Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula

55. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 15, 1980

SUBJECT

• Near Term Enhancement for Rapid Power Projection (C)

Harold has sent you a memo (Tab C)² recommending the following course of action to significantly enhance, in the near-term, our Middle East/Persian Gulf rapid reaction capability:

—Promptly establish a seven ship prepositioned force afloat in the Indian Ocean composed of two commercially chartered roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships; three Military Sealift Command (MSC) C–4 cargo ships; and, two MSC tankers;

—Direct the Secretary of Commerce to proceed with the acquisition of eight SL–7 container ships. (S)

The cost of acquiring and operating the seven ship prepositioning force over FY 80–82 is approximately $290M. The second part of Harold’s sealift package, the enhancement of our CONUS surge capability, consisting of eight SL–7 container ships and possibly two additional RO/RO ships plus a SEABEE barge ship, could cost an additional $671M in the Defense budget to acquire and operate over the FY 80–82 period. Acquisition costs of the SL–7 and the MARAD differential construction subsidies to current SL–7 owners would total about $585M in the Commerce Department budget. (S)

Funds to operate the first two RO/ROs during FY 80 would be obtained by reprogramming current funds (Congressional authorization required). Harold also contemplates the need for an FY 80 defense supplemental and an FY 81 budget amendment to cover other acquisition and operating costs. (C)

The program Harold recommends has been discussed and approved in principle by the SCC. While several decisions have yet to be made that may significantly impact on SL–7 acquisition costs (e.g., should some or all of the SL–7s be retained as container ships or should they be converted to the RO/RO configuration) I agree with Harold that these issues should not delay the basic decision to enhance our projection force capability. The uncertainties can be resolved in the near-term and should not prevent the Commerce Department from undertaking preliminary discussions with the SL–7 owners. I intend to work closely with OMB, Defense, and Commerce to develop the proper strategy for financing and acquiring the sealift enhancement ships. (C)

I have consulted with OMB on this issue and we are in general agreement on how to proceed. Jim McIntyre will be providing you a separate memo stressing the wider budgetary impact of the several possible courses of action in acquiring and modifying the SL–7 ships. (Tab D)³ (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

—That you sign the memo at Tab A⁴ approving in principle⁵ Harold’s proposal to establish a seven-ship prepositioned force in the Indian Ocean and his leasing of the two Maine-Class RO/ROs;⁶

—That you sign the memo at Tab B⁷ directing the Secretary of Commerce to initiate preliminary discussions⁸ with the owners of the commercial ships currently under consideration by DOD with a view toward acquiring these ships on the most favorable cost basis.⁹ (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 68, Middle East: Security: 2/80. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum is mistakenly dated February 15, 1989.
2. Not attached. The February 12 memorandum from Brown to Carter entitled “Near-Term Enhancement for Rapid Power Projections” is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Shoemaker, Box 124, Rapid Deployment Force [2–10/80].
3. Not attached and not found.
4. Not attached. The February 19 memorandum from Carter to Brown is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 68, Middle East: Security: 2/80. A copy was sent to McIntyre.
5. Carter underlined “in principle” and in the right-hand margin wrote: “only.”
6. Carter approved the recommendation.
7. Not attached. The February 19 memorandum to Secretary of Commerce Klutznick is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 68, Middle East: Security: 2/80. A copy was sent to McIntyre.
8. Carter underlined “preliminary discussions” and in the right-hand margin wrote: “only.”
9. Carter approved the recommendation and in the margin below it wrote: “Be cautious—I need SCC & OMB assessment of need & cost. Can total cost be borne by reprogramming? J.”