Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

57. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Bowdler) and the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Affairs (McCall) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom)¹

Washington, October 28, 1980

SUBJECT

• UN Vote on Belize

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Should the US abstain in the UNGA this fall as we have in the past, or vote for a British-supported resolution reaffirming the right of the people of Belize to self-determination, independence and territorial integrity and setting a late 1981 deadline for Belizean independence? If we do decide to vote in favor, should we seek modifications of the resolution to make it marginally more palatable to Guatemala, thereby attenuating the damage a switch in our position might cause to our already limited ability to influence the GOG in the negotiations and to improve human rights?

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

Since 1975, the US has abstained on the annual UN resolutions on Belize. The British informed us last April that they had decided to energetically pursue negotiations this year to achieve a negotiated settlement, but that with or without Guatemala’s agreement Belize would be granted independence in 12–18 months. Since then several rounds of negotiations have failed to produce agreement although progress has been made. The British have told the Guatemalans that all issues except cession of land and delay in Belizean independence beyond the end of 1981 are negotiable. The British have told us that the Guatemalans now accept those realities, although the Guatemalans for domestic political reasons cannot formally accept a Belizean independence agreement not involving a cession of territory. The British have informed the Guatemalans that the process of granting independence to Belize will begin in December and culminate prior to the end of 1981; meanwhile the two sides will continue negotiations. When you mentioned to Castillo that we would be reassessing our position on the Belize resolution this year, he made no effort to dissuade you. The British have reported that the Guatemalans have foresworn use of military force in the event of unilateral action by the British to grant Belizean independence.

The draft resolution (Tab 2)² circulating this year does not contain inflamatory rhetoric and is similar in substance to that adopted by the General Assembly in past years, but has a new provision which calls for Belizean independence with its territory intact before the conclusion of the 36th General Assembly (i.e., by late 1981). The Fourth Committee vote on the resolution could come as early as October 30. Last year’s vote was 134 in favor, none opposed (Guatemala did not vote), and 8 abstentions (US, Chile, El Salvador, Israel, Morocco, Paraguay, Spain and Uruguay.)

The British privately played an important role in shaping this year’s draft and will co-sponsor it along with a large number of Caribbean and other states. In the eyes of others our abstention is interpreted as a vote against Belizean self-determination and in favor of Guatemala.

THE OPTIONS

1. Continue to Abstain

The following arguments can be made in favor of an abstention:

—A vote for the resolution could be viewed by the Guatemalan Government as another hostile act. It would undermine our efforts to reduce Guatemalan paranoia about our intentions and to reestablish a dialogue, aimed at persuading the GOG to improve its human rights performance and carry through on political and socio-economic reforms.

—A yes vote coming on the heels of the GOG’s grant of agreement for Ambassador Landau after several months delay might be considered by the Guatemalans to be an unfitting response to their action.

—An abstention might increase our ability to influence post-UNGA Guatemalan behavior toward Belize.

—Our preference on Belize should be a negotiated settlement. While the British argue that a US vote in favor of the UN resolution would help persuade the Guatemalans to accept a settlement, the effect on the paranoid Guatemalans could be exactly the opposite. A favorable US vote could also encourage Belizean intransigence, thereby undermining the possibility of a negotiated settlement.

—A Belize which obtains independence without a prior settlement of Guatemalan claims could prove a source of continual friction in a region already beset by turmoil. Even though the Guatemalans have pledged privately to the British not to use force over Belize and the British have agreed to maintain a garrison in Belize after independence, their security guarantee cannot be open-ended. Moreover, we cannot rule out the possibility that sooner or later some hotheads in the Guatemalan Army might take action.

—For years the Guatemalan Army has cited as its major raison d’etre its obligation to assert the Guatemalan sovereignty over Belize proclaimed in the Guatemalan constitution. The failure of the Guatemalan Government to respond militarily to unilateral Belizean independence could subject the Army to domestic ridicule and undermine its morale at a time when it must face a serious challenge from domestic Marxist guerrilla groups.

—The British have told us that the Guatemalans have made a good faith effort to negotiate a settlement during this year’s round of talks, which is noteworthy given Guatemala’s domestic political constraints on Belize. We should not “reward” Guatemalan flexibility at the negotiating table with what could be regarded by them as a slap in the face.

—International criticism for our failure to side with the principle of self-determination might be countered by the argument that our abstention is merely aimed at preserving our future ability to facilitate a negotiated settlement.

2. Vote in Favor

Shift our position to support this year’s draft resolution on Belize which affirms the right of the people of Belize to self-determination, independence, and territorial integrity and declares that Belize should become an independent state by the conclusion of the 36th UNGA.

The following arguments support a “yes” vote:

—The resolution is moderate and responsible. The British have insured that it contains no language abusive to Guatemala.

—The British are determined to give Belize independence by late next year with or without a prior settlement with Guatemala.

—The Belizeans have interpreted our abstention on past UN resolutions on Belize as a vote for Guatemala and have told us that this year’s UN vote will offer the last opportunity for the US to demonstrate where it stands on the question of Belizean independence. Our stand on this year’s resolution could set the tone for our future relations with an independent Belize.

—The British have asked us to vote for the resolution and argue that our support might help nudge the Guatemalans into accepting a negotiated settlement.

—Fears that a vote for the resolution might damage our relations with Guatemala are overdrawn. Our current relations are already so poor that little more could be done to undercut them.

—The Guatemalans already may have resigned themselves to a US vote against them on Belize. Following last year’s UNGA vote, we informed the Guatemalans that we had abstained only for the purpose of encouraging a negotiated settlement; but that our growing isolation on this issue, combined with our commitment to the concept of self-determination, made our abstention increasingly difficult to maintain.

—A major Guatemalan problem with the draft resolution appears to be its imposition of a late 1981 deadline for Belizean independence. For domestic political reasons connected with the 1982 Guatemalan presidential elections, they have requested the British to delay independence until March 1982. The British have urged us not to seek any changes in this date.

—A US decision to abstain would associate us in the eyes of the Caribbean, some Latin nations and in Europe with a Guatemalan military government that is perceived as repressive, non-reformist and anti-democratic. This could undermine our efforts to convince the world of the genuineness of our commitment to support peaceful change, reforms and democratic governments in the region.

—A US decision to abstain would be perceived in the international community as yet another US waffle on the basic issue of self-determination. We should finally join the world on this issue.

Recommended Position

ARA, IO, HA and EUR all recommend that we vote in favor of the resolution. USUN concurs.

The major drawback to a “yes” vote is the potential impact on Guatemala. To help limit any damage to our present and future bilateral relationship that our switch in vote might entail, we would plan to seek modifications in the resolution to make it more palatable to Guatemala. The desire of the Belizeans to obtain US support on the resolution may be sufficiently strong that they would be willing to ask their supporters to go along with some minor changes in the resolution, provided the provisions dealing with the independence deadline and rights of the Belizean people were not altered. Such changes might commend the good faith efforts of all the parties to the dispute to seek a negotiated solution—which would be an indirect praise of Guatemala. It might also call on Guatemala and Belize to work out arrangements for post-independence cooperation on items of mutual concern and call for member states to endorse and support whatever arrangements were agreed upon. This would be a tacit recognition of special Guatemalan interests in Belize. We would consult with the Guatemalans regarding our effort to seek changes, as we take this up with the British. Whether or not our modifications were accepted, our attempts to have them incorporated would signal to the Guatemalans that our vote in favor of the resolution did not reflect a US decision to punish them, and would demonstrate our continued sensitivity to their concerns. We would also make a statement reflecting sensitivity to Guatemalan concerns.

Recommendations:

That we vote for the British supported resolution on Belize, and that the rationale for the vote be outlined publicly in a routine statement explaining our vote.³

Additionally, that we seek modifications in the resolution to make it more palatable to Guatemala, and send the cable at Tab 1⁴ providing instructions to USUN and Embassy Guatemala.⁵

Alternatively, we could abstain.⁶

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890015–0402. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Mack and Blacken on October 27; cleared in L/ARA, HA, EUR/NE, and IO/UNP. An unknown hand initialed the memorandum on McCall’s behalf.
2. Tab 2, attached but not printed, is telegram 4386 from USUN, October 19, in which the delegation described a “working paper of a UNGA resolution on Belize” that resolved: “Belize should be independent ‛before the conclusion of the 36th General Assembly.’” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890015–0410)
3. On October 29, Newsom indicated his approval.
4. Tab 1, attached but not printed, is telegram 289390 to multiple posts, October 30, noting that after a “thorough review” of policy on the UN vote the Department “decided to vote in favor of the resolution on Belize in the UN this year.” The Department instructed the Mission to inform the Guatemalan Mission of the decision. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890015–0409)
5. On October 29, Newsom indicated his approval.
6. On October 29, Newsom indicated his disapproval. An unknown hand wrote at the bottom of the page: “Instruction cable sent out, per Mr. Newsom’s instructions on 10/29. ARA informed.” The United States voted in favor of the November 11 UNGA Resolution on the “Question of Belize.” (Question of Belize, A/RES/35/20, adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 11, 1980)