(S) This complements the earlier memorandum on Saudi Arabian oil
facilities.2 It addresses the
need for an overall strategy for the Persian Gulf region, and provides
some specific proposals in that regard.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Office of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy3
Washington, January 18, 1979
THE MIDDLE EAST/PERSIAN GULF: Updating National
Policy
FOREWORD
The security of the Persian Gulf and continued Free World access to
the region’s petroleum resources are of vital interest to the United
States. Particularly in light of recent events in Iran, the Horn of
Africa, and the PDRY, there is a
critical need for the development of a US national policy for the entire region. Such a policy
should provide the necessary framework for the coordinated
implementation of various diplomatic, economic, and military
initiatives.
Several factors warrant consideration during policy formulation.
These include the critical strategic importance of the region’s
petroleum resources, the US
commitment to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the
significant impact of recent Soviet gains throughout the area.
Although policy objectives delineating vital US interests should focus on the expanding overt Soviet
threat, US initiatives to counter
lower levels of conflict should also be included. Initiatives in
these areas will in turn deter larger scale confrontations as it is
considerably more difficult to dislodge an established influence
base than to deter initial entry.
A review of the current regional situation indicates that the two
contingencies considered the most likely in the near term are
these:
- —Attack by the PDRY, with
Cuban assistance, on the YAR
and/or Oman.
- —Incursions by Iraq on Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
While efforts to enhance the capabilities of Saudi security forces
are ongoing, existing security arrangements to protect the oil
fields are minimal at best. (It should be noted, however, that the
Saudis have been especially sensitive to any US overtures to assist in oil field security in the
past).
[Page 35]
With regard to the two contingencies cited, incursions by Iraq would
have an immediate and direct impact on the US unless Saudi Arabia is provided significant outside
military assistance. In the PDRY
case, Saudi Arabia would be drawn into the conflict which in turn
would threaten US interests. By
assisting the Saudis with the PDRY
problem, the US would serve its own
best interests which include the need for stability in the
region.
The formulation of a comprehensive national policy that signals
heightened US concern and the desire
to expand our role in Persian Gulf security should begin with a
major policy statement by the President. Such a statement, preceded
by consultation with key congressional leaders and set in the
context of recent events in Iran,4 would
establish the overall framework for the new approach and could have
a significant impact on both the Soviet Union and the Middle East.
The statement would also provide a useful backdrop for the
forthcoming trip to the area by the Secretary of Defense.
An expanded discussion of specific military initiatives that should
be coordinated with selected diplomatic and economic efforts
commences on page 13.
The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are prepared
to assist in further policy development and initiative
implementation as appropriate.
[Omitted here is the table of contents, the 15-page paper, and Tabs
A–H.]
