to seek a military solution to the new situation, alarming as it is, but instead to try every available other means of bringing about a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.
5. In response, I told Gonsalves that I would of course transmit these views to the Department, but speaking for myself I thought the GOI both underestimated the new threat to Pakistan from the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and overestimated the existing capabilities of Pakistan’s armed forces. In addition, I ventured to say that the mild wording of the GOI’s public statement on the Soviet intervention very likely was serving to give heightened importance to the strengthening of Pakistan in the eyes of many people in Washington. If India as the largest regional power and a founder of the NAM would not take a strong stand against the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan, it made almost inevitable that other countries would look to other means of expressing this opposition. In reply (not unjustly I suppose) Gonsalves reminded me of the current absence of an effective Indian Government; “Indian activism under current circumstances”, he said, “is simply out of the question”.
6. N.B. The British High Commissioner in a separate meeting with Additional Secretary Krishna at almost the same time was told that [Page 427] the GOI is pressing the Soviets for a prompt “de-escalation” of their military presence in Afghanistan. This conflicts with and is less than Gonsalves’ statement to me which spoke of a withdrawal of all Soviet troops as the GOI objective. We have no immediate means of reconciling this difference.
7. Department please transmit the above to Kabul and Islamabad and any other posts at your discretion.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–2696. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.↩
- Telegram 333360 to multiple posts, December 28, relayed a Presidential message denouncing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The telegram also included a special message from Carter to be delivered to the Indian Government, which reads: “On many occasions, my country has expressed its respect for India’s policy of non-alignment and its adherence to morality and law in the conduct of foreign relations. India’s traditional policy of opposing external involvement in the region also is well known, and we have respected that policy. I believe that Soviet actions in Afghanistan have struck directly at the principles that India has long cherished, and I am sure that their actions are of as great a concern to you as they are to us.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–1258, N800001–0554, N790010–0486)↩
- Telegram 23716 from New Delhi, December 29, transmitted the following MEA statement that was issued to the Indian press on December 28: “The Government of India has taken note of events in Afghanistan since yesterday and has been kept informed about these by its Mission in Kabul. The Soviet Union has conveyed to the Government of India that at the request of Afghanistan leadership Soviet troops have been sent to Afghanistan to enable it to resist external aggression and interference.” “Consistent with the Government of India’s commitment to the principles of non-alignment, it supports the right of the Afghan people to determine their own destiny free from foreign interference.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800001–0700)↩
- See Documents 395–399.↩