Office of the Historian

180. Memorandum From James Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, January 16, 1980

SUBJECT

  • Morocco Arms Package: F–5 Replacements (C)

With the formal notification date hard upon us for the Morocco arms package,2 I flag a late (and on balance beneficial) development which I need your guidance on. It concerns the quantity of F–5 aircraft we want to include in the package. (C)

You will recall that 8 F–5s was the number we settled on prior to Christopher’s mission to Morocco,3 since this represented needed replacements for what the Moroccans had already lost. In our inter-agency proceedings since then that number tended to assume a magical character; there are now, however, persuasive technical, financial, and political reasons which make it advisable in my judgment to adjust that total upward to 20: (C)

—Technical. The Moroccans have F–5s in the earlier A and B models, which Northrop no longer makes. Replacements in whatever quantity would be from newer E and F models, and the Air Force has convinced me (and State) that a mixture of systems would be operationally very bad, especially from a maintenance support standpoint. (C)

—Financial. The Saudis are willing to finance a total F–5 replacement program of 20 aircraft (making a full squadron); however, given their emphasis on urgent supply, State does not believe that Saudi financing will be available in two or more tranches (in other words, if we limited ourselves to 8 now, we have no assurance that we could secure financing for more at a later date, whereas they agree to underwrite all 20 right now). (C)

—Political. There are indications that the Moroccans may not wish to take any F–5s if they are held to a complicated mixed-system set- [Page 436] up; if that happens, the overall size of the package would be very modest (a difference roughly between $250 million and $73 million); and while the two situations are not organically related (and should not be), I am concerned how an overly modest arms package—our first in 1980—will play in terms of the public post-Afghanistan stance we want to project. (C)

There are two major question-marks connected with an upward adjustment, and both have been answered to my satisfaction:

—Congressional Support. State’s own legislative people—are you ready for this?—are confident that Congress will go along with it. Solarz and McGovern will bitch, but they will do so in any event, and regardless of the initial package’s composition. State also feels that it is much better to go in for a total now, rather than coming back with an additional request when and if we think circumstances warrant. (C)

—Conditionality. The experts in both DOD and State assure me that we can retain full control over the pace of delivery and that if Hassan has not been sufficiently forthcoming on the political negotiation track, we will preserve enough flexibility in the mechanics of the supply to slow it down, or suspend it altogether. (C)

Hal Saunders & Company favor the upward adjustment, which does not violate the President’s decision in any way (no specific number was ever cited in the decision memo,4 and all 20 aircraft would technically be “replacements” since Morocco would agree to remove their older F–5 models—which I understand are in pretty sorry shape in any event). I would like to tell Hal that we support this too, which will undoubtedly determine Christopher’s position. (Defense strongly favors the 20 in light of the factors outlined above).

Madeleine Albright and Bob Kimmitt concur.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you authorize me to inform State that we support the inclusion of 20 F–5s in the package, provided they foresee no serious Congressional problem and that we retain full control over the pacing of supply.5 (C)

2. If you approve the 20, I think it would also be useful for Madeleine to call Stone and help set the stage.6

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 56, Morocco: 9/79–1/81. Confidential. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “DA has seen.”↩
  2. In a January 3 note for the file, Rentschler wrote: “Formal Congressional notification to occur as soon as Congress reconvenes, now scheduled for January 22. Arms sales package will be ready in case Congress reconvenes earlier than the scheduled date.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 33, Morocco: 1980)↩
  3. See Document 248.↩
  4. See Document 49.↩
  5. An unknown hand checked the “OK to go for 20” option. See Document 182.↩
  6. An unknown hand checked the Yes option.↩